THE REVIEW OF RELIGION

Volume IX JANUARY, 1945 Number 2

EDITOR
Horace L. Friess

MANAGING EDITOR
Marguerite Block

EDITORIAL BOARD

Roland H. Bainton
Stephen S. Bayne, Jr.
Ruth F. Benedict
W. Norman Brown
Eugene H. Byrne
Louis H. Gray
Evarts B. Greene
William E. Hocking
Arthur Jeffery
Raymond C. Knox
John T. McNeill
Clarence A. Manning
Ralph Marcus
Cyril C. Richardson
David E. Roberts
Herbert W. Schneider
Ryusaku Tsunoda

The Review of Religion is published bi-monthly during the eight months of the academic year (November, January, March and May). Subscriptions: $2.00 a year (foreign, $2.30); single copies 60 cents (foreign, 70 cents). All subscriptions and business matters should be addressed to the publisher, Columbia University Press, 2960 Broadway, New York City. Manuscripts, editorial communications and books for review should be addressed to the Editorial Office, 401 Low Memorial Library, Columbia University, New York City.

The articles in *The Review of Religion* are indexed in the *International Index to Periodicals*, New York City.

COPYRIGHT 1945 BY COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS

ARTICLES

The Two-Fold Truth Theory in Melanchthon . QUIRINUS BREEN 115

James Bissett Pratt's Philosophy of Religion . T. HAYES PROCTOR 137

Prayer . . . . . ABRAHAM HESCHEL 153

BOOK REVIEWS

Tsui Chi, tr.: *Mo Ni Hsia Pu Tsan: The Lower (Second?) Section of the Manichaean Hymn* . . . . . (ARTHUR JEFFERY) 169

Ismar Ellbogen: *A Century of Jewish Life* . (LUITPOLD WALLACH) 177

Philip S. Moore and Marthe Dulong, eds.: *Sententiae Petri Pictavensis*, I . . . . . (ANTON C. PEGIS) 181

Kenneth Scott Latourette: *The Great Century in Northern Africa and Asia, A.D. 1800-A.D. 1914* . . (ROBERT HASTINGS NICHOLS) 184

Arthur Huff Fauset: *Black Gods of the Metropolis* . . . . . (MELVILLE J. HERSKOVITS) 186

R. M. MacIver, ed.: *Group Relations and Group Antagonisms* . . . . . (ROBERT D. KOHN) 189

Arnold S. Nash: *The University and the Modern World* . . .

Norman Foerster, ed.: *The Humanities after the War* . . . .
. . . . . (James Gutmann) 191

Nicolas Berdyaev: *Slavery and Freedom* (Clarence A. Manning) 196

Gerald Heard: *A Preface to Prayer* . . (Herbert W. Schneider) 198

Paul Brunton: *The Wisdom of the Overself* . . . . . .
. . . . . (Frederic Spiegelberg) 204

Book Notes 207

Samuel Rosenblatt: *The People of the Book.* Walter Lowrie: *The Short Story of Jesus.* Clarence T. Craig: *The Beginning of Christianity.* Joseph C. Plumpe: *Mater Ecclesia.* James Moffatt: *The Thrill of Tradition.* Emily A. Babcock and A. C. Krey, trs.: *A History of Things Done Beyond the Sea by William Archbishop of Tyre.* Henry H. Adams: *English Domestic or Homiletic Tragedy.* Eugene W. Lyman: *Religion and the Issues of Life.* Carl B. Hyatt: *The Gateway to Citizenship. Philosophy in Postwar Reconstruction* (A.M.C.P.A.) Proceedings. Walter R. Bowie: *Which Way Ahead?* Ralph W. Sockman: *Date with Destiny.* Ben-Ami Scharfstein: *The Five Books of Moses.* John Webster Spargo: *Juridical Folklore in England, Illustrated by the Cucking-Stool.* Florence L. Ives: *The Voice in the Wilderness.*

Among the Periodicals 219

THE TWO-FOLD TRUTH THEORY IN MELANCHTHON*

QUIRINUS BREEN

Associate Professor of History, University of Oregon

I

THE OPINION has frequently been expressed that the Protestant Reformers were influenced by the two-fold truth theory[1] to the extent that it has left in Protestantism a deposit of dualism which makes it difficult to make a proper definition of the relation between religion and culture. It is often charged that Protestantism did not provide an effective check for the strengthening force of the secularism of the Renaissance, that, indeed, it encouraged its growth by severing the connection between sacred and profane, the celestial and the terrestrial. This subject is and, perhaps for a long time to come, will be debated. This study of Melanchthon's thought is presented in the hope that it may at least help to define terms.

Though less notice has been taken of Philip Melanchthon (1497-1560) than of either Luther or Calvin, there are good reasons for choosing his utterances as the object of our investigation. First, Melanchthon was both deeply religious and also throughout his life professionally a humanist. His connection with Luther, whose confidence he enjoyed, is well-known, which alone would suggest that his interest in religion was unfeigned. We may add that Melanchthon was the author of the famous *Loci Communes* and the still more celebrated *Augsburg Confession* (its early versions) whose religious glow has warmed myriads. On the other hand, his love of the classical literature, particularly the Greek, amounted to a burning passion. His humanistic roots strike even deeper than Calvin's. His granduncle, John Reuchlin, Europe's foremost expert in Hebrew, was long his adviser as a student. In his recommendation of Melanchthon for the chair of Greek at Wittenberg, Reuchlin said that

* Grateful acknowledgment is herewith made by the author to Dr. Roland H. Bainton for helpful criticism and suggestions.

1. Also known as the theory of double truth and *duplex veritas*. It proposes that "something may be true theologically which may not be true philosophically, and *vice versa*." Windelband, *History of Philosophy* (New York, 1919), pp. 320 ff.

only Erasmus could match him for competence in that language.[2] Though he was on the same faculty with Luther, he had not come with the purpose of collaborating with him *qua* reformer. He came as professor of Greek. In the course of time he became more and more involved in theological labors, but so mightily did the classics attract him that he is known to have begged the privilege of giving more of his time to them.[3] A substantial part of his works is taken up with introductions, commentaries, and orations relative to the classics.[4] From Melanchthon, with his authentic interest in both religion and culture, we may therefore look for a suggestive discussion of the relation between them. Moreover, Melanchthon rather continuously lives up to his reputation of moderation in statement. He studies to avoid extremes, so, while he is loyal to the fundamental dualism of the Reformation, he exhibits it in the most favorable possible light by leaving out of his discussions much of his century's heat of passion.

A study of Melanchthon's view of this question is also important because he had proposed a solution which is generally associated with the thought of John Calvin.[5] Certain it is that, when Calvin's *Institutes* appeared, Melanchthon had already been developing his view for several years. The alumni of Wittenberg University had given it general currency. Calvin's conversion had definitely been a conversion to Luther's formula of justification by faith alone,[6] which, as we shall see, broaches the problem of the relation of Christianity and culture. Wherever Lutheranism came Melanchthon's writings followed. Of the importance

2. *Corpus Reformatorum*, I, p. cxlvii. He was at Tübingen when called to Wittenberg. On November 1, 1524 he wrote, "Eram (Tübingae) in ea schola versatus, ubi capitale erat, attingere melius litteras." Our main source will be *Corpus Reformatorum*, hereafter referred to as *C.R.* Melanchthon's works are contained in volumes I-XXVIII, edited by Brettschneider and Bindseil (Halis Saxonum, 1834-44).

3. *C.R.*, I, cliv, clvi, for Luther's complaints about this in 1524, again in 1526.

4. Q.v., *C.R.*, esp. vols. XVI-XIX.

5. Calvin's theory is known as that of Common Grace vs. Special (Saving) Grace. There is a vast literature on this. We name J. H. Scholten, *De Leer der Hervormde Kerk*, 2 vols. (Leiden, 1861); Abraham Kuyper, *De Gemeene Gratie*, 3 vols. (Kampen, 1902-5); H. Bavinck, *The Philosophy of Revelation* (New York, 1909) and *Gereformeerde Dogmatick*, 4 vols., esp. vol. 1 (Kampen, 1928-30).

6. Calvin's conversion was certainly not a conversion to Christianity, for he had been a Christian before. It consisted in accepting a more or less systematic elaboration of Luther's formula. In his theology he diverges in several respects from Luther, particularly in his view of the Church, but the basic formula remains largely the same.

of this question Calvin, with his humanism, could not be unaware, and it is natural that Melanchthon's thinking should influence him. In any case, the identity is so striking that it argues for a measure of dependence of the younger man on the elder.[7]

Finally, Melanchthon directly and indirectly influenced Protestant educational systems. For his native land this is reflected in his appelation of "Preceptor of Germany." Since his thinking affected the curriculum of almost all Protestant education, a knowledge of his thought may suggest an approach to understanding the peculiar character of Protestant learning.

II

So that we may better comprehend the idea of the double truth we will give a brief history of it. Jean de Brescain, a professor at the University of Paris in 1247, is the first to have been disciplined for saying one thing and meaning another. This implied a *duplex veritas* but was not explicit. The case of certain students in the College of Arts in 1277 is clearer, and they were disciplined by Bishop Etienne Tempier for incautious language (*locutio incauta*). Of the 219 propositions, the following are representative:[8]

> God is not triune, for a trinity is inconsistent with the highest unity.
> Nothing is eternal as to its end which is not also eternal as to its principle.
> There was no first man, and there will be no last man.

7. Calvin sharpened Melanchthon's view by addition. The fact that Calvin's view is essentially the same as Melanchthon's is important, for it must not be taken for granted that Calvin would have adopted this view anyhow, even if Melanchthon had not so vigorously preached it. Men of vast learning have spurned the arts under the influence of deep convictions. Had Calvin not believed that he had found a thoroughly religious reason for defending the arts, he would undoubtedly have cast them aside.

8. The source is Charles du Plessis d'Argentré, *Collectio judiciorum de novis erroribus* (Paris 1728), pp. 158, 175-84. Our material follows mainly that given by M. Maywald, *Die Lehre von der Zweifachen Wahrheit* (Berlin, 1868); W. Betzendörfer, *Die Lehre von der Zweifachen Wahrheit bei Petrus Pomponatius* (Tübingen, 1918).

It appears that the students were censured for spreading their theses as propaganda, outside of the classes in philosophy (studentes . . . propriae facultatis limites excedentes). Maywald (*op. cit.*, pp. 13 f.) is mistaken in his view that the Bishop was being "gulled" by the students and therefore disciplined them for *locutio incauta* only. It argues, rather, that the Bishop's policy was to leave the classroom of philosophy free. Incidentally, Bishop Tempier condemned the "innovations" of Thomas Aquinas (*Catholic Encyclopaedia*, VI, 626).

A future resurrection cannot be acceptable to philosophers, since it is impossible to base it on reason.

Ecstasy and visions happen in accordance with nature.

As to the number of intellects, there is only one for all (men).

The world is eternal.

The natural philosopher must deny the creation of the world, for he must rest his case on natural grounds. The believer, however, can deny the eternity of the world, whereas he rests his case on supernatural grounds.

The soul is inseparable from the body, and with the destruction of the harmony of the body that of the soul is also destroyed.

A man should not be satisfied with Authority in order to attain to any certainty about a question.

The *sermones* of theologians are founded on fables.

There is no addition to knowledge on account of the knowledge of theology.

Only the philosophers are the wise in the world.

There are fables and false things in the Christian teaching as well as in others.

The proponents of these theses, when confronted with their errors, made the defense that the authorities were wrong in supposing that they themselves believed them. Their propositions, said they, "are true according to philosophy, but not according to the Catholic faith".[9]

The majority of these theses derive from the Moslem philosopher Averroes,[10] particularly those pertaining to the intellect, soul, creation, resurrection, authority, and the philosopher's monopoly of wisdom. Doctrines of immortality, the divine origin of man, miracles, prayer, veneration of relics, and the like were considered fit only for the masses, and were to be disseminated to promote good order and the general welfare of society. By 1276 such ideas had been spread for nearly a century; they were the subject of lively debate among students.[11] Averroism continued, particularly in Italy, throughout the fourteenth to the seven-

9. "Dicunt enim, ea vera esse, secundum Philosophiam; sed non secundum fidem Catholicam."

10. Averroes was considered the Moslem commentator on Aristotle *par excellence*; cf. E. Renan, *Averroes et l'Averroïsme*, huitième edit. (Paris, 1925), Part I, chap. II, also pp. 267 ff.; and for Renan's account of Averroism in the University of Padua see Part II, chap. III.

11. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles*, discusses "those who profess themselves Christians, who say that there is but one intellect (for all), and those who say that reason constrains them to say that all intellects are one, that nevertheless they firmly hold the opposite by faith." Cf. K. Heim, *Zur Geschichte des Satzes von der doppelten Wahrheit* (Tübingen, 1918), pp. 3 ff. for thirteenth century controversy on the matter. St. Thomas also wrote *Contra Averroistas*.

teenth century. Its stronghold was the University of Padua, and its major prophet was Pietro Pomponazzi (d. 1525). The latter was very popular as a professor; among his pupils had been men like Jovius (his biographer), Cardinal Ercole Gonzaga, Julius Caesar Scaliger. It was widely held a mark of culture to hold views like his. Attempts to have the Inquisition convict him of heresy were frustrated at the papal court itself, although in the Eighth Session of the Fifth Lateran Council (December, 1512) a strong prohibition had been issued against the teaching of the mortality of the individual soul, of the over-all unity of all intellects, and of the idea of the two-fold truth.[12]

Alongside the Averroist development of the *duplex veritas* runs another, which agrees in certain respects with Averroism but is spiritually alien to it. In patristic times its parallel was Neoplatonism which contrasts strongly with Averroism. The latter attempted to find God by thought only; the former sought absorption in God by intense spiritual effort through thinking, willing, and feeling. Mediated by St. Augustine, Neoplatonism gave to Christian reflection mystical warmth and a profound sense of certainty of the Christian faith. To St. Augustine we owe the great idea of a speculative mediation between reason and faith, but Harnack's view is generally accepted that Augustine was not clear on the relation between reason and faith.[13] When St. Anselm gives a dialectical defense of the idea of God, the Trinity, and the Incarnation, he does so without any apprehension. This was possible in the view of realism.[14] While his method is dialectical, Anselm's commitment to the objects to be proved is mystical: *Credo ut intelligam.* Thus there was to him no contradiction between faith and knowledge.[15] The twelfth century influx of translations of Aristotle, particularly the *Analytica posteriora,* provided a better framework for stating the question. About A.D. 1200 Simon de Tournai stated it thus: Whether faith and knowledge relative to the same (object) can co-exist in the same man ("Utrum fides et scientia simul in eodem de eodem esse possit.") That is, can a

12. W. Betzendörfer, *op. cit.,* pp. 10-15.

13. P. Hugo Lang, *Die Lehre des H. Thomas von Aquin von der Gewissheit des übernatürlichen Glaubens* (Augsburg, 1929), p. 2; Karl Heim, *Das Gewissheitsproblem in der Systematischen Theologie bis zu Schleiermacher* (Leipzig, 1911), p. 5.

14. Realism is "the concept of a reality which can exist in a plurality of particulars without its being split or vanishing in a mere mental image." K. Heim, *Zur Geschichte des Satzes von der doppelten Wahrheit* (Tübingen, 1918), p. 11.

15. Lang (*op. cit.,* p. 3) finds that Anselm too was not clear on the relation.

man have both scientifically tested knowledge and faith at the same time about the self-same object? Prevailingly the question was answered affirmatively (Alexander of Hales, Bonaventura, *et al.*) but generally with the qualification that knowledge from science is of less worth than knowledge from faith. The answer of Thomas Aquinas was negative: By definition faith excludes reason, and reason faith. Christ's disciple Thomas "saw" the wounds, but he "believed" God. Faith may be followed by knowledge concerning the same object so as to increase one's appreciation of faith. Only at the zenith of mystical ecstasy are reason and faith ever united. Thus philosophy stands on its own feet, and never is theology, nor is theology ever philosophy, even when they both deal with the same object. But there is interdependence: Cognition by faith presupposes natural cognition. Grace perfects nature.[16] Theoretically, sometimes actually, man may attain naturally to the knowledge of God which makes men *par excellence* perfect and good, but actually and historically this is almost never attained except by revelation.[17]

The solution of Thomas for the relationship between reason and faith struck men as novel. Most of his contemporaries opposed it, particularly the Franciscans, who affected loyalty to the Platonic tradition as filtered through the mind of St. Augustine. This was that theological intuition is an axiomatic, effective illumination concerning the one true good, that reason might prepare the ground for this, but that the ground of theological insight is the content of the one true good itself. That Thomas himself had not denied this apparently made no difference. Thomas was charged with holding two approaches to *unum verum bonum,* which seemed improper to men accustomed to only one approach to it.

16. Lang, *op. cit.,* pp. 5-18. See note 2, p. 15 for Seeberg's remark: "Thomas hat sich den Geist des Aristotels wirklich angeeignet, während seine Vorgänge aristotelishe Formeln akzeptiert haben." This appreciation of knowledge got by reason is something real, an inescapable fact, something to be considered so important as to be a correlative of knowledge got by faith,—that is for our present purpose the contribution of St. Thomas. It is as significant as Aristotle's recognition of matter. Though he says it never exists without form, yet it must be considered as something that can be logically distinguished from form. This was an advance over Plato, to whom it was not altogether clear what is the status of matter.

17. *Summa contra Gentiles,* lib. I, cap. 4: Remaneret igitur humanum genus, si sola rationis via ad Deum cognoscendum pateret, in maximis ignorantiae tenebris; quum Dei cognitio, quae homines maxime perfectos et bonos facit, nonnisi quibusdam paucis, et his paucis etiam post temporis longitudinem, proveniret."

The attack on Thomas followed the lines of Averroism, namely, that philosophy or reason cannot arrive at any form of certainty about the truths of Christianity. The discussion often narrowed down to realism vs. nominalism or terminism. Thomas had held with realism that general concepts may be substantively real. Ockham held that man knows nothing outside of particulars to be real. The mind of man can therefore not know the being of God. Faith has no relevance to reason, and is held only on the ground of ecclesiastical authority. It has been asserted that the realism of Anselm had to issue necessarily in the nominalism of Ockham. In fact, Thomas himself is said to have faltered in his realism so as to be an easy conquest for Ockham.[18] However that may be, Ockham's conclusion was considered a confirmation of the double truth theory. For many pious folk it was an added reason for more zealous loyalty to ecclesiastical authority as to matters of faith and tended to increase their suspicion of philosophy and science. The "Christian" Averroists tended to promote the interests of science and philosophy, while becoming more and more cynical about the Church.

III

During the first decades of the Reformation era the climate of opinion was, then, favorable to some form of the double truth theory. Since our purpose is to define its influence on Melanchthon we may dismiss the Averroists of Padua and their use of the *duplex veritas,* which would have no appeal at all for the German Reformers. Our discussion rather should concern itself with the Ockhamist emphasis, to which Luther is

18. K. Heim, *Zur Geschichte des Satzes,* pp. 12, 14 f. It seems that Heim has underestimated the motives which led Thomas to a spiritual acceptance of Aristotelianism. Ockham's argument certainly did not dispose of the natural knowledge of God, written large in the experience and literature of mankind. Thomas's acceptance of the latter as correlative to revelation is tantamount to his sharing the experience of mankind actually and historically. In that sense he differs from his predecessors, and as E. Gilson says: "By this token St. Thomas, together with his master Albertus Magnus, is the first and not the least of modern philosophers" (Lang, *op. cit.,* p. 15).

Ockham's work was carried forward among others by Gabriel Biel (1430-1495), who transcribed copious verbal excerpts from his master's commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard (K. v. Prantl, *Geschichte der Logik,* IV (Leipzig, 1870), 231 f.). It is these excerpts which Luther knew "by heart." Luther was also indebted to Pierre d'Ailly.

A brief and reliable account of St. Thomas's war with Averroism is given in J. T. McNeill, *Makers of Christianity, from Alfred the Great to Schleiermacher* (New York, 1935), pp. 125 ff.

said to have been favorable. Since Luther's thinking pervaded so much of Melanchthon's, something should be said about the founder of Protestantism.

Luther's training at Erfurt left on his mind a deep impression. It was here that all the Masters of Arts were Ockhamists and Luther came to regard Ockham as his master.[19] For our present purpose it is not necessary to enter the debate that has been carried on about Ockham's influence on Luther. It is enough to point out that the razor-minded Franciscan broke down whatever confidence he may have had that philosophy can know anything with certainty about the one true good. The following statements of Luther are typical:

A philosopher has only the words of human wisdom which certainly do not agree with the gospel.[20]

When philosophers appear to speak like Christians, it is mere blasphemy, for they do not know that God sent his Son for salvation from sin.[21]

The philosophers have attempted by reason to understand the nature and method of divine governance, which has nothing in common with reason.[22]

In places Luther appears to condemn reason as such:

Reason and our natural light is nothing else than blindness and darkness.[23]

Reason does not know that . . . hating one's enemy is sin, but thinks that it suffices to engage in outward works only.[24]

In all the articles of Faith one must relinquish reason, from it we should derive no knowledge (as to the faith); and we should put it to death; otherwise one cannot enter the kingdom of heaven.[25]

19. See J. Mackinnon, *Luther and the Reformation* (New York, 1925), I, 20 ff.; H. Grisar, *Luther* (London, 1913) I, 84-86, 130-65, with copious references to his works.

20. *Dr. M. Luthers Sämmtliche Schriften*, J. G. Walsch, ed., XXII, 1932.

21. *Ibid.*, I, 484 f.

22. *Ibid.*, VI, 185.

23. *Ibid.*, III, 148. He also speaks of it as "beautiful and glorious," but adds that it "belongs to the world, not in the Kingdom of Christ," III, 883. See also VI, 115, XIX, 1462 f.

24. *Ibid.*, XIV, 10. Luther had probably forgotten Plato's *Crito*.

25. *Ibid.*, VII, 985 f. Luther did not distinguish between "some" and "all." Some dogmas, like that of the Trinity "played a part in the psychology and aesthetics of St. Augustine." "It is very possible that such a dogma as the Incarnation, while remaining a dogma and, of course, a mystery, might suggest deeper views of certain little known aspects of physical, psychological, aesthetic, and moral reality. But if these views are to be integrated with philosophy properly so-called, they would have to be rationally self-sufficient, but in a rationalization of reality carried out by a reason made acquainted with a mystery by faith" E. Gilson, *The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy* (New York, 1940), p. 484.

Of great importance is his formula that salvation is identical with justification, that justification is by faith alone and not by works of the law. The process of salvation is absolutely unilateral. Sanctification, however important, is not a correlate of justification. Not even faith is a meritorious act. Salvation consists in having an unmerited title to eternal bliss. The final ground of one's salvation is in God's elective love or predestination (often called the heart of Protestantism). The act of faith does not in any sense pertain to ratiocination, but is exclusively an affair of the heart. It is a kind of intuition and power of appropriation which is not native to the natural faculties but is created in the believer by regeneration. It is in no wise induced by reflection or love of wisdom or virtue, nor by the example of saints or by the helps of the institutional church. Originating in divine love it operates above and altogether apart from the historical-culture process.[26]

Its operation above and apart from the historical-cultural process is reflected in Luther's explicit negative, "not by works of the law." For by law he means not only the ecclesiastical ceremonies, but the Decalogue, all human culture: philosophy, jurisprudence, natural religion, etc. Luther does not teach, however, that philosophy, natural religion, and the like, are things of naught. Like the Decalogue they show how badly man needs to be saved. "The books of all philosophers, that is, the best of them, like those of Aesop, Aristotle, Plato, Xenophon, Cicero, Cato, spring from man's natural knowledge of divine law."[27] His denial of freedom of the will pertains largely to freedom to choose to be saved. There is a freedom of choice "in things which God has not commanded, namely, outward works."[28] "We have in many respects a free will, however only in things which are under us . . . like the fishes of the sea."[29] Justification is performed by God only, even the act of faith is as it were God believing within us.[30]

26. *Ibid.*, IX, 296, 24; XIX, 762, 1455; VII, 2345.
27. *Ibid.*, I, 621.
28. *Ibid.*, I, 859.
29. *Ibid.*, I, 103.
30. J. Maritain, *Three Reformers: Luther, Descartes, Rousseau* (New York, 1928), p. 193. Friedrick Loofs, "Die Bedeutung der Rechtfertigungslehre der Apologie für die Symbolik der lutherischen Kirche" (*Theologische Studien und Kritiken*, 1884, pp. 613-88), defines Luther's meaning with great learning. To him the gap between justification and sanctification is not so wide as Luther critics have sometimes thought.

Luther was indeed influenced by the *duplex veritas* theory, but in a modified form. Man's reason can know that God is, even though it may not know what He is.

> To the heathen it is evident that there is a God, and they know God from the works of Creation, for the law of nature is known to them.
>
> There is a vast difference between knowing that there is a God and knowing what or where God is. The first is known from nature, the second from the Holy Ghost alone.[31]

This is in a way a slight concession, but it was to prove significant in the Lutheran system-builders, beginning with Melanchthon. Luther also varies from the Ockhamists in respect to the ground for certainty of salvation. The latter relied on the voice of the Church, which held that absolute certainty is not a proper demand for an individual Christian to make, that to cultivate the virtue of charity-in-faith will produce an increasing assurance of sonship. Luther's strictly individualistic view of certainty only through faith tended to dispense with the Church as a mediator in any sense. In spite of Ockham's disavowal of reason in respect to the higher things, his owning of the Church's authority indirectly gave him an anchorage in reason, to the extent that the Church had not disdained reason in interpreting the faith. Luther did not so fully have this anchorage. Now we have seen that Luther recognizes reason in natural life, even in natural religion, but it is not clear what is the status of natural life. If it is important for a man to be saved, is it also important, even mandatory, that he be a *man?* While he rejoices in his status as just before God, should he also live to the full the life of reason? Luther could not answer that with a clear affirmative. It seems that a denial of it, if clearly and consistently made, would prove that the idea of the double truth had prevailed. As it is, the denial is occasional, sometimes vociferous, but not absolute. It is illuminating that all philosophy, jurisprudence, natural religion, etc. are put in the category of law (*Gesetz*) as contrasted with the gospel. It suggests an answer to the question why reason, civic virtue, or morality should be considered at all, namely, that God commands it. That is not very satisfactory, of course, unless one can suggest an answer to the question why God would ordain the life of reason, morality, and civic virtue without

31. *Sämmtliche Schriften,* VII, 1703; XIV, 859.

any relevance to the *unum verum bonum*. In such a view truth is not clearly one.[32]

IV

Melanchthon embraced Luther's formula of justification by faith alone, negation and all. But he remained a humanist. In an oration on Plato he said:

> Let Plato's example rouse us, first so that we may love the honorable arts, and so that we may not shrink from undertaking the labors and perils attending their pursuit. . . . These are the words of Plato . . . "Investigation of nature leads us to the knowledge of God, and shows that there is in the human mind a certain light of divinity, by which life is regulated, so that it may obey God, and so that they who know God may adjust their minds to him, and after they shall have departed this life they may win to God in wonderful light forever." Young people, are not these things most gravely said?[33]

In an oration on Aristotle, speaking of noble pagans:

> If we seek delight, I think you all will find that there is nothing sweeter than by the mind to see men eminent in virtue, in whom we feel that we look as it were upon the likeness itself of the virtues. When we put Augustus before us we cogitate the image and idea of a wise, just, moderate, good prince. And meanwhile we may reconsider what sorts of things are those gifts, what sort of light wisdom is, what sort of equality is justice, what sort of restraint of various

32. Theodor Häring, *Die Theologie und der Vorwurf der doppelten Wahrheit* (Zürich, 1886), p. 2, holds that one cannot justly charge Luther with the idea of the double truth. K. Heim, *Zur Geschichte des Satzes*, pp. 15, 16 says that Luther did take over the Ockhamist idea of the double truth, though he adds that by his "new intuition of the distinction between law and gospel" Luther profoundly deepened the idea.

It were erroneous to say that Luther did not share at all in the results of the life of reason of the historical Church. A study of his utterances respecting the councils shows that he shared it to a considerable extent. True, he says that the term "council" is to him as suspicious as the term "free will" (*Sämtliche Schriften*, XVIII, 1985); again, he holds that all the councils from the Apostolic Era to Gregory the Great were only true in part (*Ibid.*, XXII, 1356); but he accepts without reserve the Nicene Creed (*Ibid.*, XVI, 2188) and the Chalcedonian canons respecting Christ's two natures, and the Virgin as Mother of God (*Ibid.*, VI, 664).

33. *Declamatio de Platone*, *C.R.*, XI, 416. In the same oration Melanchthon says: "In the Apology many things are spoken with the greatest wisdom against the arrogance of men who scorn God and deny his providence. Moreover he adds many things about immortality; that to the wise man it is most gratifying that upon departing this life he goes to those men from whom one can be taught more certainly about the highest matters." Again, ". . . these are the bases of true virtue, to hold right opinions about God and concerning the immortality of souls. This is a philosophy worthy of kings" (p. 418).

passions are moderation and constancy. Now since great utility augments this delight, we should have the more avid appetite for the histories of great men.[34]

In the same oration:

> But some one may say: Of what concern are physics and ethics to the church? It behooves the church of God to take the greatest care that one be most nobly instructed in the arts and letters which she herself truly knows to be gifts of God on account of the great uses they bring to the human race; therefore what stupidity it is to ask of what concern to us is instruction concerning the nature of things, concerning numbers, measures, celestial motions, concerning differences of regions and areas in our own country, in fact, in the whole earth which God gave for cultivation to the human race, concerning the parts of man and their functions, the causes and remedies of diseases, the essences of plants, the sources of laws and civil offices, concerning the history of all times? . . . Not to know the magnitude of the earth and the location of its regions is to be ignorant of one's own home . . . Wherefore we should love philosophy . . .[35]

Melanchthon relates with great enthusiasm the story of Rudolph Agricola's life.[36] Among other things he says:

> He was often consulted by the more erudite both in philosophy and the other arts. He derived many things from Aristotle and interpreted them to those who wanted to know his opinion. Till then no one had seen Aristotle's books on animals. So it was his very pleasant duty toward the more learned when he brought up from thence some weighty passage, as when there would be a dispute about the immortality of the human soul. What would Aristotle's opinion have been? Well, to their great astonishment he would take that sentence which is found in the Generation of Animals: Mind comes about from the outside, it is not born from the matter of bodies.[37]

In these passages there shines a genuine love of the classical literature and a true admiration for other humanists.[38] His love is not superficial; it pertains not merely to the elegance of classical articulation, though he does not undervalue it; his regard for Greek and Latin is rather predicated on his conviction that they open to one a vast literature from which one may get truth,—true meanings of words, true historical data,

34. *De Aristotele* (1544), *C.R.*, XI, 649.
35. *Ibid.*, pp. 656-58.
36. *Vita Rodolphi Agricolae*, *C.R.*, XI, 438-46.
37. *C.R.*, XI, 443, "Mens extrinsecus accedit, non nascitur ex materia corporum."
38. *Ibid.*, In the same oration he speaks in praise of Theodore of Gaza and Guarino.

truth also in the sense of intuition into the nature of things.[39] Nothing is excluded; the highest themes are accurately discoursed on in the classics. It is particularly interesting that his attention is caught by Agricola's notion that Aristotle could not well have denied the immortality of the soul.[40] Melanchthon has not merely sipped the classics; he had drunk them deeply. He has not done so from a sense of duty merely,[41] but with relish. Through them he knows more about God, immortality, law divine and human, wisdom, righteousness; through them he knows the Scriptures better;—and he loves it all.

But all this has nothing to do with salvation, for Melanchthon embraces Luther's formula without reservation. Following his magnificant statement about Plato and the knowledge of God he writes:

> However, I do not wish these opinions to be confused with the Gospel, but they should hold their own place as a doctrine of reason; when one rightly philosophizes about them, when one seeks the vestiges of divinity in things, when one considers the nature of the human mind, one (then) comes to these divinely established boundaries.[42]

Furthermore, after showing that Aristotle and Plato are "in agreement on the highest matters," Melanchthon says:

> We should love them both. . . . But even if I love and take up these thoughts of Plato, nevertheless the error of those is most sharply to be reprehended who therefore confound the Platonic philosophy with the Gospel. You are to avoid and detest such confusion regarding kinds of doctrine; one should clearly see what place is to be given to philosophy. All the good arts are gifts of God, but they must severally keep their own place. That is, true philosophy does not lack reason and proof, (it) is a certain knowledge of divine law, it knows that God is, and that he judges about civil mores; it perceives that the difference between the honorable and disgraceful is divinely immanent in us, it judges that wicked atrocities are punished by God; it even has a certain presage concerning immortality. But it does not see or teach what is characteristic of the Gospel, i.e., remission of sins, freely given by the Son of God. This

39. See also Melanchthon's orations on Eloquence; *C.R.*, XI, 50-66, "Encomicum Eloquentiae"; 364-73, *Declamatio de utilitate studiorum eloquentiae.*

40. See also Melanchthon's statement that Aristotle does not differ from Plato in the highest matters. *Decl. de Platone*, *C.R.*, XI, 415. He admires Aristotle more for logical, formal, mathematical statement. But if Jove were to speak a human tongue it would be "sermo Platonis" (*Ibid.*)

41. Throughout his orations his appeal to the duty of classical learning is strong and frequent.

42. *C.R.*, XI, 416 f.

knowledge does not rise out of human minds, nay rather, it is put far outside the purview of human reason; but the Son of God who is in the bosom of the Father has made it plain . . . wherefore prudence should prevail in discussing the kinds of doctrine, and we must reject those absurd people who throw a mist around the Gospel, who rather destroy and root out the Gospel when they transform it into Platonic Philosophy. The more also are they to be taxed who, not knowing Plato, and perverting his meaning, generate monstrous opinions and spread them in the church, as Origen and after him many others did. Infamously contaminated has been the Christian Gospel in those olden times, being ineptly mixed with Platonic philosophy.[43]

Other and no less clear statements of this dualism are found in Melanchthon of which we may note the one in his commentary on selected books of Aristotle's *Politics*:[44]

The reader should be advised to inquire as to what distinguishes political from evangelical doctrine, and in what manner the Gospel approves political doctrine. To clarify the matter we use this comparison: As medicine is far removed from the Gospel, so politics is far removed from the Gospel; and just as medicine contains a doctrine which is founded in reason, so politics is founded in reason, and no more pertains to the Gospel than does medicine. It is desirable for a physician to be a pious man; so it is desirable for one who governs a commonwealth to be a pious man. Nevertheless the arts have as such no relationship with the Gospel. For the Gospel exhibits eternal justice, which hearts receive by faith, (though) meanwhile it (the Gospel) orders that everywhere we use the laws and politics of all nations among which we live.

Indeed, the political art covers external action in life, concerning possessions, contracts, and such like, and these are not the same among all nations. Laws are of one kind among the Persians, of another in Athens, or in Rome. Accordingly, a Christian dresses differently in one part of the world than in another, reckons days differently in one place than he does in another. Whatever the policy of the place, that he uses; as Ezra judges cases according to Persian law when in Persia, so in Jerusalem he judges according to Jewish law. The centurion uses Jewish law in Judea, in Rome the Roman law. These things do not belong to the Gospel, anymore than do clothes or the spacing of days. This distinction between the Gospel and political affairs is conducive to maintaining

43. *Ibid.*, pp. 424-25. Melanchthon is perhaps referring to Ficino and the Florentine Academy. It is generally granted that their attempts to correlate Plato with the Gospel were not satisfactory, but the opinion is far-fetched that they were trying to make Platonic philosophy of the Gospel. Ficino respected Aristotle and spoke of Thomas Aquinas as the "glory of theology." Nevertheless, from Melanchthon's standpoint any attempt to correlate would be tantamount to identifying. To him, reason has nothing to do with faith (saving faith).

44. *C.R.*, XVI, Part IV, 416 ff. *Commentarii in aliquot politicos libros Aristotelis.*

tranquility and increasing reverence for the magistrates . . . The Gospel has to do with the heart, not with the civil state . . .

Meanwhile the Gospel approves all things political, if consistent with reason (Basel Edition has *cum iure naturale*) . . .

Just as Socrates, at the beginning of the *Republic,* sent the poets out of the state, so we would eject the theologians, not from the state, but we would remove them from the governing group of the commonwealth . . .[45]

V.

The foregoing quotations are proof that Melanchthon was not an extreme Ockhamist.[46] That God's being can be known without revelation, and that the light of nature also reveals something of the nature of God, are commonplaces with him. There is little to remind one of Luther's parsimonious concessions. Further evidence comes from his work as curriculum-builder of the University of Wittenberg. In a formal sense, at least, he insisted on the Faculty of Arts having equal status with the Faculty of Theology. Indeed, he says: "This philosophical *coetus* ought also to be a part of God's Church."[47] That is, in Melanchthon's living

45. Throughout, according to the context, Melanchthon is making a polemic against both Anabaptists and the Medieval Church (the political claims of the papacy, the courts Christian). See also the following:

De legibus, C.R., XI, 66-86.

Praefatio in Officia Ciceronis, C.R., XI, 86-90.

Praefatio in Aeschinis et Demosthenis Orationes, C.R., XI, 101-6.

Oratio in laudem novae scholae habita Noribergae, C.R., XI, 106-11. This oration is largely devoted to hearty praise of Renaissance Florence.

De capta Roma, C.R., XI, 130-39, deplores the sack of Rome, 1527, and the loss of Roman libraries and art.

Again, *Propositio* LXXXVI, *C.R.,* XII, 436 f.

An philosophia pietati officiat, C.R., X, 689-91.

Leges Academiae Wittenbergensis, C.R., X, 992-1024. These laws and statutes of the University of Wittenberg were largely Melanchthon's work, and receive considerable attention in the Orations and occasional discourses. They are a mine of information on the question in hand.

Quaestio, No. 67, C.R., X, 865-67. On morality in religion.

Oratio de veris legum fontibus et causis, C.R., XI, 916-24.

De ordine politico, C.R., XI, 1011-16.

There is also an interesting *Responsum* (*Melanchtonis*) *ad Picum Mirandolum* (1558), a reply to a celebrated letter of Pico della Mirandola to Ermolao Barbaro (1485). *C.R.,* IX, 678-703.

46. If he was an Ockhamist at all. As will be shown he cared almost nothing for philosophy properly so-called. He preferred rhetoric to dialectics.

47. *Leges collegii facultatis liberalium artium quas Philosophia continet, C.R.,* X, 1008-24 Lex Tertia. His term *coetus* is interesting. He uses it to designate the church, and also the Faculty of Theology. The *Leges Academiae Wittenbergensis, C.R.,* X,

experience the two are united. Therein consists largely the permanent value of his work. His fervent devotion to theology *and* the arts have carried his influence across many decades. His love of *eloquentia* made him master of coining felicitous phrases and formulas which have provided Protestantism with weapons to defend liberal studies within the shadow of the church.[48]

Professor Maritain passes over Melanchthon too lightly when he says: "It was really to others, and in particular to Melanchthon that Luther left the *rationalizing* (Italics are Maritain's) of the new doctrine. . . . Melanchthon and his Aristotle, sugared with humanism, nominalism, and pedagogy, played from this point of view. . . ."[49] We will presently point out what we consider a serious weakness in Melanchthon, but that weakness did not consist in mere rationalizing. Nor was his humanism a mere sugaring. Within certain limits he lived the life of reason. He is much more limited in his appreciation of Aristotle than was Thomas Aquinas, but his, such as it was, was genuine. Just as power of reason in Thomas to know the *unum verum bonum* philosophically was not actually diminished by Ockham's terminism, so Melanchthon's own love of the classics was not actually negatived by his inability to appreciate the formula of Thomas for the interaction of reason and faith. The results, too, would argue for the vitality of Melanchthon's humanism. Had Luther stood alone, his movement might have degenerated into a cult of unlettered bibliolatry. Melanchthon, however, put the classics into the German school system.[50] If one of the true functions of the higher learning is to preserve knowledge, modern culture owes much to Melanchthon.

On the other hand, Melanchthon has not done justice to the role of reason, which Aristotle spoke of as an energizing force.[51] It is not only

992 ff., speaks of scholastic corporations which "ought to be a special corps (*agmen*) of the church of God," whose "norm of life is the Decalogue." Here certainly the law is meant to be more than a "taskmaster to Christ."

48. Illustrations are given in E. Troeltsch, *Vernunft und Offenbarung bei Johann Gerhard und Melanchthon* (Göttingen, 1891), pp. 78 ff.

49. Maritain, *op. cit.*, p. 177.

50. Cf. his *Oratio in laudem novae scholae habita Noribergae*, *C.R.*, XI, 106-11.

51. "Reason is of such character that on the one hand it becomes all things, and on the other creates all things, in this respect resembling a property of light. For light in a certain sense converts potential into actual colors, and reason, in the present meaning, is separate, impassive, and unmixed, being in its essential nature an energiz-

that which we call reflection on experience, but it is also a power whereby we are constrained to reflect. The act of believing the voice of revelation is no exception; we reflect on it as we do on any other experience. We think on matters of faith more intensely than on other things, because they are so much more momentous. It is evident that the Christian must theologize. Christian thinkers have realized this in varying degrees. Melanchthon also came to realize it when he made the distinction between knowledge and confidence, as two constituent elements in faith.[52] But it is a concession which he is forced to make. By it he does not unloose reason so that it may exercise its powers freely. The perpetual caveats that reason should not go too far are heard in scores of orations and other writings. Reason should be trained primarily for the purpose of expressing faith in an orderly, perspicuous manner. Logic is really a sort of rhetoric.[53] Never are we ushered into the realm of reason as a promised land in which the mind may find full play for its native gifts. Melanchthon fears the apparent frivolity and irreverence which are sometimes the by-product of unfettered mental activity.[54] Yet this is a danger that must be risked. It is impossible to grasp fully the relation

ing force." *Aristotle's Psychology, a Treatise on the Principle of Life, De Anima and Parva Naturalia,* translated by W. A. Hammond (New York, 1902), p. 117 f.

52. This was in 1543, in his *Loci Theologici,* which are a more formulized *Loci Communes,* cf. *C.R.,* XXI, 743: "Ut vocabulum Fides monstret illum mediatorem et nobis applicet, significat fides non tantum historiae notitiam, sed fiduciam misericordiae promissae . . . complectitur autem fiducia misericordiae et notitiam historiae, quia fides intuetur Christum, quem agnosci necesse est esse filium aeterni Dei. . . ."

53. Troeltsch, *op. cit.,* p. 60. This point is nowhere more elaborately exhibited than in Melanchthon's *Responsum ad Picum Mirandolam, C.R.,* IX, 678-703. Pico had, in 1485, written a letter to Ermolao Barbaro, defending the scholastic pursuit of truth through ineloquent language, arguing that eloquence obscures truth. Melanchthon undertakes, in 1553, to answer in Ermolao's behalf, arguing that eloquence is the only clear form of expressing truth. If a thing cannot be said eloquently it should not be said because it cannot be well said. This is one of the more unsatisfactory aspects of his work. One is tempted to apply Professor Maritain's term "sugar" to it.

54. *Leges Academiae Wittenbergensis,* Lex sexta, warns against "futile" subjects for disputation. *Leges Collegii factultatis liberalium artium* . . . , Tertia Lex, "Let them know God and his son, our Lord Jesus Christ and let them teach philosophy in such a way that they do not corrupt the teaching of the Gospel, nor by forwardness or the curiosity of ingenius talents plant, prove, or defend profane or irreverent opinion against God, as many do in the gymnasia of other nations. In this one matter philosophers are to be under restraint because they might defend Epicureans and other wild thinkers; we will not tolerate this most unworthy perversity in the name of philosophy —that modest investigatrix of the truth. . . . Let his philosophical coetus be an honorable college. . . . Let it not be a corps of Giants or Cyclopes, madly playing with

between reason and faith unless both are given complete freedom. Both magnitudes should, ideally, be appreciated at their maximum development.

The point is important, for Melanchthon's caveats spring from a suspicion that reason in full play might damage the faith. And this is of the essence of the two-fold truth theory. The classroom in philosophy at Wittenberg was not free. This is regrettable, for that lowered philosophy to a technique of propaganda. Be the cause never so good, philosophy will not serve as mere apologist. It will have its paradoxes to upset free minds. St. Thomas held that philosophy could be a handmaid to the faith, but that handmaid was also to be free. To him she was endowed with the same dignity of free personality as her queen (theology). To Melanchthon philosophy was a kind of automaton in the service of theology. The candid reader of his works finds them pleasing; his utterance is so facile and felicitous; he is so appreciative of many fine things. But for all his labors—and his whole life was a tour de force in the study-room and on the platform—one is not thrilled with the feeling of having discovered something of eternal, soul-absorbing truth in the realm of philosophy or science. For all his expansive talks about liberal learning, an examination of his idea of its stuff and meaning ends in anticlimax. In all his attempts at constructing a system there is "not a trace of fantasy and poetry."[55]

Most regrettable of all is that Melanchthon did not arrive at metaphysical certainty of anything pertaining to the *unum verum bonum*. It seems evident that he did not even strive for it. He did not even consider it important. Dialectics was largely a branch of philology rather

fictional opinions as the Giants strove at piling up mountains. . . ." Septima Lex: "Before a disputation is publicly proposed, it is to be shown to the Dean who shall disallow all proposed subjects that are absurd, false, inane. He shall order that subjects be chosen which are true and profitable for life, seeing this is useful for many reasons: First because it conduces to sowing true and good opinion in tender minds. Then too it accustoms the youth to the love of truth, which is far better for the Republic than is the study of defending paradoxes and of weakening common and honest opinion proved by the true judgments of wise men; and because paradoxes are defended not by true arguments but by the legerdemain of sophists; the sophistical habit later brings turmoil to religion and the deliberations of the gravest affairs; nay, rather, it stirs up great tumults privately in minds, and in the end it entangles the mind by Pyrrhonic doubts about religion and many other things."

55. Troeltsch, *op. cit.*, p. 81. One cannot doubt that Melanchthon was sincere in urging his students to love the great Greeks. But in his commentary, say, on Aris-

than a method of arriving at clearer concepts of truth. Nevertheless, when he gives his opinion that philosophy can know nothing about theology, his statement rests on a doubt induced by dialectic, like Ockham's. It is generally agreed that natural reason did not produce the idea of the Incarnation, yet it remains a fact that, on the one hand, the idea of the Incarnation has fertilized the philosophical thinking of those who accept it, and, on the other, reason is capable of knowing some of the conditions under which an Incarnation is possible.[56]

If metaphysical certainty is coldly treated by theology, it will seek rest elsewhere. It did not have long to seek. There were the later conclusions of Galileo, Hobbes, *et al.*, of which it has been said that they gave a "completely new form" to the principle of Democritus and Plato that "the sole object which true knowledge of nature can deal with is what is capable of quantitative determination. . . . Thus arises the apparent materialistic proposition: philosophy is the doctrine of the motion of bodies! This is the extreme consequence of the separation of philosophy from theology, which began with the English Franciscans."[57] It were untrue to say that Melanchthon provided Protestantism with absolutely no antidote to philosophical materialism, for there is a potential antidote in his distinction between *fiducia* and *cognitio* in faith.

totle's Politics, *C.R.*, XVI, 416 ff., his method is to give a brief exposition, a few selected points (nature of the state, usury, etc.), then forthwith he uses these points as pegs on which to hang his own opinions.

Troeltsch, *op. cit.*, pp. 73, 210, implies that Melanchthon trod in the path of the double truth, but asserts that Melanchthon would not have admitted it. In his *Oratio de Philosophia, C.R.*, XI, 283, Melanchthon says that " (philosophical) erudition generally leads to the church, because the unlearned are both more unctious and negligent Learning puts on one a bridle and accustoms one to diligence. . . . The learned see how easy it is to fall and to be deceived . . . and the church herself has suffered from the rashness of destructive ignorance." This comes near to the "Knowledge is virtue" of Socrates. But it is really very different, for in the same oration he puts upon philosophy the same restraints which are given in the Statutes of the University of Wittenberg (cf. note 54). E.g., "And this simple philosophy about which I speak has for its first study not to affirm anything without proof so that it may easily *(facile)* drive out absurd opinions. . . ." *Ibid*, XI, 283. That philosophy is fearfully as well as wonderfully made apparently did not occur to Melanchthon. Theology and philosophy dwell under the same roof because the latter is not free. Thus Melanchthon did not satisfactorily solve the problem of the relation between them.

56. For another illustration of this cf. Gilson, *op. cit.*, p. 484.

57. Windelband, *op. cit.*, pp. 320 ff. See also C. D. Dampier-Whetham, *History of Science* (Cambridge, 1929), p. 147.

But he made practically nothing of it. Certain of the Protestant summists have done remarkable things with it. Some modern Protestant thinkers are rediscovering the potentiality of the idea of revelation.[58] In brief, though faith and reason as correlatives were never truly lost, Melanchthon's extremely weak affirmation of the life of reason has tended to make the road of Protestantism uneven, sometimes very rough.

VI

Melanchthon, then, provided no satisfactory solution for the relation between philosophy and theology, reason and faith. He was to that extent tarred with the stick of the *duplex veritas*. But his too radical separation of Christianity from life had a certain liberalizing effect. Believers could with joy and zest cultivate secular pursuits such as politics, medicine, philosophy, because God has commanded it. The pagans of classical times and of the Renaissance (e.g., Valla) he could appreciate by divine mandate, for in them was a spark of genuine truth. The thought need not trouble one that such truth had no relation to saving truth; it was sufficient that it was God's good pleasure to have it enjoyed.

It is of the utmost importance to note that learning thereby got religious status. Melanchthon, like Calvin, who shares this view,[59] was a religious man who would not have hesitated to abandon learning if he had been unable to perceive a religious ground for it. Thus any and all knowledge became important. One might even appreciate Roman law and Persian customs as revelatory of true light from God. It helped prepare the way for the modern view of history, to wit, that "profane"

58. President Hutchins's interpretation of the reorganization of the Federation of Theological Schools with respect to the University of Chicago is a notable example of this. Said he: "Theology goes beyond all the other disciplines. Revelation is not, as Averroes thought, a means which God employed to get in touch with men too ignorant and weak of mind to find Him out for themselves. Theology exceeds all other disciplines because God reveals what the wisest man does not know and can never learn—or at best can see but dimly and remotely—God's being and man's destiny. If this were not so, theology would add nothing to the rest of knowledge in the University. Natural theology, which is a part of philosophy, would represent the ultimate boundary of our attempt to understand God and his works" *University of Chicago Magazine* (January 1944), p. 4.

59. Cf. *Institutes of the Christian Religion*, Bk. II, Ch. II, especially paragraph 15.

history is of concern to man apart from "sacred."[60] According to Melanchthon Persian and Roman law and customs have a right to existence along side of Old Testament law. All history is autochthonous to the providence of God, and as such should be the concern of men, including believers. It may also be suggested that in Melanchthon much of theology is "natural" rather than "sacred," and as such becomes a secular pursuit, shared of course by the believer (out of gratitude). Thus the nature of God and immortality are proper themes of philosophy. So, too, the Scriptures contain much that belongs to the common heritage of mankind, which can be appreciated by all men (and by believers) and redound to their benefit apart from salvation. It therefore went without saying that Melanchthon's idea of curriculum included not only the Bible but also the arts.[61]

On the other hand, Melanchthon's manner of separating saving truth from terrestrial tended to make sterile the believers' efforts to cultivate the latter. For, after all, this life is not as important as eternity, and it is this difference in importance that takes its toll to the damage of the terrestrial. With all his encomiums for Plato and Aristotle, Melanchthon's warnings that they have contributed nothing to man's eternal welfare do dampen the zeal for the liberal arts. What if one sees genuine truth in philosophy, mathematics, it is truth of a different order, which reveals only what pertains to man's brief experience here. Thus man as man is belittled. Andreas Osiander, a bitter opponent of Melanchthon, but a fellow-Lutheran, preached that man is justified by faith in Christ as God but not in Christ *as man*.[62] Though repudiated by most Lutherans, this idea did not fall far from the tree that bore it. Melanchthon's comments on John 1:14 ("the Word was made flesh")[63]

60. This view is generally associated with Voltaire, cf. his *Philosophical Dictionary*, article on "History," section II, in which he writes satirically, "What I most admire in our modern compilers is the judgment and zeal with which they prove to us that whatever happened in former ages, in the most extensive and powerful empires of the world, took place solely for the instruction of the inhabitants of Palestine. If the kings of Babylon, in the course of their conquests, overrun the territories of the Hebrew people, it is only to correct that people for their sins. . . ."

61. Melanchthon himself edited and largely rewrote Carion's *Chronicon*, a world history. *C.R.*, XII, 705-1094. For recent discussion of Melanchthon and Carion, see Eduard Fueter, *Geschichte der Neueren Historiographie* (Munich and Berlin, 1936), pp. 186-88, 617 f.

62. *C.R.*, VII, 775-81, *Epistolae Alberto Duci, Pruss.* and *Ep. A. Osiandro.*

63. *C.R.*, XV, 24 ff.

look upon Christ's human nature purely from the point of view of its weakness, not at all from that of a powerful mind. The "glory as of the only begotten of the Father" which St. John saw in the human Jesus, Melanchthon interprets as *miracula* such as the resurrection of the dead, and not at all the wisdom that to an extent he shared with our race. One wonders if there is not something of a Monophysite in Melanchthon. All this tended to leave philosophy to men of a more secular temper. Though modern men have had concern about salvation and saving faith, nevertheless their strong thinking was done in the arts. Eventually even theology became more natural than sacred theology.[64] Reformations of Protestantism have often followed the line of reaction against institutional forms, creeds, higher learning, and the arts. For if culture or the "human element" is of God, but is not of the essence of our religion, any considerable interest in culture is tantamount to degeneration.

The two-fold truth theory may, then, be said to have leavened Melanchthon's thought. On the one hand, his work was the means of preserving in Protestantism an appreciation of culture; on the other hand, the specific nature of his concern with salvation is ever in the shadow, to neutralize. However, there are signs that in our day the dualism may be overcome, and it may be overcome within the framework of Melanchthon's system.[65] In that system he provides for both faith and the life of reason. Inadequate though his appreciation of the latter be, there it is, together with the whole classical heritage which he strove to preserve. His motive for adherence to both faith and reason is in essence his conviction that God is one, and that God is the author of both. Let reason, then, become as free as faith; let each interact with the other, each according to its nature. When both interact freely *in the same mind* there comes into being—theology.

64. This is as such not to the discredit of Melanchthon, for the powerful thinking by modern philosophers in the field of natural theology is in many respects as important for the growth of sacred theology as Greek philosophy was for the Scholastics. What we mean to say is that Melanchthon offered no satisfactory materials of which a strong sacred theology could be built.

65. I have found no textual evidence of Melanchthon's awareness of the idea of *duplex veritas*. Therefore I have not discussed it. Yet it seems to me apparent that it was in the background of much of his thinking, because so much of his work appears to be devoted to overcome that dualism. While he did not overcome it in his system, his attempt would reinforce the idea that a true solution cannot be out of harmony with his spirit.

JAMES BISSETT PRATT'S PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

T. Hayes Procter

Professor of Philosophy, Wellesley College

The title of this article is misleading, if the phrase "Philosophy of Religion" means a completely systematized body of doctrine. Pratt has given us no new concept of God, no new proofs of His existence, and no new and final solution of the problems concerning the relation of God to the world. In his thinking about religion, he is not "a philosopher's philosopher," but rather, in a very real sense, a defender of the faith.

His importance to the cause of religion lies first of all in the fact that he was deeply religious. Piety was the centre of his being. His happiness was religious happiness. His great zest for life, his delight in nature, his unfailing love for mankind, his strong sense of value, the simplicity of his character, his quiet strength, the triumph of his spirit over pain and disability, his intense moral energy—all these were manifestations of a soul at almost every moment conscious of God, and constrained by love of God.

He is important also because of the breadth of his religious experience. His early training was Presbyterian; through his marriage, he had intimate understanding of Catholicism at its best; through wide travel and extensive reading, he entered deeply into the spirit of Oriental religions.

He is important because he combined with this unusually wide experience a keenly critical mind, anxious, not to justify his beliefs but to find out what he might justly believe. He is both most accurately described and most highly praised by the great word "liberal." In so far as in our times there is a current of reaction against liberalism, his importance for the churches is all the greater. Religious leaders cannot wisely afford to ignore even the sharpest criticisms of one who was so deeply a lover of religion.

I

The word "liberal" has two important meanings, freedom and generosity. The two are intimately connected, since a free mind alone can be

generously tolerant of everything except dogmatism, prejudice, and sheer nonsense.

"Liberalism" is a name, not for any specific body of beliefs, but for liberal, i.e., free, thinking bounded only by loyalty to truth, respect for fact and for norms inherent in its own nature. If our conclusions are set beforehand we do not think but merely rationalize. There can be no question about liberal thinking, since there is no other kind. The real question is whether religion should be thought about at all. To this question Pratt's answer is clear and uncompromising. It is the Aristotelian answer "all men by nature desire to know." No aspect of experience can be excluded. In this sense thought is dominant over religion. We may, perhaps, cease to be religious whilst still remaining human, but we cannot give up the right to think without ceasing to be men.

Thinking about religion is not merely a matter of intellectual integrity, but is of enormous practical importance, precisely because of the practical importance of religion itself. Religion is powerful and, like everything powerful, it is dangerous. It may be effective for evil. We cannot too often remind ourselves that, as Professor Whithead has pointed out,

> History, down to the present day, is a melancholy record of the horrors which can attend religion: human sacrifice, and in particular the slaughter of children, cannibalism, sensual orgies, abject superstition, hatred as between races, the maintenance of degrading customs, hysteria, bigotry, can all be laid at its charge. Religion is the last refuge of human savagery. The uncritical association of religion with goodness is directly negatived by plain facts. Religion can be, and has been, the main instrument for progress. But if we survey the whole race, we must pronounce that generally it has not been so.[1]

Pratt is, of course, very far from maintaining that religion is solely a matter of intellectual belief. On the contrary, it is essentially an attitude of the "whole man," including his feelings and will. But, surely, man's reason is also part of the "whole man," and there can be no human integrity that does not include reason. Also, as a matter of fact, religion does make assertions about the nature of a universe that remains what it is, no matter what we believe about it. In so far as religion is belief at all, it contains an intellectual element. "To believe" is to believe to be true. If there is any meaning at all in this claim to truth, it means the acknowledgement of, and submission to, common standards of

1. *Religion in the Making* (New York, 1936), pp. 37-38.

truth. It means that all relevant evidence should be included, that terms should be unambiguous, that inferences should be valid, and that the system of propositions should be consistent. There may be truths about God, or truths about the world, but not special brands of religious truths or scientific truth. In so far as there is genuine thinking in any field, it is characterized by its adherence to the same standards. It is, therefore, correct to say that "there is no other kind of thinking except scientific thinking."

This appeal to reason as the final arbiter and this uncompromising loyalty to truth, is the essence of liberalism. Pratt was so unswerving in this loyalty that I am sure, if atheism were the only reasonable belief, he would have been an atheist, however unsatisfying emotionally he might have found such a doctrine.

II

Liberalism is often accused of indefiniteness, but as a matter of fact, it necessarily results in some very definite exclusions. It excludes faith, if faith be identified with mere credulousness. It excludes sentimentality, romanticism, and the "will to believe," in so far as these are merely the will to make-believe. It rejects the kind of intuitionism that regards strength of belief, or the conviction of certainty, as conclusive evidence. It is incompatible with the kind of rationalism that relies upon deductions from a priori notions unsupported by, or in conflict with, empirical facts. It cannot accept authority, whether it be that of a divinely inspired Bible, or Church councils, or individual conscience, or revelations, as determining finally the truth of doctrines and the obligation to believe them. What it thus excludes is the irrational, whether in external authority or in the irrational elements within oneself. Reason, by its very nature, can recognize no bounds, except the compulsions of fact and of its own principles. This is its freedom.

The other side of liberalism is its inclusiveness. Pratt was very humble, willing to learn from all men, anxious to enrich his own thought and life with every glimpse of truth from every source, irrespective of creed or party. His thinking was, therefore, not only relentlessly critical but characterized by the principle of inclusiveness.

Within the generous hospitality of the liberal mind there is room for reverent agnosticism. Being human we are liable to erroneous thinking,

to conclusions prematurely drawn from mistaken or partial observation of facts, to false interpretations of facts. Not only that, but when we have done our best there remain many things that we do not know, and perhaps never can know, about the world, ourselves, and God. The proper conclusion from this is not that God is in His own nature completely unintelligible or completely unknowable, or that "God" is just another name for mystery; but that, since we know in part and prophesy in part, it is our duty to search out the truth about Him through every possible avenue of knowledge to the very limit of our human capacity. Since on ignorance no assertions can be founded, the argument from ignorance is the weakest of all foundations for religion. Above all, we should be aware that what we do not know, we simply do not know.

It follows that there is room for "Over-beliefs," not, indeed, asserted as known and certain truths but as at least possible hypotheses, in themselves meaningful, not excluded by any known evidence, and held subject to revision if further evidence demands it. There is room, also, for beliefs accepted on the ground of the balance of probability, provided we do not claim certainty for them. There is both room and an important function for authorities, traditions, and revelations, if they declare a truth derived from, and supported by, evidence that competent reasonable men may share. There is, of course, not only room but necessity for immediate experience and intuition, if we are also aware that there are many intuitions, and that the interpretation of intuitions brings us within the jurisdiction of reason. There is room for emotion, even though there is no room for "thinking with the blood." There is room for decision and for the "will to believe," if these do not mean that we can make assertions true merely by deciding to accept them, or by willing them hard. There is room for faith, particularly in the sense of loyal adherence, and in the sense of venture. There is room for many varieties of poetic imagery, for diverse mythologies, for the widest variety of symbols, and for the utmost richness of liturgy.

This is its generosity.

III

A liberal philosopher may perform two important functions for the Church. The first is the defense of the faith against the unbeliever. But much more important for the Church and its leaders is the second function, which is the purification of the faith for the believer.

Pratt's defense of the faith is his vigorous criticism of philosophies that are entirely incompatible with religion. Chief amongst these is materialism or extreme naturalism. His books, *Matter and Spirit, Naturalism,* and, in part, *Personal Realism,* establish religious belief as a possibility not excluded by the most rigorous employment of the scientific method or by any teachings of science as such. Materialism and extreme naturalism are shown to be philosophy, not science, and bad philosophy at that. He is insistent and eloquent in calling to our attention the realm of facts pointed to by such words as "mind," "consciousness," "will," and "soul." These cannot be included within the concept of nature if that concept is interpreted, as the materialists interpret it, in terms of mere matter and mechanistic laws, yet they must be taken account of by anyone who asserts truths claiming validity beyond the limited sphere of any special science. Materialism is so incredible that, when clearly stated, it destroys even its own foundations. In these writings all friends of religion will find many sharp weapons for use against the common intellectual enemy of all religions.

If we do take these facts into account, there are two courses open to us: we may re-interpret the concept of nature so that it does not by very definition exclude them, or we may accept some kind of dualism of mind and matter.

The hypothesis of a physical world, really existing and independent of its being known, seemed to Pratt to be the most illuminating hypothesis and also the most probable. Since he also accepts mind as real, he is driven to a frank, even militant dualism. Further, since mind is effective, he argues very forcefully that the relation between mind and body is one of interaction.

As a philosopher he argued with strong conviction that such dualism is the most tenable doctrine, but as a philosopher of religion, he does not identify dualism with religion nor maintain that this is the only philosophy compatible with it. He was too free from dogmatism and too faithful to his own standards ever to maintain that there is only one philosophy of religion.

IV

I pass lightly over Pratt's defense of the faith, because I think the purification of the faith through liberal thinking is at the present time immensely more important for religious leaders.

Dualism frankly asserts supernaturalism. If "Nature" is completely described in terms which, by their very definition exclude mind, then, obviously, no one who believes in mind can also believe that nature, as so described, is all inclusive. In this sense, all philosophies other than materialism, even if not dualistic, must believe in the supernatural. In this sense, also, belief in the supernatural is essential to religion.

But "super-naturalism" has another common meaning—the belief that nature is not really characterized by general laws but is subject to constant and arbitrary interference. In this sense it is essential neither to philosophy nor to religion.

It is to be regretted that Pratt did not live to complete his last book, entitled *God and the War,* a book addressed to Christian thinkers and written

> because of my profound conviction of the unique value of the Christian tradition and of Christian thought, and because some of the tendencies to be found among many would-be defenders of Christianity seem to me fraught with the utmost danger for the cause that both they and I love so well.

One of these is

> the tendency of many leaders of popular Christian thought to disregard the plain evidence of experience and of careful critical thinking, and to appeal, instead, to some pleasing imaginary picture. . . . This tendency is one of the causes of the loss of respect for Christianity found in so many leaders of thought, especially among the younger generation. One does small service to Christianity by identifying it with beliefs for which little can be said except that they are comforting.

I quote a typical passage, since I think there is need for protest against the emphasis on the supernatural in much of current preaching. It makes religion not only very difficult to believe but also of very doubtful moral value. Also it is, in the long run, not of great advantage to capitalize on fear. In the chapter entitled, "Atheists in Foxholes," Pratt asks,

> What shall we say to the soldier trembling in a foxhole? Shall it be: "My dear sir, give up your critical attitude and accept the good old faith that you learned at your mother's knee that whatsoever you pray for with faith you can get. Then pray that the laws of falling bodies may be miraculously altered so all bombs coming straight at you may be deflected from their course. If you do this you will feel much happier and stronger." It is possible that, if we speak thus and succeed in converting the man in the foxhole, he will take courage and

may even get away in safety. It is possible that . . . his conversion may last the rest of his days and he may conduct himself thereafter on the conviction that whatever he prays for he can get. Considering the kind of world we actually live in, this does not seem to me a consummation devoutly to be wished.

Or we might say to the poor frightened atheist: "You are probably right in doubting the existence of some magnified non-natural man up in the sky who abrogates the laws of nature for the benefit of those who believe and pray. This world of ours is a world of law. It is a world that can be counted on. But the fact that there is no big man in the sky, or that one cannot control the fall of bombs by prayer, does not mean that there is no Divine Mind back of all this regular and, in a sense, rational activity."

We might further say:

"My friend, a foxhole is really no place to discuss the existence of God. Let us postpone philosophy and theology to a more appropriate moment; but whatever you believe or do not believe about God, for Heaven's sake, be a man! Summon up whatever courage you may possess, and if you must think, reflect on this fact, that the preservation of your life is not the most important thing at stake here and now. There are more important things than the preservation of your little stream of consciousness. The Cause for which you took up arms, the cause of freedom and democracy and of the future of humanity, is immensely more important than is your breath and your feelings. Whatever you do in these next minutes, whether it be an attempt to escape from this dangerous place or to take the best shelter possible right here—do it consciously for the sake of the larger Cause which you represent and with which you have identified yourself. At this supreme moment re-dedicate yourself to those great things for which your country stands. Let the thought of these larger purposes fill the background of your mind. And remember, that even if the little collection of protoplasm which goes by your name, be immediately destroyed, the bombs cannot destroy that greater thing to which you now consecrate all that you have and are. Keep before your mind the thought of that supremely brave man who, whatever your theology may teach about Him, deliberately suffered a death more terrible than any that awaits you for the same great Cause of man, for which you may now be called upon to give the last full measure of devotion."[2]

Equally searching is his criticism of the "New Supernaturalism," with its complete contrast between God and the World, its emphasis on transcendence and denial of immanence, its emphasis on "original sin," its suspicion of mysticism, its refusal to recognize reason as the final court of appeal, and its correlative reliance on the authority of the "Word of God."

He does not, of course, deny that there are elements of truth in this

2. Unpublished MS.

theology. Properly interpreted, there is need for "decision" as an element in belief, and as against an extreme doctrine of immanence, there is a needed emphasis on the transcendence of God, lest He be completely identified with the world. There is also need to recognize the place of rational obedience in our duty to accept what is really true and to seek what is really good.

But to describe God as "wholly other" is to deny an important part of the teachings of Jesus and of the Christian traditions. It severs God so completely from the world that nothing can be accepted by the Christian faith either from ordinary experience, religious experience, or from philosophy or science. It severs the will of God so completely from human values that it is difficult to see how God can be, in any significant sense, man's God, or how man can describe Him, with any meaning we could recognize, by such words as Holy, Righteous, Just, or Good. It can, therefore, give no reason, other than His power, why we should love Him rather than hate Him, serve Him rather than rebel against Him. Further, it makes impossible any knowledge of God save through "Revelation," which being found neither in nature, in inspired texts, in mystic vision, in a living church, in experience or reason, is completely without content, a revelation that reveals nothing. In the last resort, the "word of God" reduces to almost anything we want to believe.[3]

More unfortunate, however, is the utter repudiation of reason. This is seen in the careless ambiguity of its terms, its fondness for using familiar English words in a misleading sense, and in its delight in paradoxes.

> This is one aspect of its fundamental rejection of the ultimate authority of Reason. It makes no attempt to resolve its paradoxes by further analysis but, rather, glories in the fact that contradictory opposites may both be true in the same sense and at the same time.[4]
>
> For the Christian faith to say farewell to reason, and to take as its model, instead, the passionate slogans, the prejudice, and wishful thinking of politics would be the first step toward suicide—or something worse than suicide. This way madness lies. Such a Christian faith might last for a time in a Nazi land if it had the backing of a Nazi Fuehrer; but in a Democracy its fate would be like that of the man who built his house upon the sand.[5]

3. *Can We Keep the Faith?* (New Haven, 1941), pp. 57 ff.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 63.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 64.

This is the ultimate issue between any form of liberalism and any kind of authoritarianism. The liberal can accept any declaration by any authority, in so far as it makes sense and is supported by evidence, but he cannot consider it either intellectually, morally, or religiously his duty to believe in the final truth of any theology which can only be believed if one ceases to think. This is not "pride of reason."

As rational beings we refuse to abdicate the throne of our autonomy. This is strictly true. And the final explanation of our refusal is to be found in the fact that we cannot abdicate. We cannot avoid the necessity of making the final decision; for even if we decide to abdicate *it is we who decide*;[6]

and further, it is not only reason that we should deny, but along with it, freedom in every sense of the word.

V

In thus rejecting "Supernaturalism," old or new, Pratt has much in common with religious humanism. Both being liberal, they agree that the final appeal for decision in intellectual matters is to reason and intelligence; both agree that moral ideals are independent of the will of God, and that the only God who can command the loving worship of a free and rational soul is one who is worthy of worship.

Pratt, however, does not agree that God can be identified with nature or the order within nature, or with social process, or with "the growth of organic unity making for mutuality and community." It is not enough that God should have only such reality as belongs to Alma Mater or to Uncle Sam, nor that "the assertion that there is personal, intelligent, loving God [be] nothing but a name for the fact that men are persons and that men and some animals are intelligent and affectionate."[7] Such "humanism" is bad empiricism and not even good humanism, for man cannot be understood out of his relation to the cosmos of which he is a part.

To specialize upon the study of man is perfectly justified; to refuse to be turned away from the needs of humanity by some fantastic form of otherworldliness is admirable. But not all the facts which are relevant to the study of man are to be found in physics, physiology, and behaviorism. To pay no attention to metaphysical questions, to look for no cosmic implications, to confine

6. *Ibid.*, p. 71.
7. *Adventures in Philosophy and Religion* (New York, 1931), pp. 185-89.

oneself to the verified facts of history and accepted laws of physical science is to leave out a good deal that is relevant and important in the study of man. . . . Humanism carried to its logical conclusion . . . launches one upon metaphysics—or theology.[8]

Furthermore, humanism by being too narrowly empirical forbids the venture of faith, even of a reasonable faith. As a reverent agnostic, realizing that none of the questions of ultimate importance to religion can ever be completely settled by appeal to evidence, for the simple reason that the evidence is only partially within human grasp, Pratt stresses, as strongly as the orthodox, the need for "decision" and the need for the "will to believe," within the limits set by our ultimate loyalty to truth. "Faith is not the only important requisite for a justifiable decision and for a life that can be justified, but its place can be taken by nothing else." Provided that our faith be not a credulous or emotional set of nonsensical contradictions and that it does not fly in the face of the evidence, we have the *right* to believe.

The liberal Christian, at any rate, makes his venture on Christianity because it is a reasonable faith, because the aura of reverence with which it came to him out of the past of his race, has a power over his will that few things possess, and because it is knit up with the highest to which he can aspire and with the loveliest for which he dares to hope.[9]

So unsatisfactory does he find humanism that he would exclude it from among possible Christian beliefs, and questions whether it is entitled to be called religious at all,[10] though in later life he was inclined to modify this to some extent. Certainly in so far as religion is an attitude of the whole man and not merely a matter of intellectual belief, he could recognize at least an emotional and volitional affinity even with those whose beliefs he regarded as inadequate or mistaken—even with atheists whose views he certainly did not share. He could not, however, regard the humanists' "God" as God at all. For him God is first of all "the Determiner of Destiny": The essential thing in religion is our relation to something that is cosmic in its nature. Religion becomes merely moral idealism in so far as it denies this. The "Social Gospel," "the betterment of man's estate," are but poor things without the sense of a cosmos that motivates philosophy, the cosmic longing that underlies

8. *Can We Keep the Faith?* pp. 73-84.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 84.
10. *The Religious Consciousness* (New York, 1920), p. 5.

theology, and the conscious and social relation to God that is the spiritual life. Humanism does not satisfy the demands of the religious consciousness.

I suggest, however, that we should distinguish between the denials of the humanists and their positive religious affirmations. Humanism seems to be derived from two different sources. The first source is the tendency of liberalism itself towards extreme naturalism. Pratt rightly criticises the identification of God either with nature or even with such empirically verifiable facts as the values embodied in man or history. It is only by dogmatically asserting naturalism that we can exclude at least the possibility that there may be a God, in some sense or other more nearly cosmic—that one can exclude the right to make the venture of faith.

The other source of humanism is in the nature of religious worship itself. Worship is an attitude of love, devotion, service. It follows that the object of our deepest devotion must, above all else, be worthy of our worship and that goodness, in some sense that human beings can acknowledge as good, must be His primary attribute. We can no more abdicate the throne of our highest moral consciousness than we can abdicate the throne of reason. The final object of our worship is the truly worshipful. More than this God may be; this, at least He must be.

If this be our basic premiss, we may assert any kind of reality or degree of power that is consistent with His Goodness, but if we reduce goodness to the mere fact of existence or of power, God ceases to be the object of our highest aspirations. It is better that our God should be less than omnipotent than that He should be less than good; better even that God be an ideal with no other locus in the universe than our own hearts than that He be existent and not good.

An essential humanism of this kind, purged of its dogmatic denials, is, I suggest, not discontinuous with the Christian tradition, and it could well claim to find its basis in the life and teachings of Jesus Himself. In his ethical teaching Pratt agrees with at least one of the basic premisses of humanism. He explicitly denies that morality can be defined as sheer obedience to the Will of God, no matter what it may be.

> The question at once arises whether God wills a given form of conduct because it is good, or whether it is good because God wills it. And the necessary answer is, of course, immediately obvious. The upholder of . . . the will of God theory of Ethics is precluded from saying that God wills an act because

it is good; for that answer would assume that morality is definable antecedently to God's will. He is, therefore, bound to say that an act is good because, and only because, God wills it. . . . The doctrine therefore amounts to this: that the word "goodness" is to be defined as God's will, no matter what it may be. The assertion that God is good becomes thus a redundancy amounting only to the undeniable proposition that He will what He wills. . . . If moral goodness . . . is to be defined as obedience to the will of a Being who is to be called good in no other sense than the He wills what He wills (which also the devils do), we want to be shown what obligation there is upon us to be good in this sense: or how obedience to this will . . . can be called rational or conducive to the values which we know as good.[11]

I suggest, further, that if this be accepted, the primary meaning of "Divinity" is not the "Ultimate Determiner of Destiny" (who might not be good) but, rather, "Perfection of Goodness."

VI

There is no difficulty in asserting that a real God and an existent God or even a powerful God may be good. The difficulty arises when we make Him the ultimate ground of existence and attribute to Him all power. But, for Pratt, a limited God who is "only one type of cosmic behavior," the good against the evil, while satisfying the moral element within the religious consciousness, does not satisfy the cosmic. "Only the whole of things, the totality of being, can fully satisfy the cosmic element in the religious heart."[12] From this point of view, a finite God cannot satisfy the religious consciousness which demands an infinite God in the sense of the totality of Being. God cannot have an environment. From this it follows that "Nature is either the appearance of or (in a sense) the body of God," and that "between the Divine Life and our personalities there should be an immeasurably more intimate relation than ever exists between two human souls."[13]

The evidence for the existence of such a God, is to be found partly in immediate and direct contact with God in religious experience, particularly the experience of the mystics, including the "milder mystics." In his *Religious Consciousness* and in *Can We Keep the Faith,* Pratt has

11. "God and the Moral Law," *The Harvard Theological Review,* XXIX (July, 1936) 155-56.
12. *Ibid.,* p. 165.
13. *Ibid.,* p. 167.

given us a careful analysis of the mystical experience and a temperate estimate of its evidential value. The mystical experience is neither the only evidence for the Faith, nor is it essential to it. The facts of mysticism do not demonstrably prove the existence of God, but the testimony of the mystics through thirty centuries may make our belief considerably more probable.[14] Mystical experience, further, does not guarantee the truth of any interpretation in terms of any particular theological concepts. Its minimum value is to be found in the "sense of presence" and its "sweetness and joy."

Whitehead has forcefully expressed the objection to the mystic's appeal to such inner experience. If religious experience is "the direct intuition of a personal being substrate to the universe" and "merely experienced in exceptional moments," it is "a function of these moments, . . . a private psychological habit and is without general evidential force."[15] It can be explained away by whatever explains such moments.

Pratt would, I think, be prepared to agree to this objection, in so far as it concerns any element in mystical experience except the "sense of presence," since this, like perception, is not just "inner experience," and if, as in the case of perception, it is sometimes mistaken, it does not follow that it is always mistaken.

> What (the mystic) tells us of the further nature of the being he experiences is doubtless a matter of interpretation, but his immediate awareness that he is in the presence of an Other is hardly to be analyzed further without altering it into something very different from what it really is. This awareness of an Other, stripped of its creedal interpretations, differs, so the mystic asserts, *toto coelo* from a mere belief. It comes with all the immediacy of sense perception. It has, of course, sensuous elements as every percept has; but to identify it with any collection of mere sense data is to mutilate it beyond recognition. It is, in short, if we may trust the mystics' introspective description (not their interpretation) a sign fact.[16]

Religious experience is an "immediate awareness of a Divine Other," but God exists in and expresses Himself through all reality and may, therefore, be apprehended in other ways. Mysticism functions in giving important corroborative evidence, and the seers open our eyes. "Later on (the religious man) may learn that he is in touch with God every-

14. *Can We Keep the Faith?* p. 129.
15. *Religion in the Making,* pp. 64-65.
16. *Can We Keep the Faith?* p. 121.

where; but it is in the mystic experience that he first and most fully *recognizes* God."[17]

VII

The Scylla and Charybdis of any philosophy of religion may be expressed as "God without goodness" and "Goodness without God." If choice between them is forced upon us, I have suggested that the lover of the good, anxious that religion be a force for the betterment of the world, cannot hesitate to decide for the latter alternative. But Pratt seems to me right in his insistence that we should, at any rate, all *like* to be able to believe that there is a cosmic support for our deepest values. We should like there to be a consonance between our aspirations, at least in some purified form, and the nature of things. The main problems of Christian theology and its deepest divisions arise from its tendency to insist that God must be both Good and All.

Two things are clear. We must not make this assertion by reducing morality to the arbitrary Will of God, or by identifying what ought to be merely with what is. This results in the blackest immorality, the reduction of right to might. Christianity has been, and still is by no means guiltless of this greatest of all heresies. Better to be Russell's unwearied Atlas, bearing the whole weight of values upon our own weak shoulders, than lose all values other than power.

For this reason I find myself disagreeing with Pratt's insistence that

> the essential thing about the Divine is its reality. When religious thought reaches its ultimate meaning it will always find that nothing short of the totality of the Real can satisfy it. About the existence of God in this high sense there can be no doubt. For his reality there is unanswerable ontological demonstration.[18]

If we do say that the essential thing about the Divine is its reality, then I agree with him that the final definition of God is the biblical "I am that I am." But this is not enough for a rational religion. To it must be added "I am love."

That God is loving, Pratt does not doubt; the evidence for this is partly in the "sweetness and joy" of the mystical experience, partly in the purposive characters within natural processes that imply an immanent purposing mind. But this is still not enough. It does not prove moral purposes. In the last resort, Pratt comes perilously close to the

17. *Ibid.*, p. 129.
18. *Naturalism* (New Haven, 1939), p. 177.

substitution of aesthetic for moral categories in describing God. Nature, which is the body of God, displays for our admiration the activity of

> the cosmic artist . . . ever fulfilling the inner urge of his own love of life and love of beauty. The Heavens declare the Glory of God, for they *are* His Glory. When we feel the beauty of the starry heavens and of trees and flowers, the wonders of the sea and of the interstellar spaces, it is literally the beauty of God that we behold.[19]

It includes an "element of wildness."

> His life is full of finite death, his delight includes sorrow and anguish. [Nature] is the endlessly spontaneous Dance of Shiva . . . the Divine [that] never works but ever plays. Its activity is only sport.[20]

There is a sublimity about this conception of God; it has a purgative value in carrying us beyond too great insistence on our small concerns and too great regard for comfort. It is, after all, God's answer to Job out of the whirlwind. But though the parade of God's power and the reminder of our littleness may silence us, it does not convince us that God is Love, for there still remains the evil of the world.

Because of his insistence upon the freedom and responsibility of the human soul, Pratt can, perhaps, account for the evil whose cause is the wrong choosing of free souls. For this the responsibility lies with man, not with God. But not all the evil in the world is moral evil. There seem to be things at cross-purposes, and in nature an element not only of wildness but of frustration. Since "the body of God" does not environ and limit God, as our bodies environ and limit our souls, but is the complete expression of His will, it would seem that the evils of nature are directly due to God's causation. Even more than this may be said. Our bodies belong to nature and thus are part of the body of God. The theory of interaction between mind and body works both ways; bodies act on spirit as well as spirit upon body. It is difficult, therefore, to see how God can be completely freed from responsibility even for moral evil.

The notion of nature as the "body of God" and God as the Soul of the world, is also not free from metaphysical difficulties. Taken literally, it carries into the concept of God the same kind of dualism and utter difference that Pratt insists upon in the relation between the human mind and the human body. If one presses the notion, we seem to be

19. *Personal Realism* (New York, 1937), pp. 377 ff.
20. *Ibid.*, pp. 375 ff.

driven either to the kind of absolutist monism which he rejects, or to an ultimate body-mind dualism, in God as well as in us, which would result in the doctrine that God was finite with an environment and, at least to some extent, conditioned by the nature of the matter of the world.

I think that Pratt himself, who modestly calls his own view no more than an "ultimate guess," would agree that this is the least important part of his thought. Much more important are such works as *The Religious Consciousness, India and its Faiths,* and *The Pilgrimage of Buddhism,* with their sympathetic descriptions of religions as continuous but ever changing streams of spiritual life, and his temperate evaluations of their worth. More important, also, is his *Can We Keep the Faith?,* with its careful separation between what is and what is not essential in Christian belief. Although he was ever a philosopher, religion is for him vastly more important than philosophy, and living, conscious intercourse with God vastly more important than precise beliefs about Him. A faith that does not claim to be knowledge needs no demonstrable proof; nor does its object need precise definition. Its insights can be expressed through poetic images; through symbols that point beyond themselves; through creeds, in so far as they are frankly recognized not as final formulae used as the basis for persecutions and exclusions, but as symbols that do not literally mean what they say and never can say all that is to be said.

But in so far as we have beliefs and make assertions or give definitions, no appeal to authority, tradition, social utility, can ever make incredible beliefs credible. Pratt's rigorous examination of theological propositions before the bar of reason may be of the greatest service to the Church, no less than his vindication of the intellectual respectability of the really essential religious beliefs.

He leaves us with a heightened sense of the unity of religious belief and with room, in mind as well as in heart and in will, for the Venture of Faith; for "a faith that is warm, but without fanaticism, reasonable but not coldly abstract, courageous yet never self-deceived, nor disloyal to truth, calmly confident, yet never blind, and neither slavishly servile to authority nor yet lonely and separatist."[21]

Such was his own faith.

21. *The Religious Consciousness,* p. 223.

PRAYER

ABRAHAM JOSHUA HESCHEL

Associate Professor of Jewish Philosophy, Hebrew Union College

ABOUT A HUNDRED YEARS AGO, Rabbi Isaac Meir Alter of Ger pondered over the question of what a certain shoemaker of his acquaintance should do about his morning prayer. His customers were poor men who owned only one pair of shoes. The shoemaker used to pick up their shoes at a late evening hour, work on them the whole night and part of the morning, in order to deliver them before their owners had to go to work. When should the shoemaker say his morning prayer? Should he pray quickly the first thing in the morning, and then go back to work? Or should he continue his work, let the appointed hour of prayer go by and, every once in a while, raising his hammer from the shoes, utter a sigh: "Woe unto me, I haven't prayed yet!"? Perhaps that sigh is worth more than prayer itself.

We, too, face this dilemma of wholehearted regret or perfunctory fulfillment. Many of us regretfully refrain from habitual prayer, waiting for an urge that is complete, sudden, and unexampled. But the unexampled is scarce, and perpetual refraining can easily grow into a habit—idle, sullen, and stolid. We may even come to forget what to regret, what to miss.

I

PRAYER AS AN ANSWER

We do not refuse to pray. We merely feel that our tongue is tied, our mind inert, our inner vision dim, when we are about to enter the door that leads to prayer. We do not refuse to pray; we abstain from it. We ring the hollow bell of selfishness, rather than absorb the stillness that surrounds the world, that hovers over all the restlessness and fear of life—the secret stillness that precedes our birth and follows our death. Futile self-indulgence brings us out of tune with the gentle song of nature's waiting, of mankind's striving for salvation. Is not listening to the pulse of wonder worth silence and abstinence from self-assertion? Why do we not set apart an hour of living for devotion to God by surrendering to stillness? We dwell on the edge of mystery and ignore it,

wasting our souls, risking our stake in God. We constantly pour our inner light away from Him, setting up the thick screen of self between Him and us, adding more shadows to the darkness that already hovers between Him and our wayward reason. Accepting surmises as dogmas, and prejudices as solutions, we ridicule the evidence of life for what is more than life. Our mind has ceased to be sensitive to the wonder. Deprived of the power of devotion to what is more important than our individual fate, steeped in passionate anxiety to survive, we lose sight of what fate is, of what living is. Rushing through the ecstasies of ambition, we only awake when plunged into dread or grief. In darkness, then, we grope for solace, for meaning, for prayer.

But there is a wider, voluntary entrance to prayer than sorrow and despair—the opening of our thoughts to God. We cannot make Him visible to us, but we can make ourselves visible to Him. So we open our thoughts to Him—feeble our tongue, but sensitive our heart. We see more than we can say. The trees stand like guards of the Everlasting; the flowers like signposts of His goodness—only *we* have failed to be testimonies to His presence, tokens of His trust. How could we have lived in the shadow of greatness and defied it?

Mindfulness of God rises slowly, a thought at a time. Suddenly we are there. Or is He here, at the margin of our soul? When we begin to feel a qualm of diffidence lest we hurt what is holy, lest we break what is whole, then we discover that He is not austere. He answers with love our trembling awe. Repentant of forgetting Him even for a while, we become sharers of gentle joy; we would like to dedicate ourselves forever to the unfoldment of His final order.

To pray is to take notice of the wonder, to regain the sense of the mystery that animates all beings, the divine margin in all attainments. Prayer is our humble answer to the inconceivable surprise of living. It is all we can offer in return for the mystery by which we live. Who is worthy to be present at the constant unfolding of time? Amidst the meditation of mountains, the humility of flowers—wiser than all alphabets—clouds that die constantly for the sake of beauty, *we* are hating, hunting, hurting. Suddenly we feel ashamed of our clashes and complaints in the face of the tacit greatness in nature. It is so embarrassing to live! How strange we are in the world, and how presumptuous our doings! Only one response can maintain us: gratefulness for witnessing

the wonder, for the gift of our unearned right to serve, to adore, and to fulfill. It is gratefulness which makes the soul great.

However, we often lack the strength to be grateful, the courage to answer, the ability to pray. To escape from the mean and penurious, from calculating and scheming, is at times the parching desire of man. Tired of discord, he longs to escape from his own mind—and for the peace of prayer. How good it is to wrap oneself in prayer, spinning a deep softness of gratitude to God around all thoughts, enveloping oneself in the silk of a song! But how can man draw songs out of his heart if his consciousness is a woeful turmoil of fear and ambition? He has nothing to offer but disgust, and the weariness of wasting the soul. Accustomed to winding strands of thoughts, to twisting phrases in order to reap praise, he is incapable of finding simple, straight words. His language abounds in traps and decoys, in shams and tricks, in gibes and sneers. In the teeth of such powerful distractions he has to focus all the powers of his mind on one concern. In the midst of universal agitation how can there be tranquillity?

Trembling in the realization that we are a blend of modesty and insolence, of self-denial and bias, we beseech God for rescue, for help in the control of our thoughts, words, and deeds. We lay all our forces before Him. Prayer is arrival at the border. "The dominion is Thine. Take away from me all that may not enter Thy realm."

II

PRAYER AND THE SPIRITUAL LIFE

As a tree torn from the soil, as a river separated from its source, the human soul wanes when detached from what is greater than itself. Without the ideal, the real turns chaotic; without the universal, the individual becomes accidental. It is the pattern of the impeccable which makes the average possible. It is the attachment to what is spiritually superior: loyalty to a sacred person or idea, devotion to a noble friend or teacher, love for a people or for mankind, which holds our inner life together. But any ideal, human, social, or artistic, if it forms a roof over all of life, shuts us off from the light. Even the palm of one hand may bar the light of the entire sun. Indeed, we must be open to the remote in order to perceive the near. Unless we aspire to the utmost, we shrink to inferiority.

Prayer is our attachment to the utmost. Without God in sight, we are like the scattered rungs of a broken ladder. To pray is to become a ladder on which thoughts mount to God to join the movement toward Him which surges unnoticed throughout the entire universe. We do not step out of the world when we pray; we merely see the world in a different setting. The self is not the hub, but the spoke of the revolving wheel. In prayer we shift the center of living from self-consciousness to self-surrender. God is the center toward which all forces tend. He is the source, and we are the flowing of His force, the ebb and flow of His tides.

Prayer takes the mind out of the narrowness of self-interest, and enables us to see the world in the mirror of the holy. For when we betake ourselves to the extreme opposite of the ego, we can behold a situation from the aspect of God. Prayer is a way to master what is inferior in us, to discern between the signal and the trivial, between the vital and the futile, by taking counsel with what we know about the will of God, by seeing our fate in proportion to God. Prayer clarifies our hopes and intentions. It helps us discover our true aspirations, the pangs we ignore, the longings we forget. It is an act of self-purification, a quarantine for the soul. It gives us the opportunity to be honest, to say what we believe, and to stand for what we say. For the accord of assertion and conviction, of thought and conscience, is the basis of all prayer.

Prayer teaches us what to aspire for. So often we do not know what to cling to. Prayer implants in us the ideals we ought to cherish. Salvation, purity of mind and tongue, or willingness to help, may hover as ideas before our mind, but the idea becomes a concern, something to long for, a goal to be reached, when we pray: "Guard my tongue from evil and my lips from speaking guile; and in the face of those who curse me, let my soul be silent."

Prayer is the essence of spiritual living. Its spell is present in every spiritual experience. Its drive enables us to delve into what is beneath our beliefs and desires, and to emerge with a renewed taste for the endless simplicity of the good. On the globe of the microcosm the flow of prayer is like the Gulf Stream, imparting warmth to all that is cold, melting all that is hard in our life. For even loyalties may freeze to indifference if detached from the stream which carries the strength to be loyal. How often does justice lapse into cruelty, and righteousness into hypocrisy. Prayer revives and keeps alive the rare greatness of some past

experience in which things glowed with meaning and blessing. It remains important, even when we ignore it for a while, like a candlestick set aside for the day. Night will come, and we shall again gather round its tiny flame. Our affection for the trifles of living will be mixed with longing for the comfort of all men.

However, prayer is no panacea, no substitute for action. It is, rather, like a beam thrown from a flashlight before us into the darkness. It is in this light that we who grope, stumble, and climb discover where we stand, what surrounds us, and the course which we should choose. Prayer makes visible the right, and reveals the hampering and the false. In its radiance we behold the worth of our efforts, the range of our hopes, and the meaning of our deeds. Envy and fear, despair and resentment, anguish and grief, which lie heavily upon the heart, are dispelled like shadows by its light.

Sometimes prayer is more than a light before us; it is a light within us. Those who have once been resplendent with this light find little meaning in speculations about the efficacy of prayer. A story is told about a Rabbi who once entered heaven in a dream. He was permitted to approach the temple in Paradise where the great sages of the Talmud, the Tannaim, were spending their eternal lives. He saw that they were just sitting around tables studying the Talmud. The disappointed Rabbi wondered, "Is this all there is to Paradise?" But suddenly he heard a voice, "You are mistaken. The Tannaim are not in Paradise. Paradise is in the Tannaim."

III

SUFFERING—THE SOURCE OF PRAYER?

In those souls in which prayer is a rare flower, enchanting, surprising, and scarce, it seems to come to pass by the lucky chance of misfortune, as an inevitable or adventitious by-product of affliction. But suffering is not the source of prayer. A motive does not bring about an act as a cause produces an effect; it merely stimulates the potential into becoming the actual. Peril or want may clear the ground for its growth, stubbing up the weeds of self-assurance, ridding the heart of the hard and obdurate, but it can never raise prayer.

To a farmer about to prepare a seedbed, the prerequisite for his undertaking is not the accidental need of a crop. His need of food does

not endow him with skill in cultivating the earth; it merely affords the stimulus and purpose for his undertaking. It is his knowledge, his possession of the idea of tillage, which enables him to raise crops. The same principle applies to prayer. The natural loyalty of living, fertilized by faith saved through a lifetime, is the soil on which prayer can grow. Laden with secret fertility, and patient discreetness concerning things to be and things forever unknown, the soil of the soul nourishes and holds the roots of prayer. But the soil by itself does not produce crops. There must also be the idea of prayer to make the soul yield its amazing fruit.

The idea of prayer may seem to be the assumption of man's ability to accost God, to lay our hopes, sorrows, and wishes before Him. But this assumption is a paraphrase, rather than a precise expression of what we believe. We do not feel that we possess a magic power of speaking to the Infinite; we merely witness the wonder of prayer, the wonder of man addressing himself to the Eternal. Contact with Him is not our achievement. It is a gift, coming down to us from on high like a meteor, rather than rising up like a rocket. Before the words of prayer come to the lips, the mind must believe in God's willingness to draw near to us, and in our ability to clear the path for His approach. Such belief is the idea that leads us toward prayer.

Prayer is not a soliloquy. But is it a dialogue with God? Does man address Him as person to person? It is incorrect to describe prayer on the analogy of human conversation; we do not communicate with God. We only make ourselves communicable to Him. Prayer is an emanation of what is most precious in us toward Him, the outpouring of the heart before Him. It is not a relationship between person and person, between subject and subject, but an endeavor to become the object of His thought.

Prayer is like the light from a burning glass in which all the rays that emanate from the soul are gathered to a focus. There are hours when we are resplendent with the glowing awareness of our share in His secret interests on earth. We pray. We are carried forward to Him who is coming close to us. We endeavor to divine His will, not merely His command. Prayer is an answer to God: "Here am I. And this is the record of my days. Look into my heart, into my hopes and my regrets." We de-

part in shame and joy. Yet prayer never ends, for faith endows us with a bold craving that He draw near to us and approach us as a father—not only as a ruler, not only through our walking in His ways, but through His entering into our ways. The purpose of prayer is to be brought to His attention, to be listened to, to be understood by Him; not to know Him, but to *be known* to Him. To pray is to behold life not only as a result of His power, but as a concern of His will, or to strive to make it a divine concern. For the ultimate aspiration of man is not to be a master, but an object of His knowledge. To live "in the light of His countenance," to become a thought of God—this is the true career of man.

But are we worthy of being known, of entering into His mercy, of being a matter of concern to Him? It seems as if the meaning of prayer lies in man's aspiration to be thought of by God as one who is thinking of Him. Man waxes in God when serving the sacred, and wanes when he betrays his task. Man lives in His mind when He abides in human life.

There is no human misery more strongly felt than the state of being forsaken by God. Nothing is so terrible as rejection by Him. It is a horror to live deserted by God, and effaced from His mind. The fear of being forgotten even for an instant is a powerful spur to a pious man to bring himself to the attention of God, to keep his life *worth* being known to Him. He prefers to be smitten by His punishment rather than to be left alone. In all his prayers he begs, explicitly or implicitly, "Do not forsake me, O Lord."

The man who betrays Him day after day, drunk with vanity, resentment, or reckless ambition, lives in a ghostly mist of misgivings. Having ruined love with greed, he is still wondering about the lack of tenderness. His soul contains a hiding-place for an escaping conscience. He has torn his ties to God into shreds of shrieking dread, and his ear is dull and callous. Spoiler of his own lot, he walks the earth a skeleton of a soul, raving about missed delight.

God is not alone when discarded by man. But man is alone. To avoid prayer constantly is to dig a gap between man and God which can widen into an abyss. But sometimes, awakening on the edge of despair to weep, and arising from forgetfulness, we feel how yearning moves in softly to become the lord of a restless breast, and we pass over the gap with the lightness of a dream.

IV

THE NATURE OF KAWWANA

A Rabbi once remarked on the passage in the Amidah, "For Thou hearkenest in mercy to the prayer of every mouth," that we would expect the phrase to be "the prayer of every heart." But the passage wishes to remind us that it is the mercy of God to accept even prayers that come only from the mouth as lip-service, without inner devotion. However, this remark in no way denies the principle that Kawwana, or inner participation, is indispensable to prayer, the principle which found a precise expression in the medieval saying: "Prayer without Kawwana is like a body without a soul."

Yet, what is the nature of Kawwana? Is it paying attention to the context of the fixed texts? Thinking? Prayer is not thinking. To the thinker, God is an object; to the man who prays, He is the subject. Awaking in the presence of God, our aim is not to acquire objective knowledge, but to deepen the mutual allegiance of man and God. What we want is not to know Him, but to be known to Him; not to form judgments about Him, but to be judged by Him; not to make the world an object of our mind, but to let it come to His attention, to augment His, rather than our knowledge. We endeavor to disclose ourselves to the Sustainer of all, rather than to enclose the world in ourselves.

To most people, thinking is a thing that grows in the hothouse of logic, separated from the atmosphere of character and of everyday living. They consider it possible for a man to be unscrupulous, and yet to write well about righteousness. Others may disagree with this view. However, all of us, mindful of the ancient distinction between lip-service and the service of the heart, agree that prayer is not a hothouse plant of temples, but a shoot that grows in the soil of life, springing from widespread roots hidden in all our needs and deeds. Vicious needs, wicked deeds, felt or committed today, are like rot cankering the roots of tomorrow's prayer. A hand used in crime is an axe laid to the roots of worship. It is as Isaiah said: "And when ye spread forth your hands, I will hide mine eyes from you; Yea, when ye make many prayers, I will not hear; Your hands are full of blood." Life is fashioned by prayer, and prayer is the quintessence of life.

The laws of science we comprehend as a rational concept in critical understanding, while the mercy and greatness of the Infinite we absorb

as a mystery. Prayer is a spiritual source in itself. Though not born of an urge to learn, it often endows us with insights not attainable by speculation. It is in prayer that we obtain the subsidy of God for the failing efforts of our wisdom.

But prayer goes beyond the scope of emotion; it is the approach of the human to the transcendent. Prayer makes man a relative to the sublime, initiating him into the mystery. The will, at times, is an outsider to the sanctuary of the soul. It ushers in great things, but does not always control them. The will to pray opens the gates, but what enters is not its product. The will is not a creative, but an auxiliary power, the servant of the soul. Creative forces may be discharged, but not engendered, by the will. Thus, inclination to pray is not prayer. Deeper forces and qualities of the soul must be mobilized before prayer can be accomplished. To pray is to pull oneself together, to pour our perception, volition, memory, thought, hope, feeling, dreams, all that is moving in us, into one tone. Not the words we utter, the service of the lips, but the way in which it is performed, the devotion of the heart to what the words contain, the consciousness of speaking under His eyes, is the pith of prayer.

For neither the lips nor the brain are the limits of the scene on which prayer takes place. Speech and devotion are functions auxiliary to a metaphysical process. Common to all men who pray is the certainty that prayer is an act which makes the heart audible to God. Who would pour his most precious hopes into a deaf abyss? Essential is the metaphysical rather than the psychical dimension of prayer. Prayer is not a thought that rambles alone in the world, but an event that starts in man and ends in God. What goes on in our heart is a humble preliminary to an event in God.

The passage of hours, almost unnoticeable, but leaving behind the feeling of loss or omission, is either an invitation to despair or a ladder to eternity. This little time in our hands melts away ere it can be formed. Before our eyes man and maid, spring and splendor, slide into oblivion. However, there are hours that perish and hours that join the everlasting. Prayer is a crucible in which time is cast in the likeness of the eternal. Man hands over his time to God in the secrecy of single words. When anointed by prayer, his thoughts and deeds do not sink into nothingness, but merge into the endless knowledge of an all-em-

bracing God. We yield our thoughts to Him who endowed us with a chain of days for the duration of life.

V

THE ESSENCE OF PRAYER

To many psychologists, prayer is but a function, a shadow cast by the circumstances of our lives, growing and diminishing along with our needs and wants. Consequently, to understand the nature of prayer, it is enough to become familiar with the various occasions on which it is offered. But is it possible to determine the value of a work of art by discovering the occasion of its creation? Assuming that we can ascertain whether Cervantes wrote his *Don Quixote* in order to pay his debts, or to attain fame and impress his friends, would that have any bearing upon either the intrinsic value, or our appreciation of his art? Nor is the factor which induces a person to pray the substance of prayer. The essence of prayer is inherent in the act of prayer itself. It can be detected only inside the consciousness of man during the act of worship.

The drive toward practical consequences is not the force that inspires a person at the moment of his chanting praise to God. Even in supplication the thought of aid or protection does not constitute the inner act of prayer. The hope of results may be the motive that leads the mind into prayer, but not the content which fills the worshiper's consciousness in the essential moment of prayer. The artist may give a concert for the sake of the promised remuneration, but, in the moment when he is passionately seeking with his fingertips the vast swarm of swift and secret sounds, the consideration of subsequent reward is far from his mind. His whole being is immersed in the music. The slightest shift of attention, the emergence of any ulterior motive, would break his intense concentration, and his singleminded devotion would collapse, his control of the instrument would fail. Even an artisan can never be true to his task, unless he is motivated by love of the work for its own sake. Only by wholehearted devotion to his trade, can he produce a consummate piece of craftsmanship. Prayer, too, is primarily Kawwana, the yielding of the entire being to one goal, the gathering of the soul into focus.

The focus of prayer is not the self. A man may spend hours meditating about himself, or be stirred by the deepest sympathy for his fellow man,

and no prayer will come to pass. Prayer comes to pass in a complete turning of the heart toward God, toward His goodness and power. It is the momentary disregard of our personal concerns, the absence of self-centered thoughts, which constitute the act of prayer. Feeling becomes prayer in the moment in which we forget ourselves and become aware of God. When we analyze the consciousness of a supplicant, we discover that it is not concentrated upon his own interests, but on something beyond the self. The thought of personal need is absent, and the thought of divine grace alone is present in his mind. Thus, in beseeching Him for bread, there is *one* instant, at least, in which our mind is directed neither to our hunger nor to food, but to His mercy. This instant is prayer.

We start with a personal concern and live to feel the utmost, for the fate of the individual is a counterpoint in a larger theme. In prayer we come close to hearing the eternal theme and discerning our place in it. It is as if our life were a seamless garment, continuous with the Infinite. Our poverty is His. His property is ours. Overwhelmed with awe of His share in our lives, we extend ourselves to Him, expose our goals to His goodness, exchange our will for His wisdom. For this reason, the analogy between prayer and petitioning another human being is like the analogy between the ocean and a cup of water. For the essence of prayer lies in man's self-transcending, in his surpassing the limits of what is human, in his relating the natural to the Divine.

Prayer is an invitation to God to intervene in our lives, to let His will prevail in our affairs; it is the opening of a window to Him in our will, an effort to make Him the Lord of our soul. We submit our interests to His concern, and seek to be allied with what is ultimately right. Our approach to the Holy is not an intrusion, but an answer. Between the dawn of childhood and the door of death, man encounters things and events out of which comes a whisper of truth, not much louder than stillness, but exhorting and persistent. Yet man listens to his fears and his whims, rather than to the soft petitions of God. The Lord of the universe is suing for the favor of man, but man fails to realize his own importance. It is the disentanglement of our heart from cant, bias, and ambition, the staving in of the bulk of stupid conceit, the cracking of hollow self-reliance, that enables us to respond to this request for our service.

VI

THE TWO MAIN TYPES OF PRAYER

At first sight prayer appears to be a communication of ideas or feelings through spoken words. Every one of us bears a vast accumulation of unuttered sorrows, scruples, hopes, and yearnings, frozen in the muteness of his nature. In prayer the ice breaks, our feelings begin to move our mind, striving for an outlet. It is not an expression of things accidentally stored up in our minds, but an emanation of what is most personal in us, an act of self-expression.

Yet, in a sense, prayer starts where expression fails. The words that reach our lips are often but waves of an overflowing stream touching the shore. We often seek and miss, struggle and fail to adjust our unique feelings to the patterns of texts. The soul, then, intimates its persistent striving, the riddle of its unhappiness, the strain of living twixt hope and fear. Where is the tree that can utter fully the silent passion of the soil? Words can only open the door, and we can only weep on the threshold of our incommunicable thirst after the incomprehensible. A certain passage in the morning prayer was interpreted by the Kotzker Rabbi to mean that God loves what is left over at the bottom of the heart and cannot be expressed in words. It is the ineffable feeling which reaches God rather than the expressed feeling.

Various attempts have been made to classify prayer. The division into supplication and praise pays attention to the theme, but not to the inner dynamics of prayer. This inner dynamics takes its course between the soul of man and the words. From this point of view, we have to distinguish between two main types of prayer: prayer as an act of expression, and prayer as an act of empathy. The first type takes place when there is a strong feeling within that leads to prayer, when we are stirred by something and seek words to express our state of mind. But the more common type of prayer is an act of empathy. There need be no prayerful mood in us when we begin to pray. It is through our reading and feeling the words of the prayers, through imaginative projection of our consciousness into the meaning of the words, and through empathy into the ideas with which the words are pregnant, that this type of prayer comes to pass.

The ability to express what is hidden in the heart is a rare gift, and

cannot be counted upon by all men. What, then, makes it possible for us to pray is our ability to affiliate our own minds with the pattern of fixed texts, to unlock our hearts to the words, and to surrender to their meanings. For words are not dead tools, but living entities full of spiritual power. The power of words often surpasses the power of our minds. The word is often the giver, and man the recipient. Thus man submits to the words. They inspire his mind and awaken his heart. We do not turn the light of prayer on and off at will, as we control sober speculation; we are seized by the overwhelming spell of His name. It is amazement, not understanding; awe, not reasoning; a challenge, a sweep of emotion, the tide of a mood, an identification of our wills with the living will of God.

What do most of us know about the substance of words? Estranged from the soil of the soul, our words do not grow as fruits of joy, but are found as sapless clichés, refuse in the backyard of the intelligence. There can be no prayer without a sense of the dignity of words. Everyone feels the binding force of the uttered word, the reality of an oath, vow, or promise, but rarely do we ponder on the nature of the secret power stored up in words. When the heart, co-operating with the forces of faith against tumult and anxiety, succeeds in keeping alive the inner stillness, we feel how great and gentle words can be. Strength and pride come from their sounds. They soften the harshness of fear and unfold the wings of hope. Our thoughts, tiny and feeble, become powerful in their wake.

There is always the opportunity of realizing the holy, but when we fail to use it, there are words to remind the mind what to draw from the depth of every hour. Words are like mountain peaks pointing to the unfathomable. Ascending their trails we arrive at prayer. They are like notes of music. It is the strength of our inner life which makes the symbols live; it is the fulness of our heart which lends force to words. By our feeling we make manifest and real what is indicated in the texts. In prayer, we discover what moves us unawares, what is urgent in our lives, what in us is related to the ultimate.

Is it the outburst of eloquence which makes the Infinite listen to our feeble voice? Prayer is not a sermon delivered to God. Essential in prayer is the intention, not the technical skill. In oratory, as in any

other work of art, we endeavor to lend an adequate form to an idea; we apply all our care to adjusting the form to the content. But prayer is almost pure content; the form is unimportant. It makes no difference whether we stammer or are eloquent. We can concentrate entirely on our inner devotion.

Two brief stories may be told relative to the two main types of prayer, the expressive and the empathic. One of these, told in Sefer Hassidim, concerns a young shepherd who was unable to read the Hebrew prayers. The only way in which he worshiped God was to say: "O Lord, I should like to pray, but I cannot read Hebrew. There is only one thing I can do for you—if you would give me your sheep, I would take care of them for nothing." One day a learned man passing by heard the shepherd pronounce his offer, and shouted at him: "You are blasphemous!" He told the boy that he should read the daily Hebrew prayers instead of uttering irreverent words. When the shepherd told him that he could not read Hebrew, he took him to his house and began to teach him to read the prayer-book. One night the learned man had a dream, in which he was told that there was great sadness in heaven because the young shepherd had ceased to say his usual prayer. He was commanded to advise the boy to return to his old way of praying.

Now many of us are so much on the side of the shepherd-boy as to be opposed to the institution of regular prayer, claiming that we should pray only when and as we feel inspired to do so. For such there is a story, told by Rabbi Israel Friedman, the Rizhiner, about a small Jewish town, far off from the main roads of the land. But it had all the necessary municipal institutions: a bathhouse, a cemetery, a hospital, and a law-court; as well as all sorts of craftsmen—tailors, shoemakers, carpenters, and masons. One trade, however, was lacking; there was no watchmaker. In the course of years many of the clocks became so annoyingly inaccurate that their owners just decided to let them run down, and ignore them altogether. There were others, however, who maintained that as long as the clocks ran they should not be abandoned. So they wound their clocks day after day, though they knew that they were not accurate. One day the news spread through the town that a watchmaker had arrived, and everyone rushed to him with their clocks. But the only ones he could repair were those that had been kept running—the abandoned clocks had grown too rusty!

VII

THE VISION OF PRAYER

The thirst for companionship, which drives us so often into error and adventure, indicates the intense loneliness from which we suffer. We are alone even with our friends. The smattering of understanding which a human being has to offer is not enough to satisfy our need of sympathy. Human eyes can see the foam, but not the seething at the bottom. In the hour of greatest agony we are alone. It is such a sense of solitude which prompts the heart to seek the companionship of God. He alone can know the motives of our actions; He alone can be truly trusted. Prayer is confidence, unbosoming oneself to God. For man is incapable of being alone. His incurable, inconsolable loneliness forces him to look for things yet unattained, for people yet unknown. He often runs after a sop, but soon retires discontented from all false or feeble companionship. Prayer may follow such retirement.

What is pride worth if it does not add to the glory of God? We forfeit our dignity when we abandon loyalty to what is sacred; our existence dwindles to trifles. We barter life for oblivion, and pay the price of toil and pain in the pursuit of aimlessness. Only concern for our inalienable share in the unknown holds our inner life together. It enables us to grasp the utopia of faith, to divine what is desirable to God, aspiring to be, not only a part of nature, but a partner of God. The sacred is a necessity in our lives, and prayer is born of this necessity. Through prayer we sanctify ourselves, our feelings, our ideas. Everyday things become sacred when prayed for to God.

The privilege of praying is man's greatest distinction. For what is there in man to induce reverence, to make his life sacred and his rights inalienable? The possession of knowledge, wealth, or skill does not compose the dignity of man. A person possessing none of these gifts may still lay claim to dignity. Our reverence for man is aroused by something in him beyond his own and our reach, something that no one can deprive him of. It is his right to pray, his ability to worship, to utter the cry that can reach God: "If they cry at all unto Me, I will surely hear their cry."

The main ends of prayer are to move God, to let Him participate in our lives, and to interest ourselves in Him. What is the meaning of praise if not to make His concern our own? Worship is an act of inner agreement with God. We can only petition Him for things we need

when we are sure of His sympathy for us. To praise is to feel God's concern; to petition is to let Him feel our concern. In prayer we establish a living contact with God, between our concern and His will, between despair and promise, want and abundance. We affirm our adherence by invoking His love.

Prayer is spiritual ecstasy. It is as if all our vital thoughts in fierce ardor should burst the mind to stream toward God. A keen single force draws our yearning for the utmost out of the seclusion of the soul. We try to see our visions in His light, to feel our life as His affair. We begin by letting the thought of Him engage our minds, by realizing His name and entering into a reverie which leads through beauty and stillness, from feeling to thought, and from understanding to devotion. For the coins of prayer bear the image of God's dreams and wishes for fear-haunted man.

At the beginning of all action is an inner vision in which things to be are experienced as real. Prayer, too, is frequently an inner vision, an intense dreaming for God—the reflection of the Divine intentions in the soul of man. We dream of a time "when the world will be perfected under the Kingdom of God, and all the children of flesh will call upon Thy name, when Thou wilt turn unto Thyself all the wicked of the earth." We anticipate the fulfillment of the hope shared by both God and man. To pray is to dream in league with God, to envision His holy visions.

Mo Ni Chiao Hsia Pu Tsan: The Lower (Second?) Section of the Manichaean Hymns. Translated by Tsui Chi. Reprinted from the *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies.* Vol. xi, part 1. London, 1943.

Through the courtesy of Dr. W. B. Henning of the London School of Oriental Studies, I have received from Mr. Tsui Chi, of St. Albans, England, a copy of his recent translation into English of the Hymns in this very curious and interesting text. The Roll belongs to the material brought back by Sir Aurel Stein from Tun-huang, and was recognized as Manichaean by Dr. Lionel Giles[1] when the material came to the British Museum, where it is now listed as Or.8210 (2659). Paul Pelliot noticed it in *JRAS* (1925), p. 113, and in the same Journal for 1926 Drs. Waldschmidt and Lentz described the Roll, which has written on the reverse side a Buddhist Vinaya text, and on the obverse this Manichaean text, the colophon to which describes it as being the lower (second?) section of the Manichaean Hymns. It is a community Hymn Book, containing Hymns, some in Iranian, both Pahlavi (Middle-Persian) and Parthian, in Chinese transcription, but the majority in Chinese translations from Iranian originals. Dr. Henning has recognized that the longest of these hymns, one entitled "In Praise of the World of Light," belongs to the Parthian Hymn Cycle entitled *Huvīdagmān,* "Happy are we."

There are 423 lines in the extant text. Roughly thirty lines are rubrics, giving titles, sometimes with instructions as to the liturgical use of the hymns, and at times the name of the author of the piece, just as we are accustomed to see in our modern Hymn Books. Thus we read: "The Gāthā should follow the Iranian[2] phonetics" (l. 154); "the indications and principles are profound and mystical, and the recital should

1. It is said to have been earlier recognized as Manichaean by Yabuki, in *Tonkō-chihō-shutsu kosha-butten kaisetsu moku roku* (Tokyo, 1917) (see Sir Aurel Stein, *Serindia* [Oxford, 1921], pt. ii, p. 922), but it was printed among the Buddhist texts in the *Taisho Tripiṭaka,* vol. liv.

2. The translator uses "Sanskrit" to translate the Chinese character *fan,* but as Dr. Henning points out in a note, this character which was used in Buddhist Chinese for both Sanskrit and Pali, was doubtless borrowed by the Manichaeans merely in the sense of "Scripture language," and since it was used indifferently for Sanskrit or Pali, according as the question was the Sanskrit or the Pali Canon, the Manichaeans, whose Scripture Canon was in Iranian, would have used the word as meaning "Iranian."

follow the Iranian phonetics" (l. 176); and again: "This Gāthā is used to conclude the Wishing during offering to the Dead" (l. 405); "A Gāthā: being a list for Collecting of Offerings" (l. 173); or "This Gāthā is used at the time of sunset in the Penitential and wishing service for the Auditores" (l. 387); and again: "A Hymn of Universal Petition and Praise, by Mo-yeh the Mu-shê"[3] (l. 120); or "In Praise of the World of Light," odes by Wei-Mao the Mu-shê" (l. 261).

The longer Hymns have the name "Praises," and the shorter ones the name *gat,* i.e., the Iranian *Gāthā,* which in territory under Iranian influence had doubtless come to be a technical term that could be used for any religious hymns, and did not necessarily have a specifically Zoroastrian connotation. Except in a few cases, the material is arranged in stanzas of four *pādai* of seven characters each. The hymns in the collection are all the work of a translator named Tao-ming, who adds a postscript telling how he chose these pieces from some three thousand in the Iranian books, and giving directions both to the scribe and to the chanter, so that we have no doubt whatever that these hymns were to be used in the services of the Manichaean Church in Chinese territory among Chinese speaking people. In ll. 351 ff., indeed, we have even a glimpse of the community at worship:

> During the recital of the above walk three times round and perform the homage three times. The "Stander" having chanted the Hymn makes a joint conclusion with the first one, and utters in chorus with the assembly—
>
> "We persons of the Superior form, comprehending the Venerable of Light,
> Can therefore believe in and accept clear speeches.
> Since the Great Saint is the embodiment of good deeds,
> So may it please Him to bestow mercy and make all the people joyful."
>
> After this "We persons of Superior form," the assembly will be silent. The Venerable one will recite the "Gāthā of A Fu Li," which is followed by the concluding Gāthā of "The Wonderful Body of Light."

As the scroll is broken at the beginning we do not know what the original superscription was, but, since what we have commences with part of a hymn in transcription, the probability is that we have not lost many lines of this second section of the book, and it is not impossible that the first half may yet turn up somewhere.

3. Mu-shê is the Chinese transcription of the Soghdian *mwčk'* = "Master" (Uighur *možak* of the Tufan Turkish documents), and so the διδάσκαλος or Magister of the Western texts, i.e., the Teachers who devoted their lives to the propagation of the faith.

The Roll has peculiar interest at the moment, because the newly found Coptic Manichaean documents also contain two sections of another and much earlier Hymn or Psalm Book[4] of the Manichaean community in Egypt. The Manichaeans seem to have been as much a singing community as the early Christians. We had long known from the notice in the *Fihrist* that the singing of hymns was thought by the Manichaeans to help liberate the light elements so that they might mount up,[5] much as the Muslim dervishes depend on their *zikr* for help in liberating the soul.[6] Augustine also, *Contra Faustum* xv, 5, mentions their hymns in their gatherings for worship. So it was not surprising that when actual Manichaean documents came to light in Turkestan, from the ruins of what had once been the home of a notable community of that faith, there should have been among the documents so many fragments of hymns, both in Turkish and Iranian,[7] or that the more recent Coptic find should have included portions of a Psalm (Hymn) Book.

Dr. Henning, in his notes to this translation, points out that the Manichaean community in Chinese Turkestan had four great Hymn cycles, two in Parthian and two in Pahlavi, and as Tao-ming in his postscript says that he translated these pieces from some three thousand passages in the Iranian originals, we may suppose that he chose from all four cycles, though so far only one (No. xiii from the Parthian *Huvīdagmān*) has been recognized.

4. It is really a single book (Schmidt-Polotsky, *Ein Mani-Fund in Ägypten*, p. 31), but the section so far published by the late Mr. C. R. C. Allberry, of Christ's College, Cambridge, is entitled *A Manichaean Psalm Book, Part* II, (Stuttgart, 1938). Schmidt insists that Psalm-Book is a more correct designation than Hymn-Book, but as it obviously served the purposes of our modern Hymn Books there seems to be no reason to be pedantic about the title.

5. *Fihrist*, p. 330, l. 25 (see Flügel's *Mani*, pp. 90, 232), and similarly, Shahrastānī (p. 191) says, "and among the things that help towards the freeing and separation and raising of the light particles, are praises and sanctuses *(tasbīh wa taqdīs)*." As already noted, the larger pieces in the Chinese Hymn Roll are called "Praises," and one of the smaller collections of Iranian Hymns was called *Qšudagān* = sanctuses, (see Waldschmidt and Lentz in *JRAS* (1926), pp. 121, 122.

6. Indeed, it would not be surprising to find that some dervish practices were of Manichaean origin.

7. It is worthy of note that there are hymn fragments in all three of the Iranian dialects represented there, in Pahlavi (Middle Persian), Parthian and Soghdian.

The twenty-five pieces in the collection are:

I. An Iranian Hymn in transcription. 5 lines.
II. A Hymn in Praise of Jesus, in two Cantos.[8] 75 lines.
III. A Hymn lamenting Impermanence, by Mo-szŭ-hsin (?Sisinnios). 36 lines.
IV. A universal Hymn of Petition and Praise,[9] by Mo-yeh the Mu-shê. 33 lines.
V. An Iranian Hymn in Chinese transcription. 5 lines.
VI. A Hymn in Praise of Mani, by many Mu-shê. 4 lines.
VII. A Hymn "The First One, the Venerable of Light," by Na-luo-yen. 3 lines.
VIII. A Gāthā in two Cantos; for the Collecting of Offerings. 6 lines.
IX. An Iranian Hymn in Chinese transcription. 8 lines.
X. A Hymn in Praise of the Law-Protecting Messengers of Light, by Tzu-hei-tuo. In three Cantos. 35 lines.
XI. A Gāthā in Praise of the Unsurpassed Venerable of Light (perhaps by Sisinnios). 12 lines.
XII. A Hymn in Praise of the Five Lights, by many Mu-shê. In two Cantos. 24 lines.
XIII. A Hymn in Praise of the World of Light, by Wei-Mao[10] the Mu-shê. 77 lines.
XIV. A hymn to conclude the Wishing of the Ten-day Fasting.[11] 7 lines.
XV. A second Canto of the same. 8 lines.
XVI. A Gāthā to conclude the Wishing, after praising the Venerable of Light. 3 lines.
XVII. A Gāthā to conclude the Wishing, after praising the Sun. 3 lines.
XVIII. A Gāthā to conclude the Wishing, after praising Srōsh. 3 lines.
XIX. A Gāthā to conclude the Wishing, after praising Jesus. 3 lines.
XX. A Gāthā to conclude the Wishing, after praising Mani. 7 lines.
XXI. A Gāthā to conclude the Wishing, at the time of sunset. 6 lines.

8. This is the Hymn translated by Waldschmidt and Lentz in *Die Stellung Jesu im Manichäismus,* (Berlin, 1926) pp. 97-111.

9. This is the Hymn translated by Waldschmidt and Lentz in *Manichäische Dogmatik,* (Berlin, 1933). They identify the author with Mār Zakū, whom the *Fihrist,* 328 names as one of the early disciples who appeared with Mani before Shāpūr, who in the *Maḥrnāmag,* 239 (Müller, *Ein Doppelblatt,* p. 20) is hailed "O Great Teacher, Mār Zakū," and whom *Fihrist,* 337 lists as the author of one of the Manichaean Epistles.

10. Henning thinks that perhaps under the name of Wei-Mao we have Mār 'Ammō, the Apostle of the Parthians, who was known as the author of the Parthian Hymn Cycles.

11. Nos. xiv and xv from their rubrics are obviously connected with services in commemoration of the dead.

XXII. A Gāthā for sunset use in the Penitential and Wishing service for Auditores.[12] 6 lines.

XXIII. A Gāthā for use to conclude various Chantings and Wishings. 3 lines.

XXIV. A Gāthā to conclude the Wishing, during offering for the Dead. 4 lines.

XXV. A prose Penitential Prayer for Auditores. 4 lines.

The fact that the texts are all translations from Iranian originals necessarily marks them as belonging to the second stage of the Manichaean translation effort, for much of the Iranian material is itself translation from Syriac originals, as is the case with the Coptic Hymns.[13] But if some of the early study of the Chinese documents, such, e.g., as that of Miss Luise Troje,[14] went too far in its enthusiasm for these texts, H. H. Schaeder's judgment in *Gnomon* IX, 337, 338, that they represent only a degenerate form of Manichaism, goes too far in the other direction. In working through this Hymn Roll one is impressed by the way its material illustrates not only what we have in earlier Eastern sources, but also much that we find in Western sources, so that it seems time to revise earlier judgments as to their value for the understanding of primitive Manichaism.[15] It has been pointed out by several investigators that the Manichaean propaganda was accustomed to express itself as far as possible in terms of its immediate religious environment.[16] In the Iranian mission the propaganda used Zoroastrian phraseology and drew on the Iranian mythology[17] to make its message clearer to audiences whose background was the old Iranian culture. In the Western Mission we find Faustus and Fortunatus using Christian phraseology

12. Four lines are verses, and then it breaks into a prose conclusion.

13. *Psalm-Book* II, p. xix, though the editor thinks that they were translated first into Greek and then into Coptic, but with reference back to the Syriac originals.

14. *Die Dreizehn und die Zwölf in Traktat Pelliot* (Leipzig, 1925).

15. See, for example, Henning's judgment in *OLZ* (1935) Nr. 4 col. 221: "nur späte Schriften in chinesischen Sprache, die für das Verständnis des Urmanichäismus wertlos sind."

16. See Von Wesendonk, e.g., *Die Lehre des Mani,* (1922), p. 52.

17. W. B. Henning, in publishing the fragments of the *Book of Giants* in *BSOAS* XI, i (1943), 52-74, has recently drawn attention to an interesting example of this. Al-Ghadanfar of Tabrīz (Kessler, *Mani,* 199), had said that Mani in his *Book of Giants* had told the tales of Sām and Narīmān, which names he had taken from the Avesta. Truly enough, in both the Middle-Persian and Soghdian fragments which survive we find the names Sām and Narīmān, in the account of the dragon-killing, but it is clear that in the Syriac original the names were Ohya and Ahya, the sons of Σεμιαξᾶς, chief of the 'Εγρήγοροι of the *Book of Enoch* (vi, 3), and obviously Sām had been chosen because he also was of phenomenal length of life and was a dragon slayer.

and endeavoring to show that the Manichaean teaching was a truer Christianity than that of the Church.[18] So, in contact with areas that were largely populated by Buddhists, the propaganda set itself forth in Buddhist terms. In this connection it is well to remember that, as early as 732, the Imperial Edict issued in China against the Manichaean propaganda calls it a perverse doctrine which deceives the people by pretending to be Buddhism.[19]

These Hymns are full of Buddhist phraseology. Mani is called a Buddha (372), Jesus is called a Buddha (29), and sun and moon are Buddhas of light (25). The goal which the soul finally reaches after its emancipation and refining is called Nirvāṇa (399), and so the Father of Greatness is called King of Nirvāṇa (309). Technical Buddhist Sanskrit terms keep cropping up, such as *vaiḍūrya* (41), *avidyā* (272), Lohans = Arhants (256), *kalpa* (64 and 247), *vihiṃsā* (21), *makaras* (19), *buddhagotra* (234). Also Chinese names that refer to familiar Buddhist figures are occasionally used, e.g., Ti-Tsang (130), who like the Japanese Jizo represents the Bodhisatva Kṣitigarbha, and because of similarity of function is given as the name of that figure known in the Western tradition as Gloriosus Rex; or Kwan-yin and Shih-chih (391 and cf. 133), the Chinese equivalents of Avalokiteśvara and Mahāsthāmaprāpta are used for Appelant and Respondent.[20] Some of this Buddhist terminology may have been introduced by the Chinese translator, but much Buddhist Sanskrit terminology had already been introduced into the Iranian and Turkish Manichaean texts composed in areas of Buddhist domination.

Not all that might seem on the surface to be due to Buddhist influence, however, is to be traced to such an origin. The continual emphasis on Law, e.g., and the use of the word Law to mean "religion," is not due to Buddhist influence. It is possible, even probable, that the Chinese character *fa* was chosen by Tao-ming because it is the character commonly used to indicate the Buddhist Code, the *dharma*,[21] but in the Uighur texts we have the word *nom* used very much as in these Chinese

18. Cf. Augustine *C. Faust.* v, 1-3.

19. Text and translation by Chavannes and Pelliot, in *JA* (1913), pp. 154, 155; and see p. 382.

20. There is some discussion of this Buddhist terminology in Waldschmidt and Lentz, *Die Stellung Jesu*, pp. 9 ff.

21. Soothill and Hodus, *Dictionary of Chinese Buddhist Terms*, (1937), p. 267b.

texts, and this *nom*[22] is clearly derived from the Syriac transliteration of the Greek νόμος, a word which is also to be found frequently in the Coptic texts, both in the Homilies and in the Psalm-Book. Similarly, the word for "sea," *hai,* may have been chosen because it stands for the Buddhist Sanskrit *Sāgara,*[23] and, in the particular phrase "sea of birth and death," may refer to the Buddhist idea of the *saṃsaramahāsamudra,* the great ocean of successive existences that has to be crossed by the soul.[24] Yet, in the Coptic texts we have, e.g., in the Psalm-Book, both the Greek word θάλασσα (70, l. 3) and the Coptic *iam* (150, l. 28; 151, l. 8) for the sea of life where the soul uneasily voyages till it finds emancipation. The horror of harming any form of life so vividly expressed in Hymn Roll ll. 91, 104, 392, 393,[25] may in its expression have been influenced by the Buddhist conception of *ahimsa,* but it was equally part of the Western tradition, for Cyril of Jerusalem, writing in the year 348 (*Catecheses* VI,-31), ridicules it.

There has perhaps been a tendency to exaggerate the differences between the Western and the Eastern traditions as to Manichaean teaching. As Polotsky has pointed out,[26] the *Manuhmed-Vahman* figure and the *grīv žīvandag,* which used to be thought to appear only in the Iranian tradition, now appear to be but the Iranian translations of elements we find well established in the Western tradition. On the other hand, elements that were thought to be exclusively of the Western tradition now appear in the Eastern as well. For example, the *Jesus patibilis* who figures so prominently in the pages of Augustine—*omni suspensus ex ligno*—the suffering Jesus who hangs from every tree,[27] and

22. In the Uighur texts we have it used not only in the general sense, as in *üč ödki-i nom,* "the Law of the Three Moments," *iki yiltiz nom,* "the Law of the Two Roots," and in the hypostatization of *nom qutī,* "Majesty of Law," who becomes the third member of the triad of the Third Evocation, but is also used in the specialized meaning of "Scripture," translating the Buddhist Sanskrit *sūtra,* just as in Mongol. This is also true of its use in the Coptic documents, cf. *Psalm-Book* II, p. 57, l. 11.

23. Soothill and Hodus, p. 327b.

24. Chavannes et Pelliot *JA* (1911), p. 532.

25. It appears in the Karabalgasun Inscription, and impressed the Arabic authors later, as is evidenced by al-Bīrūnī *Chronologie,* 207, and by al-Jāḥiẓ in cap. IV of his *Kitāb al-Ḥayawān.* Cf. Ṭabarī *Annales,* III, 588, where we cannot suspect any Buddhist influence.

26. *Mani-Fund,* p. 81.

27. August. *de Haer.* xlvi; *C. Faust.* ii, 5 ff; xx, 2, 11, 13; Evodius, *de Fide,* xxxiv, and C. F. Baur, *Das manichäische Religionssystem,* pp. 71-72. Kessler, in *PRE,* ³XII (1903),

whom Augustine (*C. Faust.* v, 5) called "the false delusive son of a false delusive man," appears quite clearly before us in the Hymn Roll, e.g., in l. 74, where Jesus is the Tree of whose fruits whoever eats will leave forever the current of birth and death (and cf. l. 254, where the Five Lights, i.e., the Elements, are called "the very flesh and blood of Jesus").

The translator used photographs of the original roll, and it is to be hoped that it may be possible to publish the text without too long a delay, for the only text at present available is the rather inaccessible print made in 1928 at Tokyo in Volume LIV of the *Taisho Tripiṭaka,* where it is numbered 2140 and occupies pages 370-379. As the translator remarks, these Manichaean texts are extremely ambiguous, so that, until we know more of the Manichaean system of thought, translations of such documents are bound to differ considerably. A comparison of his translation with that of the parts rendered into German by Waldschmidt and Lentz shows that they often differ widely in their interpretation of passages, and much further study will have to be done before we fully understand the documents.

Two things stand out in even a cursory examination of the Hymn Roll. The first is the very real spirit of piety that breathes through them. These were men and women who understood personal religion as a spiritual experience, an impression one gets also from the Coptic Psalms. They are not formal expressions of praise and penitence, but are warm, living religion expressing itself in song. The second is the unique position of Jesus in the system. That Jesus loomed large in the Manichaeism that appears in the pages of Augustine was natural, since the Manichaean teachers of North Africa were careful to emphasize how much of Christianity there was in their system. Nor was it strange that Oriental Christian writers should have been so impressed by the importance of Jesus in the Manichaean system as to claim that Mani must at one time have been a Christian teacher.[28] But when Waldschmidt and Lentz published their study, *Die Stellung Jesu,* one had the feeling that they had, perhaps, picked out and emphasized certain points in the

p. 208, l. 35 claimed that this was a purely Western development, and cf. Polotsky in Pauly-Wissowa, *Supplementband,* VI (1935), 258.

28. *Chronique de Séert,* in *Patr. Orient.* IV, 226; *Chronicon Maroniticum,* in *CSCO* Syr. IV; Michael Syrus, ed. Chabot, pp. 117, 118; Barhebraeus, *Mukhtaṣar,* 129. It is interesting that Cyril of Jerusalem, VI, 21 indignantly denies that Mani had ever had any connection with the Church.

Eastern tradition unduly. Now that we have the complete Hymn Roll before us, however, it is clear that they have not exaggerated, and the unique position of Jesus in the Chinese material parallels his unique position in the Coptic documents.

Mr. Tsui Chi and his sponsor, Dr. Henning, have rendered an important service in making this text available for fuller study, and the attention of students in this country is called to it.

ARTHUR JEFFERY

Columbia University

A Century of Jewish Life. By ISMAR ELBOGEN. Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society of America, 1944. xliii, 814 pp. $3.00.

Heinrich Graetz, the greatest Jewish scholar and historian of modern times, stated in his *Geschichte der Juden,* XI (1870), vi, that he prefers to close his work with "the truly new European era of 1848." Professor Ismar Elbogen picked up the threads of the narrative with the generation before 1848, and led the historical exposition down to our own times. The book is meant to be a supplement to the English edition of Graetz's monumental *History of the Jews,* published in six volumes by The Jewish Publication Society of America (most recent edition, 1941). Professor Moses Hades of Columbia University translated the German manuscript into dignified English. Dr. Solomon Grayzel, Editor of the Society, prefaced the work. Professor Alexander Marx, upon whose suggestion the volume was written, contributes (pp. xi-xx) an appreciation of the author, who passed away on August 1st, 1943, leaving behind the manuscript of the book before us.

This book appears at a time of a great human crisis, when human society shockingly suffers from deep strains, physical, and emotional. One wonders what to expect from a work bearing the time-heavy title *A Century of Jewish Life,* because today we search bravely into the meaning of history, knowing better than ever before that the reality in which we live is but temporal. In our age of a seemingly popular culture nothing could be more laudable than to make known "the best that has been taught in the world" (Matthew Arnold). A popularly written survey of the last hundred years of Jewish existence is well worth having now. It tears away the cover of graces and conventions from certain features of

modern civilization, disclosing the ignoble prompting of man as he indulges in a fury of blood and brutality against his Jewish brother.

An exposition of the historical springs upon which the complex theme of the writing of "Jewish History" is based, could hardly have failed to illustrate the historical approach of the author who is fully aware of the difficulties involved in the writing of "contemporary history": "Danger of straying from scientific objectivity grows when the requisite detachment is lacking, when the thoughts and the feelings of the judge are inextricably involved in the stream of events, and where the reader expects not only a factual account but an attitude" (p. xliii).

Large parts of the book, indeed, possess the quality of "sharing," if I may use a Buchmanite notion, especially those dealing with the events of the last two decades. This is to be expected, because "it is recognized that a man who stands in an historical process is too limited in vision to discern the full meaning of that process, and too limited to fulfill the meaning, however much the freedom of his knowledge and his power is one element in the stuff of history" (Reinhold Niebuhr, *The Nature and Destiny of Man*, II, 3). But Elbogen's fears that his emotional participation in the happenings he describes might affect his historical approach, are dispelled by the fact that, on the contrary, such a participation makes possible a deeper penetration into the structure of history. Max Scheler, in *Moralia* (1923), showed the significance of emotions for the process of perception. What we call "objectivity" does not require an emotional unconcern of the scholar for the material to be investigated, because

> nothing would remain after the extinction of the *Ich* to comprehend the *Nicht-Ichs*. The deeper reason lies in the fact that the formal reality of individuality, such as is found in the historic personality, must become operative in the historian too, so that it may be reconstructed and understood by him, (G. Simmel, *Probleme der Geschichtsphilosophie*, p. 60).

Theodor Litt's structural analysis of *Erkenntnis und Leben*, proved that as soon as

> the mental life has caught the eye of any "object," it means simultaneously, that it reacts with regard to this object either in a perceptible manner, thus excluding an attitude of expediency, or for the purpose of expediency, thus excluding an attitude of perception (pp. 39 f.).

Elbogen did not offer an outline of the principles guiding his his-

torical approach which, nevertheless, are recognizable in his work. That there are various approaches in writing history, and that each generation writes its own history, has become a commonplace that, if reiterated, sounds like a stale joke. If the historian is imbued with the spirit of his age, or is somehow a product of the age, his interpretation of the available historical material becomes obvious in the presentation of his object. The ingenious Heinrich Graetz set forth his historical method in a treatise entitled *Die Konstruktion der jüdischen Geschichte* (1846). Elbogen's writing of history appears as a descriptive enumeration of historical facts, political, cultural, religious, and social, revealing his special gift as an historian of literature, which was indeed his main field of research. Thus, stress is placed on the material expression of historical development. To achieve this effect, facts and events are piled upon facts and events until the general lines are obvious. This method hardly probes beneath the surface of history to appraise the ideas that carry it, for which reason the book appears as a *report* on *res gestae*. Since the author adheres to a descriptive manner of writing history, which shows the course of historical development without really explaining it, and not to the genetic approach, the importance of ideological elements which have counted greatly in the shaping of modern Jewish history have not been taken into consideration. But today it should be more obvious than ever before that the determining springs of modern Jewish history are to be found in the ideologies that shape modern civilization.

Here is an example of descriptive history which does not count with the genesis of historical development. We read (on p. xxxvii): "As a response to the Hep Hep riots in 1819, [Leopold Zunz and Eduard Gans] organized the *Verein für Kultur und Wissenschaft der Juden*. . . . the organization was premature and not successful, but it created what Zunz called the 'the Science of Judaism'." In reality, the founding of the association was the result of the reaction against the Jewish emancipation which took place after the signing of the Holy Alliance of 1815. Most of the leading members of the *Verein* had met since 1816 in a "Scientific Circle" (*ZGJD*. v, 1935, p. 3). As an old man, Zunz himself underlined the expression "Science of Judaism" in the minutes of the *Verein* where it appears on May 27, 1821, suggested by Eduard Gans, the pupil of Hegel (*ZGJD*. v, 1935, pp. 19 f.).

To lift the writing of Jewish history to the broader viewpoint of world developments is essential because of the world-wide dispersion of the Jews. Jewish history sinks into its proper place only if seen in the wide horizon of general history, in the same manner as the history of American Jews finds its proper place only if seen from and in the horizon of American history. Generally speaking, the historical methodology to be employed in the writing of Jewish history thus lies in an emphasis on the history of ideas. Leopold Zunz, the founder of modern nineteenth century Jewish research, a pupil of the great classical scholars Friedrich August Wolf and August Boeckh, recognized this fact by stating that "the history of the dispersed Jewish people is a world of ideas" (*Zeitschrift für die Wissenschaft des Judentums*, I [1822-23], 116).

As a whole, the book propounds many important issues for consideration. It gives us a much needed survey of the last hundred years of Jewish history. Considering the evils of our days and the difficulties of the far-flung object, we must expect some deficiencies, and we marvel that there are not more.

The author's judgment as to Napoleon's alleged "insincere" attitude towards the Jews (pp. xxviii f.) should be modified in accordance with Robert Anchel, *Napoléon et les Juifs* (Paris, 1928), who concluded (p. 581), that Napoleon's "oeuvre relative aux Juifs se présente donc à nous comme animée d'un dessein unique d'amélioration sociale." The importance of the French consistorial constitution imposed by Napoleon on the Jews has been underestimated by Elbogen. It became the basis for the organization of the Jews in a number of German States (Hesse, Baden, Württemberg, Westphalia) during the nineteenth century. Page 292 contains an inconsistency between the opinion of the Russian Minister von Plehve and the author's interpretation of it. Since Plehve was convinced of the "fearful poverty" of the Jews, Elbogen's conclusion as to Plehve's refusal to permit their emigration because he did not want "too much intelligence and capital to be withdrawn from the country" is unwarranted. It seems to be quite evident that Plehve did not want to lose future soldiers. Kurt Eisner (p. 488) was *Prime Minister* of Bavaria. As to the imaginary inscription for the entrances of Concentration Camps, suggested by Elbogen, the reviewer wishes to record the very prosaic one over the *exit* of the Dachau Concentration Camp: *Arbeit macht frei*. Since the book will be in the hands

of laymen, it would have been advisable to indicate in the *Bibliography* (pp. 771 ff.) the decidedly anti-Semitic literature (in order to prevent misuse), such as Ahlwardt (p. 771); *Antisemitenspiegel* (p. 772); Guenther (p. 776); *Handbuch der Judenfrage* (p. 776); *Semi-Gotha, Semi-Kürschner* (p. 784), etc.

As a popular source of information, the book will serve a good purpose; as a posthumous work it will be a lasting memorial for a life devoted to scientific pursuit. The author's staunch belief in the future of the Jews, even in the face of the undescribable holocaust that continues to sweep them under Europe's soil, is a valiant expression of optimism. One may vigorously agree with this basic faith of his in a better future, and yet wince a bit at any over-optimistic picture: the night is over, and over there glows the ruddy dawn. We should guard ourselves against any naïve, and thereby ruinous optimism, stimulating unqualified hopes. The fighting optimism of the ancient Hebrew prophets seems to hover over the concluding words of the tired old man who, a short time before his demise, wrote in his *Epilogue* with dithyrambic verve (p. 682):

> The dominion of wickedness will be broken, but we shall still be far from the millenium. Strenuous and unstinted efforts will be needed to heal the wounds the world bleeds from. Though trained in martyrdom, the Jewish people never before has experienced such a cataclysm as has our generation. But we go on! . . . Battered from all sides, we were capable of giving to the world some of the greatest luminaries of the period. We don't despair! As long as Israel believes, Israel will not perish! We trust in God, and we go on!

LUITPOLD WALLACH

Knoxville, Tenn.

Sententiae Petri Pictavensis, I. Edited by PHILIP S. MOORE, C.S.C., and MARTHE DULONG. Notre Dame, Indiana: The University of Notre Dame, 1943, lxii, 326 pp.

Peter of Poitiers (ca. 1130-1205) was a pupil and disciple of the famous *Magister* of so many medieval theological commentaries, Peter Lombard (before 1159). He taught theology in Paris for many years and wrote his chief work, the *Sententiae*, before 1170 (cf. P. S. Moore, *The Works of Peter of Poitiers* [Notre Dame, Ind., 1936] p. 41). He was chancellor of the University of Paris during 1193-1205 (assuming, of course, that we may speak of a *university* during this transition period).

Teaching and writing in the second half of the twelfth century, Peter was active at that moment in European thought when the task of codifying and organizing Christian doctrine was meeting the problem of measuring the nature and the limits of such human tools as logic and grammar used in the service of faith. In an earlier age, when the Christian awareness of the human reason was still obscure, Peter Damian could heap scorn on Cicero and Donatus. But if only because of Abelard, the work of understanding faith in a human way and with human instruments flourished in the twelfth century; and whereas Peter Damian had damned the grammarians on the ground that they merely taught you to decline God in the plural, thinkers like Abelard, Hugh of St. Victor, Peter Lombard, and Peter of Poitiers were wrestling with the problem of reconciling the limitations of human language and logic with the perfections of God. How dare man, using a language which is burdened with change and time and plurality, speak of an immutable God? The *Sententiae,* or *Sentences,* of Peter of Poitiers is a contribution to the development of an answer to this question.

The present work contains an edition of the first book of Peter's *Sentences.* The editors recognize (pp. lvii-lviii) that their edition cannot be called critical, since they have not been able to establish a family tree among the thirty-five MSS of the *Sentences* (described in *The Works of Peter of Poitiers,* pp. 28 ff.). Without any question, the Moore-Dulong text is superior to that of the Maurist, Hugh Mathoud (Paris, 1655) reprinted in Migne's *Patrologia Latina* (vol. 211). The present editors have contributed a substantial Introduction to the text, in which they discuss the method (pp. xiv-xxi), the sources (pp. xxii-xxvii) and especially the dependence on Peter Lombard of the *Sentences* of Peter of Poitiers (pp. xxviii-1), They have also supplied the main historical references in the *Sentences.* These are aids for which the student of medieval thought will be grateful.

What is missing in the Introduction is a precise doctrinal estimate of the *Sentences.* Perhaps the editors reserve such an estimate until all five books of Peter's work have been edited. Grabmann and Landgraf have already stressed the importance of the *Sentences,* and Father Moore, to whom the present Introduction owes so much, has followed their lead. No one can quarrel with this general position. But, in the Moore-Dulong Introduction, we read that Peter of Poitiers exercised consider-

able influence on Simon of Tournai and Prepositinus of Cremona. We read further that this influence "continued well into the thirteenth century, where it is found even in the *Summa Theologica* of St. Thomas" (p. ix). As an example of Peter's influence, the editors offer the following: "Thus Peter's explanation of the divine names, based on speculative grammar, have no doubt influenced Thomistic theories on the divine names and analogy, while in general his speculations on the Trinity help us considerably in understanding the corresponding treatise in St. Thomas" *(ibid.)*. It is in such statements that we could wish for further precisions.

If the question were merely concerned with the form and method of the *Sentences*, it could be argued that Peter's treatise is much more a *summa* than a compilation of patristic texts. But this is not the essential point. The editors have emphasized in their Introduction that speculative grammar was "Peter's favorite means of solving questions and difficulties, at least in the first book of the *Sentences*" (pp. xvii-xviii). But most of the first book is occupied precisely with such questions and difficulties. Peter is constantly concerned with the use of nouns and verbs in formulating propositions about God and God's knowledge. He is involved in such problems as whether a change in tenses has any effect on the meaning of a proposition. What sort of difference is there between saying that *Socrates is sitting*, that *Socrates sat*, and that *Socrates will sit*? Does time enter into the meaning of a proposition? Even more, what tools is one to use in determining the effect on meaning of these differences in propositions?

On such questions there is a considerable difference between Peter of Poitiers and St. Thomas Aquinas. Peter experiences not a little trouble in reconciling the effect of time on the meaning of propositions with the invariability of the divine knowledge (*Sentences*, I, 13; pp. 126-27); and his difficulties are due mainly to the fact that behind his use of language he has scarcely the rudiments of a psychology and a metaphysics of human knowledge. How far removed St. Thomas is from this position may be seen from such Thomistic texts as *In I Sent.*, d.41, q.1, a.5; *Sum. Theol.*, I, q.14, a.15; and *Quodl.*, IV, a.17. The issue is an important one if we are to understand the development of theology from the twelfth to the thirteenth century. Between Peter of Poitiers and St. Thomas there stands the whole Aristotelian theory of knowledge, a

theory that is a closed book to the chancellor of Paris. Peter's attachment to grammar suffers from all the limitations that such an ignorance imposes. That is why a more attentive use of the suggestive article by Father Chenu on the relations between grammar and theology in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries would have been desirable (cf. M.-D. Chenu, "Grammaire et théologie aux XIIe et XIIIe siècles," *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge*, x [1936], pp. 5-28).

Anton C. Pegis

Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, Toronto

The Great Century in Northern Africa and Asia, A.D. 1800-A.D. 1914. Vol. VI of *A History of the Expansion of Christianity*. By Kenneth Scott Latourette. New York and London: Harper and Brothers, 1944. ix, 502 pages, 5 maps. $4.00.

Professor Latourette's history, concerning the grand design, magnitude and value of which the vocabularies of reviewers have long since been exhausted, here nears its end. After this sixth volume there is to be another occupied largely with summary and interpretation of the preceding narrative. To the period 1800-1914 as many volumes are given as to all the previous time, because of the power of Christianity and the sweep of its expansion in these years. "Never had the faith won adherents among so many peoples and in so many countries. Never had it exerted so wide an influence upon the human race." The book in hand describes some of the most momentous advances of Christianity in this period, and its progress in its principal missionary fields, India, China, Japan, Korea, as well as in the Mediterranean countries of Africa, the Near East, and the Indo-Chinese peninsula.

In each country the same general plan is followed. Facts of anthropology, political history, and social conditions relevant to the situation and advance of Christianity are stated. The work of all Christian agencies is described in fulness amazing considering necessary compression. The Christian movement as a whole is measured. Accounts are given, according to the author's method, of the effect of Christianity on the environment and vice versa. The quality of all this, thus meagerly outlined, is what Professor Latourette has accustomed us to. The work rests

on vast reading in primary and secondary sources, attested by bibliography and footnotes. Sure knowledge, shrewd observation, and wise judgment appear on every page. The treatment of missions of all churches is markedly impartial and sympathetic in both space and attitude. Differing methods of missionary work and their results are studied. Because churches and societies in such numbers are considered, there have to be pages that read like a catalogue, but room is found for portraits of outstanding missionary leaders and accounts of their service. Reports of the effects of Christianity on individuals and groups contribute vividness.

The great activity and advance of Christianity in Northern Africa and Asia is seen as a sign of its high vitality in Europe and America, which the author has described in earlier volumes on the "Great Century." A striking proof of this is that "The extension was chiefly by voluntary organizations supported by the gifts of private individuals." Political and economic influences were not decisive. "The primary source of the spread of Roman Catholic and Protestant Christianity was neither political nor economic, but was to be found in the great revival of the Christian faith in the nineteenth century." This revival and its continuing effects appear in that "Never before had Christianity or any other religion had so many individuals giving full time to the propagation of their faith. Never had so many hundreds of thousands contributed voluntarily of their means to assist the spread of Christianity or of any other religion." A remarkable feature of this book, as of the author's earlier volumes, is the full and appreciative consideration of Roman Catholic work. But it is his judgment, with regard to the increased strength of Christianity in the nineteenth century, that "in both numbers and influence Protestantism grew relatively much more rapidly than any other major division of Christianity."

Estimating results, Professor Latourette, as is his habit, is accurate, cautious, and discriminating. In his general summary of them he says, "Numerically the results . . . were not very impressive." In 1914 Christians numbered slightly less than one per cent of the population of India and about half of this in China. But the small number of converts was due in part to standards for baptism and communicant membership far higher than had prevailed in the previous history of Christianity. Converts "were mainly from underprivileged minorities" (as at the begin-

ning in the Roman Empire); but even so, "Indigenous leadership was arising." With this, "The churches were growing rapidly in size and inner strength." The varieties of Christianity, particularly of Protestantism, "may seem to have made for confusion and weakness," but they were "the means of bringing . . . the full richness of the historic Christian heritage." . . . "In the larger lands Christianity was having an influence quite out of proportion" to its numbers. "In almost every country . . . Christianity was rapidly gaining strength and influence and was becoming better rooted in the soil. . . . The year 1914 saw Christianity on a rising tide."

These are the statements not of a promoter, but of a conscientious historian, and they are based on unique knowledge of the facts. "The rising tide," an expression more than once used, is his judgment of Christianity in 1914. "It is not surprising that in the third of a century after 1914 the numbers of Christians doubled in some of the major countries and that in most of them the effect of Christianity mounted."

Robert Hastings Nichols

Union Theological Seminary
New York City

Black Gods of the Metropolis (Vol. III, Publications of the Philadelphia Anthropological Society). By Arthur Huff Fauset. Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1944. x, 126 pp. $2.00.

This volume analyzes the cult practices of five Negro religious groups in Philadelphia. The five are the Mt. Sinai Holy Church of America, Inc., the United House of Prayer for All People, the Church of God (Black Jews), the Moorish Science Temple of America, and the Father Divine Peace Mission Movement. For each of these, the author first gives a short case history of a member as an introduction to the discussion, and there are more such histories in an appendix of selected case materials. Then follow short statements of the origin and organization of each cult, the qualifications for membership it sets up, how it is financed, its "sacred text," its "beliefs," its "rituals," and its "practices."

The study was made principally in Philadelphia, and the field research occupied a period of more than two years. In an introductory chapter, certain problems are raised. The first of these concerns where

the Negro cults came from, which involves the question of possible African influences manifest in present-day survivals, and the history of the development in this country of Negro religious institutions. The second question is represented by the sub-heading, "What do the cults mean?" Though the intent of this designation is somewhat obscure, what is considered is, first, the separatist tendency of these groupings to split off from larger, better established ones, then a classification of these groups, and finally the proportion of Negroes who belong to them. After the data have been presented, concluding chapters give comparative analyses of various traits of the five cults studied, explore the problem of the attraction the cults have for the Negroes who join them, indicate the functional roles of these groups in terms of their bearing on the economic, educational, and political problems of the members, and then return to the questions raised in the opening chapter—the "religiosity" of the American Negro as an inborn trait, and the problem of African influences.

It is a promising field, and one which, by its very nature, calls for study of a type that can best be termed ethnological. Little is known of the sanctions and inner structure of these cults. Almost nothing is to be found in the literature concerning the theological concepts that give them validity in the eyes of their members, or the world-view they teach, which endows them with their enormous vitality. Of the details of cult practices such as initiation rites, furthermore, or the meaning of the possession experience, to name only two important items, we are quite ignorant. In the light of this serious gap in our knowledge of American Negro life, any systematic study of the cult groups is to be welcomed, and it is in terms of this fact that the present volume, like the study by R. J. Jones after which it is patterned, makes its contribution.

It is unfortunate, however, that the contribution is so slight and the findings thus so open to question. For example, it is difficult for me to see how the "beliefs" of any religious group that has enough of belief to give it cohesion can be summarized in less than a page, as is done in the case of three of the five cults examined. Also, I am extremely doubtful of the representativeness of a sample of five cults, four of which are aberrant in terms of the general type of Negro grouping with which Dr. Fauset is concerned. I refer first to the "Church of God" (modified Judaism), and the Moorish Science Temple (Moslem). Statistics are

lacking, but I would hazard a guess that the proportion of these non-Christian sects among American Negroes is very small, even in Philadelphia itself. I would term two others, "Daddy" Grace's United House of Prayer and Father Divine's Peace Mission Movement, aberrant from another point of view—they are headed by personalities who have made of them organizations of such scope and weight that they cannot be grouped with the "store-front" gatherings they are here presumably classed with. Thus, of the five, as far as I can gather from the brief descriptions, only the Mt. Sinai Holy Church might be considered typical.

There are further points on which it is necessary to enter demurrers. "Reference has been made," says Dr. Fauset in one passage (p. 87) of a concluding chapter, "to the role of the Negro cult in relieving and releasing psychological tensions, particularly in the case of Negroes who are confronted for the first time with the problems of northern urban life." Yet, one asks, are the members of these cults so largely newcomers to northern cities? Except for the non-Christian ones, how can it be said that these groupings in Philadelphia (or Chicago, or Detroit, or New York, for that matter) differ from those found in the rural South? Again, one wonders at the perspective in the discussion of motivation as concerns the leaders of these groups—the stress that is laid on the "business" aspect. I do not doubt that more than pure religious fervor activates these men and women, for they make a living, some of them, and a good one, out of their activities. Yet, what is their power over their followers? And what of the many poorer, smaller groups, where the leader is a worker like all others, and in him, as in his followers, the flame of belief burns bright? Can it be that Dr. Fauset has himself not penetrated deeply enough into the psychology of his subjects; that he has not the "feel" for religious phenomena that might permit him to delve beneath statement to sanction, beneath cult to conviction?

One other matter concerns a problem apparently of some importance to Dr. Fauset—whether or not the Negro is "innately" religious. I had not known that any serious student in recent times holds that he is. And since the discussion turns largely on a statement of mine, may I make the specific disclaimer that I do not so hold? It appears that in a recent work I phrased the following sentence: "Underlying the life of the American Negro is a deep religious *bent* (italics Dr. Fauset's) that is but

the manifestation of a similar drive that, everywhere in Negro societies, makes the supernatural a major focus of interest." The context of this statement might have made it clear that this *bent* was regarded by me as cultural, not biological; if it did not make this clear, a considerable published effort on my part during past years to combat racism might have given Dr. Fauset pause. But he first derives from this word the inference of "an inner compulsion" (p. 96); then the implication of "an almost instinctive participation by American Negroes in religious pursuits" (p. 97); and then "some inexorable law peculiar to his nature . . . or, as Herskovits expresses it, a 'drive' . . . " (p. 98). Then, in the findings, we learn that "The study does not present adequate grounds for believing that there is an instinctive religious 'bent' or 'temperament' which sets apart the American Negro from other Americans in his quest for the satisfaction of basic urges or needs through religious processes" (p. 107). This, I submit, is the straw man technique with a vengeance, and is unworthy of a student of Dr. Fauset's ability and training. I am only glad I can agree entirely and heartily with the finding.

MELVILLE J. HERSKOVITS

Northwestern University

Group Relations and Group Antagonisms. Edited by R. M. MACIVER. New York: Harper Brothers, 1944. lx, 237 pp. $2.00.

The topic announced for one of the series of luncheon conferences of the Institute for Religious Studies held in the winter of 1942-43 might well have suggested "The Conflict of Cultures" as the title for this whole series. Although the Chairman in his opening remarks at the first session announced the theme of the program as "Group Relations and Group Antagonisms," many of the speakers seemed to attribute the difficulties of their group, in part at least, to its being a minority group. It seems to me that to imply that the very real and unjust disabilities imposed on Negroes and Jews, for instance, are due to their being minority groups, is in large part misleading. If that word "minority" never entered our discussions on group relations in America, we would face our undemocratic behavior much more realistically. While it is true that the Catholics are disadvantaged in certain sections of our country, it is astonishing to find the title of "The Roman Catholic Minority" heading

the address of Dr. George N. Shuster, thoughtful and broadminded as he is. I wonder if any other people think of the enormous number of Catholics in America with their militancy as a *minority* group? For an entirely different reason, my group image of the Society of Friends never appears to me to have any minority elements in its composition. Their splendid record of continuous all-embracing charity and human sympathy for suffering makes their group image loom large.

In the clear-visioned opening address, Dr. Robert M. MacIver (who was Chairman at the meetings and Editor of this publication) made very just observations on the dangers of group images:

> These images that every group carries of every other group are misshapen images, misconceived. They do not represent the reality of the other group. In the economic field, there is the group image which employers have of workers and vice versa. In the religious demain, group images of Catholics, Protestants and Jews . . . and these group images are of the same kind, group-created and distorted.

Perhaps Dr. MacIver might have added that the group image which each of us makes of his own kind; of the group or groups to which *we* belong, economic, religious or professional, are frequently as unclear and undiscriminating as to the individuals included, as are our views of the members of other groups.

This necessity for self-analysis has been missed by a number of the speakers and it seems to me an important one, namely, that we should recognize the areas of our own intellectual or social isolationism. We are always clear about what the other fellow is doing or threatens to do to us, but we are unconscious of group-cemented snobbishness in our own kind. Perhaps we forget that a person is cultured according to the extent to which he can appreciate the worth in ways and thoughts other than those of people just like himself. There are notable exceptions to be found among these addresses. For instance, Mr. Mousheng H. Lin, speaking on "The Chinese in the United States," gave a list of American misconceptions of the Chinese and also reported quite a number of "Chinese misconceptions of the American." And in a fair-minded address on the Negro group, Professor Alain Locke says of that group: "We ourselves suffer far too much from that ingrowing complaint" (a recital of minority wrongs) "and sometimes even from self-pity and always from the morbid consciousness of being part of a minority discriminated

against. That is not either the healthy side of the picture nor the constructive side."

Another notable contribution to the necessity for self-examination of one's own group is that of Professor Douglas V. Steere, of Haverford, in his analysis of the common beliefs and bases of association in the Society of Friends, which, as I have already said, I cannot think of as a minority. Professor Steere exhibits a saving sense of humor about the disabilities of his group. Perhaps confessions of weakness are easier for those who, above all, would avoid self-righteousness. At any rate, it is there: the absence of complaint about the action of others; the stress laid on how we ourselves are acting towards others.

But these are but superficial comments on a volume of addresses which is a valuable addition to the inadequate studies now available on group relations in the modern world. We may hope that its publication will encourage other symposia exploring the relations of the individuals in existing groups to those in the new groupings in process of formation as the old attachments weaken and we strive for a more democratic society.

ROBERT D. KOHN

New York City

The University and the Modern World. By ARNOLD S. NASH. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1944. xxiv, 312 pp. $2.50.

The Humanities after the War. Edited by NORMAN FOERSTER. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944. vii, 95 pp. $1.50.

These two books have even more in common than their titles indicate. Though they are part of the voluminous flood of discussion concerning higher education in the post-war world, they are not presentations of special plans, such as A. D. Henderson's *Vitalizing Liberal Education* is for Antioch, Frank Aydelotte's *Breaking the Academic Lockstep,* for Swarthmore, or Mark Van Doren's *Liberal Education* for St. John's College. Dr. Nash, as well as Professor Foerster and his six collaborators, is deeply disturbed by the state of university education in America, and intensely aware of the fact that the schools, like the world of which they are a part, are confronted by a crisis without parallel in history. All of these authors are convinced that no significant alteration of or

improvement in education can be achieved by tinkering with the techniques of the past or by minor modifications in the content of academic curricula, but that a fundamental reconsideration of educational philosophy is required. And both the books now under review conclude that this philosophic revision demands what they would agree in calling a spiritual and, indeed, a religious reorientation. It is this latter fact which makes it especially appropriate to consider the two volumes together and which justifies extensive discussion of them in these pages.

In an important respect the two books are very different in attitude. Whereas Dr. Nash recognizes the achievements of modern science, both the natural sciences and social studies, as part of the total humanistic heritage, Dr. Foerster and most of his colleagues accept the more conventional view and see in the sciences the rival, if not the enemy, of the "humanities" for which they are fighting. Dr. Nash repudiates those historians for whom "science was hardly to be recognized as culture and hence . . . could be relegated to a position of little importance" (p. 265). He insists that "those who would build the new *Weltanschauung* ignore at their peril the experimental method and the knowledge revealed thereby" (p. xvi). It has, he adds, been his main preoccupation "to ascertain the part played by the scientific movement in the creation of the modern world and the value of scientific method in the attempted elucidation of problems both within and without the field of the natural sciences" (p. xvii). The sciences are once more to include theology as their queen, albeit as a constitutional monarch reigning but not ruling, and not determining "the nature and character of the 'non-theological' " subjects (p. 293).

As Reinhold Niebuhr points out in his brief Foreword, Mr. Nash's thesis is

> that the modern university has built its curriculum and elaborated its educational procedures upon the basis of an inadequate philosophy. . . . He rejects both a conception of freedom which fails to recognize that all human activities must be based on a definite faith; and a conception of faith which denies freedom and leads to obscurantism (pp. xi, xii).

The "inadequate philosophy" is identified by Mr. Nash as "logical positivism," though he seems to mean rather more by this designation than the phrase usually connotes.

> Nothing indicates more clearly that we are in an age of cultural decline than the

fact that logical positivism is the most influential school among younger philosophers (pp. 141-42). . . . There is little doubt that the rise of this doctrine in central Europe in the 1920's and its subsequent acceptance by so many younger thinkers in the Anglo-Saxon world in the 1930's was largely due to the fact that it fitted in with the wide-spread spirit of disillusionment with man and all his works. It seemed much better to achieve clarity than profundity (pp. 143-44).

It is asserted—though hardly proved—that Hitler's success was "largely due to his provision of a theory about living to fill the vacuum created by the older generation of fact-hypnotized professors" (p. 145). Just how "fact-hypnotized" logical positivists are also the "intellectual counterparts" of scholastic metaphysicians (p. xv) is even less apparent.

Dr. Nash finds in John Dewey's philosophy much that he regards as most reprehensible. "The inadequacy of John Dewey's instrumentalism" is evident in that Dewey "has not faced the fact that 'consequences' can only be 'tested' by criteria that transcend and yet are relevant to the consequences in question" (p. 271). Again,

John Dewey's writings on education are filled with illustrations of this tendency of the modern mind to absolutize its own criteria in the act of attacking others as arbitrary. Thus Dewey may be right in arguing that no tradition, be it that of a political party or a Church, can be accepted as the final criterion, but he is certainly wrong in assuming that therefore man does not need any such criterion at all. In practice one inevitably enters. In Dewey's case, it is that of early twentieth-century science, seen through the spectacles of an American middle-class liberal intellectual of an older generation (p. 117).

To these inadequate philosophies of "logical positivism" and "instrumentalism," Nash opposes the "Christian" viewpoint of Professors Reinhold Niebuhr and Paul Tillich, of William Temple and Fred Clarke, with frequent doses of the "scientific" philosophy of Launcelot Hogben. He quotes with approval from Clarke's *Review of Educational Thought*: "The ultimate basis of all sound education is not Enquiry but Faith" (p. 273), and puts at the head of his concluding chapter T. S. Eliot's assertion that "a Christian education would primarily train people to think in Christian categories" (p. 252).

Nash agrees with his teacher, Clarke, "that a thorough-going denial of Original Sin is one of the well-marked tendencies of modern men which must take some share of the blame for our own present troubles and be regarded as calling for corrective action by the processes of

education" (p. 274). Such corrective action could, he believes, be taken by

> Christian scholars who would view it as part of their vocation as a Christian intelligentsia to create a Christian world-view within which the conclusions of the specialized subjects of the university curriculum could be given their ultimate meaning in terms of a specifically Christian philosophy of man and of his relation to the historical process (p. 287).

From the point of view of Professor Foerster and most of his collaborators, science is characterized as "materialistic," and the civilization which is based on it is the culture of "an acquisitive society, materialistic in its interests, unhealthy in its pleasures, disillusioned in its ideals, a society moving blindly" toward disaster (Foerster, p. 26). To be sure, not all of Foerster's collaborators separate the "humanities" and the "sciences" in this way. Professor T. M. Greene's admirably lucid and persuasive essay emphasizes the need of humanistic training and discipline in morality, religion, art, and science, all in relation to one another. Dr. Abraham Flexner, though he urges the validity of scientific method in at least certain domains of humanistic study, and suggests that the distinction between the field of science and the fields of art and values may merge in "supreme moments" for the "rare genius," still insists that "science as science" is "morally neutral." To provide moral guidance and social and individual values is "The Burden of Humanism," the title of Flexner's present paper, and though he here sees industry as a mediator between science and humanism, his ultimate conception of the intellectual life still seems to be that aseptic unreality which enfeebled his discussion of *Universities, American, English and German,* in 1930. Dr. Nash, in the critical bibliography in his volume, has some witty and relevant comment on Flexner's estimate of European universities as "incomparably superior to anything which has yet been created in America" (p. 304).

In general Foerster and his collaborators defend the humanities against science—"materialistic" science. The philosophy which they hold responsible for the present low estate of humanistic studies they identify as "naturalism," which assumes "that there is nothing in life but the satisfaction of material wants," and which "sinks into materialistic apathy" (Roscoe Pound, pp. 23, 25). It is this "naturalistic philosophy" which Foerster himself indicts in the Preface to his volume, and which

he holds responsible for the "brash one-sidedness" (p. v) which teaches "that all knowledge is scientific" in contrast to that "true science" which Foerster, agreeing with Flexner, praises for its neutral attitude. Naturalistic philosophers, Foerster insists in his Preface (p. vii) are "lost in a relativism approaching nihilism," and it is therefore against them that he has assembled his cohorts. Strange to say, though this "naturalism" is a modern, nineteenth-century disease, it has its antecedents in the sty of Epicurus, towards whom Pound especially points an accusing finger (pp. 15, 24). Epicurus and Marx appear to be the forerunners of that modern naturalism against which the majority of Foerster's co-workers are struggling. These naturalists, besides being "relativistic" and almost "nihilistic," are responsible for the present plight of education, for "any educational system concerned first with process is bound . . . to be mistaken about ends" (G. K. Chalmers, p. 85).

Reading these various comments on the "naturalists" one begins to wonder just who they really are. They seem very like Dr. Nash's "logical positivists." If, as internal evidence suggests, the naturalism of John Dewey is the target, the question seems appropriate how any philosophy could more clearly emphasize than has his the intimate relationship between means and ends on which the anti-naturalists would now focus our attention. Indeed, the specific ends which the anti-naturalists here propose, the "New View of the World" which President Chalmers offers, for example, might well claim the allegiance of many "naturalists." So might the "new direction" for the humanities which Professor Foerster offers at the end of his own essay (p. 31):

> In history, emphasis will fall on the interpretation of the best that man has done. In literature and the arts, it will fall on the best that man has said and made, and might say and make. In philosophy, it will fall on the understanding and defining of man's greatness. And in religion it will fall upon that which is greater than man.

Clearly the last phrase is capable of a variety of interpretations—one suspects that Foerster himself, or some of his co-workers, would insist on a supernatural interpretation, not to say an anti-naturalistic one. Dr. Nash would doubtless require that not only the best that has been done, said, and made by man be taught in history, literature and art, but also that the worst be recognized—that man's baseness as well as his greatness be contemplated. But many naturalists would find Foerster's

entire statement acceptable, even in their religious views. If these humanists would cease attacking a "naturalism" which often seems to be a straw man set up for that purpose, and would turn instead to a flesh and blood naturalism, such as that expounded in the recent symposium edited by Professor Krikorian,[1] they might learn that they have no monopoly of humanistic ideals. Dr. Nash might be especially interested in the vigorous presentation of the viewpoint of the "older generation"—John Dewey's forthright contribution, "Antinaturalism in Extremis."

James Gutmann

Columbia University

Slavery and Freedom. By Nicolas Berdyaev. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1944. 271 pp. $2.75.

Why are American boys dying on the beachheads of France, of Italy, of Asia, of the islands of the South Pacific in the name of democracy? Because they are slaves. Why are German Nazis, Russian Communists, and Japanese believers in Shinto dying in the same war? Because they are slaves. Why are men and women all over the world falling in love, producing children and struggling to produce and bring up families? Because they are slaves. Why are philosophers, business men, statesmen, politicians, gangsters, and murderers working and thinking day and night, planning good and evil in the world? Because they are slaves.

Who then is free? Only those rare individuals, those aristocrats of the spirit who have learned to come into direct free communion with a free God, who can transcend themselves until they achieve a real free personality, and those personalities can appear anywhere in the world, in any class, in any economic condition, in any stage of intellectual development.

It is a brilliant conception that this brilliant author has given to humanity, and its key can be found on the inside of the title page where the translator comments upon the translation of Geniality, *Narodnitchestvo, sobornost.* The Russian language is remarkably rich in the possibilities of creating abstract nouns based upon the concrete, and Berdyaev takes full advantage of this fact. The ordinary man whom Christ came on earth to redeem can only take advantage of the spiritual

1. *Naturalism and the Human Spirit* (New York, 1944).

results of Christianity by becoming a personality living in the realm of the spirit rather than a person. When he reaches that stage, and views God and the essence of the world in a transcendant light, then and only then will he be able to move toward the misnamed Kingdom of God, for even belief in the superiority of God cannot fail to produce slavery, and the free man, devoted to truth ,to beauty, to God, a microcosm of the world which is completely independent and bound by no objective conception of duty or obligation—can then pass to the essence of everything and, from his developed personality, can step down to help his undeveloped brothers.

Berdyaev is interested only in the attempt to picture that man, that true member of the Communion of Saints in the traditional terminology and to show that that man alone has a real place in the eternal. From that standpoint the book is a keen analysis of the evils that have filled the world from the beginning of cosmic time and that will remain until the end. The author points out the defects, but the final remedy must still be so definitely vague in regard to this world that it hardly fits in with the attempts of the Church and mankind to carry on the struggle against evil and towards what men call freedom.

Perhaps the best judgment on the book may be that of H. G. Wells, in his introduction to the Oxford translation of Leo Tolstoy's *Resurrection*. After a bleak dawn in Petrograd, when men have

> talked of sex and love, and God and truth, and sex and cruelty, and politics and science, and cruelty and sex, and everyone is weary and chilly, someone with a good voice takes the New Testament and reads a few irrelevant texts.
>
> " 'Good,' says a fervent voice, 'A new life has dawned for me. I see the truth, I see everything.'; With a sign the intellectual and moral satiety rises to disperse."

The world is hungry for freedom, it is weary of slavery, it needs a new ideal, a new sense of the meaning of God, but that goal must be available for all who want to grasp it, it must be intelligible to the ordinary individual, and not only to the extraordinary personality. Perhaps no book in modern times has so well justified the diatribe of the Grand Inquisitor in *The Brothers Karamazov* of Dostoyevsky against the liberty that Christ preached or has made more clear the reason why Christ at the end of the story kissed the old Torquemada on his "bloodless ninety year old lips." The dictators of today may mark the limit of human degradation, but the ideal of this book might show them as self-

sacrificing angels of light in their desire to make life tolerable and intelligible for their fellow men. Berdyaev is a great thinker, a great eschatologist, but in a world in agony, this book can only be an urge to despair or madness. The Christian ideal, even with a Hell, must have some message for the overwhelming number of human beings who are struggling for a better world, who have vague visions of the future, and who are willing to sacrifice their lives for it. The spiritual aristocrats as here drawn are more deadly for a better world than are any of the classes so ably chastized.

CLARENCE A. MANNING

Columbia University.

A Preface to Prayer. By GERALD HEARD. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1944. xvi, 250 pp. $2.00.

Here is presented, in terms familiar to Western minds, a well-constructed theory of the spiritual life and a practical discipline for living it. The author has gathered skilfully from the classic mysticisms of East and West, and has made from his gleanings a system of theosophy which pretends to be also a plausible interpretation of emergent evolution and of "depth psychology." He gives "a universal frame of reference and a practice which unites any who would pray with all who pray" (p. xvi), and he believes he has found "the true Church Universal, that unbroken succession of holy men bound in love and peace with one another through their common love of God, that comprehensive and undying society which may claim to be inerrant" (p. 48).

There is a half-hearted attempt to reconcile this system with Christian thought, especially with the ideas and disciplines of the Christian mystics. This attempt probably explains the title of the book and its author's general effort to present mystical contemplation as the highest level of prayer. Though the author offers this book as a systematic apologia for prayer, in the hope that it will stimulate prayer among those who now feel no need for it, the argument is less a preface to prayer than a substitute for it. Few Christians, even the most mystical, will regard its conception of the spiritual life as anything closely resembling Christian prayer. Mr. Heard does not condemn ordinary prayer explicitly, but by relegating petitionary prayer to the "low level"

and intercessory prayer to a "middle level," reserving the "high level" exclusively for mystical contemplation or "pure consciousness," he effectually dismisses most of the conventional forms of prayer among Christians. He also repudiates "redemptorism" in favor of a doctrine of conscious evolution.

For these reasons his system might be more congenial to those Jewish and Mohammedan mystics for whom prayer is essentially "blessing God," and whose culminating expressions of piety are found in simple formulae continually repeated. It is essential to Mr. Heard's "high level" prayer of contemplation that it discourage discursive thought, that it should therefore avoid "propositions," and should confine itself to "affirmations" or "invocations," preferably monosyllabic.

> Nor should that invocation have in it any personal appeal. The soul is finding what it needs above all—loss of self—in realizing that the One Is, and that, in that fact, all else may be left as inevitably resolved. Gradually the word (God, Love, Father, the One) loses all its surface sense, but does not cease sounding, as though it had its own inherent energy. It acts like a pearl diver's rope. . . . There comes a time when the "dream diver" touches the "dream floor." The outer world of sense is gone, and if the chain of linked words has been kept going—then in the dream level the word again releases its meaning and the imagery and incidents down there deal with the search for the completed consciousness (pp. 213-214).

The aim of such "high" prayer is to silence both analytic thought and individual will, until the self is lost in integral thought (or "pure consciousness," detached from self and particular objects) and the will rests in the affirmation, "Thy Will be done." Mr. Heard asserts vigorously what he fails to explain plausibly, namely, that, though the discipline of "conscious control of consciousness" is a *via negativa,* the state of union is a positive appreciation of universal meaning:

> Integral thought grasps with an instantaneous glance and creative association the relationships of things which seem to the lower mind alien and irrelevant. . . . By saying what Reality is not, at last there dawns on the mind a super-verbal notion of what Reality-in-Itself might be. (This is the "dazzling dark" of Dionysius the Areopagite.) This is not nonsense (pp. 147-148).

Now, I am quite willing to admit that all this "is not nonsense," but it seems to me clearly and precisely a *verbal* notion. One thing that has always troubled me about mystics is their verbosity. They claim to have "super-verbal notions," but in practice they appear to be masters

of verbal systems. Mr. Heard, for instance, engages in a long, highly *analytical preface* to a spiritual life whose qualities are supposed to be quite different. If through prayer analytical thought is transcended, how account for the elaborate verbal and discursive systems by which mystics seek to make their goal intelligible even to themselves? For it will not do to reply that mystics expound mysticism only for the benefit of laymen. One way of escape from a life of uncreative dreaming is the elaborate attempt to defend dreaming scientifically. The mystical union seems not to be its own reward, for it is constantly being celebrated in rational discourse. No one can read the great mystics, not even Mr. Heard, without being impressed by the analytical labors on which they are engaged, by their urgent desire to communicate the ineffable verbally, by their skill in building systems which they themselves can understand only by careful attention to clever dialectics. Mysticism, whatever mystical experience may be, is a form of discursive philosophy. Mr. Heard's particular philosophic concern is with the theory of evolution: evolution, he explains, proceeds from biological selection, through adaptation by self-consciousness, to complete "adaptation" in "pure" or selfless consciousness.

> Consciousness has returned again to the line of evolution from which it departed when animal innocency and animal timelessness were abandoned. The Road of Life, the road to total and all-embracing consciousness, has been rejoined. The detached consciousness—detached from instinct, detached from that confining attention to matters of racial significance—has completed man's emancipation from the narrow significance of biological meaning. He has been made free that he may find (not arbitrariness and incoherence) but a larger meaning, a more perfect, more comprehensive service (p. 217).

Such a theory of evolution or progress provides a "frame of reference" in which the theory of "pure consciousness" is intelligible and significant. It is not prayer that provides a frame of reference for philosophy, but vice versa. One must be learned in the problems of discursive reason in order to discover the meaning of "super-verbal notions." From this point of view, Mr. Heard's transcription of the classic doctrines of mysticism is a major achievement and a brilliant *analytical* construction. He makes many dubious historical generalizations. For instance, he thinks the Protestants have made little or no contribution to the practice and theory of prayer, and uses almost exclusively Catholic illustrations when he criticizes the theory and practice of petition. He makes

no use of his knowledge of the Quaker forms of contemplation, of pietist prayer meetings, Methodist camp meetings, and revivalistic ecstacies. What excellent material for his purposes he could have found in Jonathan Edwards, John Woolman, Count Zinzendorf, to say nothing of the German transcendentalists! And in Oriental mysticism he oversimplifies his task by overlooking the radical differences and "analytical" follies among Eastern Schools of meditation. Historically, does it seem reasonable to regard meditation of the Oriental type as an evolution from petitionary "prayer"?

But to quarrel with Mr. Heard about historical facts would be to miss the chief point and value of his argument. Though the "universal frame of reference" for mysticism may be less real than it is to him, his outline of it is all the more impressive for being his. Any student of the history of religions will recognize in Mr. Heard's elaborate chart, entitled "The Solution of the Ego," a brilliant, eclectic, noble, three-fold path. His diagram shows, as neatly as Gautama Buddha's sermon or the Yoga Sutras did, how "the uncoiling of the spiral starts with Greed," Fear, and Ignorance, which three forces of bondage constitute "the might of the senses"; how, by a process of "purgation" and "proficiency," the soul is led upward through "the night of faith" and "the night of spirit" to "Union," in which blessed state "there is no time, there is no self," there is only "awareness that the body is the projection and shell of the spirit." This traditional language of mystical discipline is made intelligible by a wealth of illustration and analogy, taken largely from "depth psychology" and to a less extent from recent work on extra-sensory perception. In short, the value of the work is the attempt to make mysticism intelligible to a modern psychologist.

I shall make no attempt to estimate the validity of Mr. Heard's psychology, for it lies well beyond my competence to do so. I wish to call attention, however, to a notion which Mr. Heard exploits to the full and which seems to me to be thoroughly misleading. He takes "depth psychology" quite literally as a plumbing of the depths (or heights) of the human spirit, and takes for granted as many others do, equally uncritically, that ordinary consciousness is "superficial," in the sense that it does not reveal man's "deepest" needs or insights. Starting with this assumption, one concludes readily that "analytical" science and empirical knowledge are limited to "animal" concerns, and that "spirit" must

necessarily be subconscious, detached, etc. Such a presupposition begs the question at the start. I am sure that a "depth psychologist" does not mean by "depth" here "spiritual profundity." What lies buried in the depth of the subconscious may or may not be spiritually significant. The aim of the descent into the depths is usually clinical. Even Mr. Heard, when it comes to practical details, writes clinically, prescribing "exercises" for the troubled in spirit—the anxious, the sleepless, the frustrated, etc. His therapeutics may, like the more orthodox forms of Yoga, have some practical value for psychiatrists; they are a sophisticated mythology for mental hygiene. But, to assume that at the bottom of this clinical probing there lies union with God, to identify the life of prayer with a course of healing, to imagine that religious devotion is a technique for getting rid of the embarrassments of self-consciousness, this seems to me a procedure all too common today among those who seek a scientific faith. Mr. Heard has a long analysis of a Roman Catholic saint whose visions and persecutions by the devil he can readily account for as an instance of a common disease known as *poltergeistics*. But he does not wish us to infer that all saints are polter geistics or all mystics mad.

Why should we infer that religion is for "the solution of the ego"? Why should we assume that the chief function of prayer and contemplation is to get rid of ordinary consciousness? What is wrong with "analytical" thought anyway? The charges made against it by Mr. Heard are palpably absurd. To regard ordinary science as a development of greed, fear, and ignorance is as absurd as to regard mysticism as madness. Why shouldn't a reasonable man "demand comprehensibility"? (p. 149). And what is the purpose of this whole book, if not to make selflessness comprehensible? Those who, like Mr. Heard, can explain intelligibly what their mysticism aims at, and why they believe in it, can be credited with having at least verbal notions well developed. When they claim, however, to have instantaneous revelations of the unity of all things, without having any "propositions" to report at all, when they report that they are not mental idlers because they can feel themselves carried along effortlessly by the stream of evolution and are therefore creative dreamers, and other such talk, why should not reasonable men regard them as mentally irresponsible—as having verbal notions without identifiable content?

And as for prayer, why may it not have an analytic instead of an in-

tegrative function? When prayer is viewed as a form of self-analysis, petitionary prayer appears on a quite different "level." I can imagine one of Mr. Heard's mystics being rudely awakened from his "detached" contemplation by the leader of a Methodist prayer meeting with, "Brother, lead us in prayer!" Anyone who has been thus compelled to formulate petitions, or, for that matter, any President who has the duty of writing a proclamation of thanksgiving, knows the intellectual and moral predicament in which he is put. It is a very difficult thing for a reflective person to make a genuine prayer. The occasion compels at least a little analysis and decision. Certainly prayer lends itself much more readily to self-criticism and analysis than to "integral" or detached consciousness. There are many Christian theologians who share Mr. Heard's disdain for petitionary prayer, and to them this *Preface* ought to be a warning, since it indicates definitely in what direction those should move who believe that prayer is essentially mystical communion rather than a formulation of specific needs and values.

There is one aspect of Mr. Heard's system that seems to me an exceptionally brilliant and original version of mystical asceticism—what he calls "the principle of unlimited liability." If I understand it correctly, it is a reinterpretation of the doctrine of *karma* in terms of Western medicine and economics. "The whole of life is one immense company of Unlimited Liability" (p. 157). All healing of others and all suffering of one's own diseases are incidents in a communal discipline and are to be regarded as opportunities for spiritual development, i.e., as deliverance from evil. . . . There is no private salvation" (p. 157). Neither is there private property. The discipline of "purgation" and "proficiency" demand, on the economic side, that a man allot himself

> the lowest possible salary that will keep him efficient. . . . The remainder of his possessions, income, and energy go into such social works as call for his immediate attention. . . . To treat as a partner one who is still unfit for the unlimited liability which partnership demands of *both* sides, is unfair to both. . . . Yet he wishes to join in such a partnership with those who can sustain it. . . . He wishes to help form part of a creative economy (p. 240).

Accordingly he learns to live "rationedly" and trusts "the collective" to which he belongs to decide "what his particular ration should be." Thus he achieves freedom from all anxiety over the economic basis for his spiritual "efficiency," and "the social works" that call for his "im-

mediate attention" are reduced to a minimum. Each is thus liable *ad infinitum*—an economy which is admirably adapted to aid mystical absorption into the One.

HERBERT W. SCHNEIDER

Columbia University

The Wisdom of the Overself. By PAUL BRUNTON. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1943. 457 pp. $3.75.

The author calls this latest one of his many books the end of "a course," which he evidently has undergone himself. He started out as a kind of traveling salesman in spiritual curiosities and ends up as a philosopher, truly inspired by the greatness of some of the doctrines he has discovered on his way. Brunton first searched for teachers, later for the "overself," and finally develops, in this volume, the wisdom of the "overself," which is, as it were, a whole system of theology.

The book contains an account of highest, ultimate meditative achievements of a number of related Eastern systems. Brunton's scholarship cannot be doubted, though it is not of usual academic linguistic type. To question his honesty, as some reviewers have done from time to time, is an unwarranted insult. Brunton covers the field of his studies fairly well and knows practically all that is available in translations of meditation texts. He writes, "Hundreds of texts were examined in the effort to trace and collate basic ideas" (p. 13), but he rarely uses quotation marks and hardly ever gives his source. Only a few times he mentions discussions with Indian scholars or yogis, sometimes giving their names and sometimes withholding them.

Those scholastic features which we miss, are not necessary for Brunton's readers, however. After all, he does not write for Orientalists and Sanskrit scholars versed in Yoga texts, but discarding all the ballast connected with philological, anthropological, and historical research, he simply renders the latest results of his spiritual investigations in an unrestricted way, beyond geographical and historical limitations and without the provincialism of any particular narrow convention. "That which is here presented is a fresh incarnation and not a revivified corpse," he says, (p. 15). "Today I walk in utter independence of thought and, like Emerson, without school or master," (p. 16). Hardly ever will we find a Sanskrit word in Brunton's book.

Brunton compares with Blavatsky and other theosophical writers in so far as he writes, without academic references, out of the attainment of a way of thinking. In other words, Brunton has become able to think and to develop an argument and a meditation in the way the yogi in India has ever done; in fact, he is one himself and develops consequences and results of spiritual research quite as a matter of course. He handles the material as a master and not as a mere onlooker.

Strange as this approach to Indian philosophy may seem, we have to realize that it is a most valuable and needed one, because, without Brunton's reliable guidance in the ways of Indian thinking, a great many people in the Western world, feeling frustrated by academic "objectivity," would fall victim to all kinds of occultist fakers. Thus Brunton is the needed link between scholarly research, without which he himself would never have arrived where he is now, and the layman who is longing for a way of higher life as so many sense it somehow in the East. Ever so many feel today that now, once more, the East has a message to give to the West. We only need to refer to the works of Gerald Heard as an example.

Brunton has penetrated further than many others who are writing in his line. He has touched the heights of overcoming even meditative mysticism and its achievements, as Brunton calls it, in order to arrive at "philosophy," by which he means the realization that Yoga is means, not ends (p. 432). A particularity of his own thinking is that brand of idealism called "mentalism," by which he tries to establish a further going identity than is adequate between Vedanta monism on the one hand, and modern science on the other. In connection with this mentalism we may mention curious parallels between Brunton's viewpoint and pragmatistic epistomology.

Brunton has successfully avoided any conventional or wornout religious terminology—even the word "God" is not used. He writes,

> such a nebulous term as God must first be defined before it can properly be used, but it has already acquired so many different meanings in so many different intellects that a definition which would be satisfactory to all is difficult, perhaps impossible to find. Therefore we are justified in using a self-explanatory term. And such a term—the World-Mind—will henceforth be used throughout this book to indicate this universal intelligence. (p. 37).

Sometimes Brunton feels the temptation of developing more detailed doctrines out of his inspired state than is possible. In so far, he belongs

to the typical theological too-much-knowers. This is evident whenever he writes about creation and God's activities:

> The World-Mind does not need to create the universe out of nothing when it can bring it to birth out of its own self. And as a mental principle it does this by projecting the world as its idea. The world is its self-projection (p. 48).

In connection with this he calls God's first characteristic constructive imagination.

The overself, Brunton's famous discovery, is defined as the hidden meeting-point of the world-mind with each conscious being. It should not be called sub-conscious but rather over-conscious (p. 63). When Brunton states that the overself has its human habitat in the heart (p. 58), we fear that he is following certain doubtful Upanishad-passages which were, even in their own time, meant to veil or falsify a higher insight.

Is Brunton's task completed? We feel that throughout the whole course of his many publications there is still a basic lack. The ethics of the overself have not yet been developed and certainly find a much too brief formulation in this recent book. The categorical imperative of the overself, that a man may "go ahead into whatever activity his will decides upon, for he finds at last the secret of inspired action" (p. 453) is wholly insufficient. His statement on the next page that the philosopher finally "need not deny a disciplined happiness of the senses" may be merely formulated for the sake of carefulness, but certainly tastes a little of puritanical restrictions. In other words, Brunton has not penetrated into Tantra and will still have to discover Avalon to be truly great, if that is a possibility within his makeup.

FREDERIC SPIEGELBERG

Stanford University

BOOK NOTES

The People of the Book. By SAMUEL ROSENBLATT. New York: Behrman's Jewish Book House, 1943. vii, 149 pp. $2.50.

Rabbi Samuel Rosenblatt, of the Beth Tfiloh Congregation in Baltimore, Maryland, and Lecturer on Jewish Literature at the Johns Hopkins University, has dedicated to Morres Shuger, "philanthropist, patron of Jewish learning, upholder of the traditions of his people," a volume of essays, in fifteen chapters, dealing with "The People," "The Book," and the "People of the Book." This title is borrowed from a favorite phrase of Mohammed, founder of Islam, and was also utilized by the late Rabbi Maurice H. Harris for a series of textbooks; popular for many years in Jewish religious schools, before they were superseded by modern books, more suitable to contemporary tastes. Rabbi Rosenblatt has written a group of interpretative studies, which throw light upon his views regarding Jewry, Jewish ideals, and Jewish personalities. He seeks "merely to call attention to facts not generally known or hidden in learned tomes which renders them inaccessible to any but professional scholars." While it is true that the essays contain a number of items not especially familiar to the average layleader, nevertheless, the works of Jewish historians, essayists, and journalists today have done much to bring the bulk of the material to the notice of the laity.

The author has striven to find vivid titles for his chapters: For example, he says of the Bible: "It Sold More Copies than 'Gone With the Wind,' " a chapter-heading of questionable taste. In the section entitled "People of the Book," Rabbi Rosenblatt gives biographic accounts of Rabbi Akiba, Moses Maimonides, Rashi, and Yehuda Halevi—apparently collecting, in the instance of the three last named, brief articles on the recently observed anniversaries of these notables. The chapter, "Mohammed's Jewish Teachers," doubtless will have an appeal for the average reader, since it summarizes the contributions of Judaism to the culture and religion of Islam. Moreover, it concludes with the words:

> If the Mohammedan could only be convinced that the Jew has no intentions of robbing him of his spiritual heritage, there is hope that he, in his turn, will respect the Jew's political and cultural claim to the little strip of earth which became the holy land of three religions because Jews once inhabited it, and taught in it the belief in the one God, revered alike by Moslem and Jew.

In his essay, "God Has Not Changed," Rabbi Rosenblatt remarks,

> these new emphases in the Jewish conception of God that are required by the ideologies of our age are noticeable in the works of some of the foremost Jewish theologians of our time, such as those of Mordecai M. Kaplan, Louis Finkelstein and others. One may not agree with everything in their philosophy of Judaism, one may reject their system as a whole. Their service, however, in pointing out the spiritual and social implications of the Jewish ideas about God is a contribution to Jewish religious thought that all may accept wthout reservation.

It may be true that Professor Kaplan, author of *Judaism as a Civilization,* has advanced ideas regarding the nature of God which are inconoclastic, but, to the best of my knowledge, the teachings of Rabbi Finkelstein, President of the Jewish Theological Seminary, are strongly traditional in character.

The style of the essays in *The People of the Book* is fluent and pleasant. They make no great pretensions, and cannot be compared, of course, to the writings of Salo Baron, Ismar Elbogen, Abram Sachar, and others. Anyone who desires to add to his library a modest and readable volume, not to be taken too seriously, in the present richness of Jewish Literary activity, will do well to secure *The People of the Book.*

LOUIS I. NEWMAN

The Short Story of Jesus. By WALTER LOWRIE. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1943. xv, 224 pp. $2.50.

The distinguished translator and biographer of Kierkegaard is not telling a shortened story of Jesus—he is describing the one year of Jesus' career as it is set down in Mark, the shortest Gospel. His complete confidence in the chronology of this Gospel enables him to allocate sections of Q to definite times and places within Mark's framework. In spite, therefore, of the profound influence of Albert Schweitzer upon his thinking, he has really written a "liberal" life of Jesus. Form-Criticism is neither used nor mentioned. To accept it would undermine the foundations of this book, which are laid in pre-Form-Criticism scholarship. But the most ardent Form Critic cannot be deaf to the beautiful overtones of these pages, nor to the persuasiveness of the religious convictions. The reader senses the powerful dramatic elements in the Gospel of Mark as it stands.

Even though Dr. Lowrie has disavowed his former liberal position, it has left its mark upon him, partly in a tendency to rationalize certain miracles such as the feeding of the five thousand, and the walking on the water, while for subjective reasons, as he frankly confesses, he accepts the Virgin Birth and the Resurrection. The liberal attitude is also seen in his treatment of the two cycles of tradition in the middle of the Gospel, including the two feedings. Since there is no significance to be attached to the fact of the doublet, we read, "It is a dolorous observation that two traditions of the Gospel story can vary so widely as do these which we are about to study. But we are not obliged to infer that other parts of St. Mark's Gospel are as unreliable as this."

Jesus sought for solitude near Bethsaida, but was confronted by a multitude, and taught them many things. "There are the Beatitudes. In St. Luke's version the emphatic 'now' marks very sharply the brink which separates the present from the future aeon. These words were spoken on a mountain, being the beginning of the Sermon on the Mount. I believe that this was the mountain near Bethsaida." Like Schweitzer, the author is stronger in historical imagination than in exegesis. He chooses the word "now" from the third Gospel, but rejects that author's statement that the word was spoken on the plain after coming down from the mountain. It was during this retirement at Bethsaida that Jesus

chose the Cross and saw himself proceeding presently to Jerusalem to die, followed by the Twelve, who are the men that have taken the Kingdom of heaven by violence.

One of the most characteristic passages occurs in connection with the Feeding of the Five Thousand. It will give a fair idea of the prevalent tone:

> And this scene at Bethsaida was much more than a gracious idyll of contentment and good will. About it there was a glamor which was not shed by the setting sun—not of the moonlight, not of the starlight. A celestial radiance illuminated the expectant multitude, which in that moment of intense enthusiasm was capable of "seeing the things which are invisible." At such a moment they would hardly be conscious of physical hunger, and Jesus did not need to feed them with the bread which perisheth; but to their deep feeling of religious awe he responded with a religious gesture. He invited them to a sacramental meal. And they understood that a very serious and solemn act was being performed. . . . The symbolical banquet which he improvised near Bethsaida was to him a comfortable assurance that those who were his guests here would hereafter find entrance into his Father's Kingdom. Although the men who partook of this sacrament were not in like manner consciously assured, their future blessedness was not made insecure by reason of their defect of understanding . . . with all the solemnity of a priest at the altar he broke the eucharisticized bread and distributed particles to the vast congregation, till all had been fed. In a sense they were "filled," for nothing is so filling, nothing so intoxicating as the eschatological hope and a taste of the powers of the age to come.

Dr. Lowrie's familiarity with humane culture and church tradition, combined with his long experience of preaching, give his book a mellow quality; it is eirenic, and also positive and full of ardent enthusiasm.

FLORENCE B. LOVELL

The Beginning of Christianity. By CLARENCE TUCKER CRAIG. Nashville: Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1943. 366 pp. $2.75.

Professor Craig had a happy idea when he decided to write a popular introduction to the history of Christianity during the first century. He aims to prepare students for an understanding of the New Testament approached from the background of the historical religious movement that gave birth to this body of literature. The book is designed for readers who have no previous acquaintance with the subject. It is suited to the needs of college classes entering for the first time upon a study of Christian beginnings, but its avoidance of debatable technical problems makes it a useful volume for the general reader who may be interested to acquaint himself with the course of events that resulted in the rise of Christianity during the years when the New Testament books were written. The primary aim of the author is to furnish reliable historical information rather than an apologetic defense of early Christian faith, but he believes that the validity of the faith will become most truly apparent to one who approaches it from the historical point of view.

In somewhat leisurely fashion the reader is guided along the historical jour-

ney. First, the background of the Christian gospel is sketched in terms of its Palestinian setting and the contemporary state of religion among the Jews. This is followed by an account of the work of John the Baptist and Jesus. Present-day methods of recovering knowledge of Jesus are tersely described and the main features of his career and teaching are epitomized. Passing on to the life of the early Christian community in Palestine, we are told about the emergence of belief in the risen Jesus as the new Lord, the spread of the religious movement among Palestinian Jews, the conversion of Paul, the ethical standards stressed in the preaching and new phases in the thinking about Jesus. Next, the story of the early gentile mission, with its distinctive problems, is recounted down to the fall of Jerusalem in A.D. 70. The final section of the book, coming down to the end of the first century, deals with the consolidation of the Church. New stages in organization, the growth of doctrine, the conflict with rising heresy, the elaboration of moral teaching, the problems arising from persecution by the Roman authorities, and the revision of thinking about the early end of the world are rapidly surveyed.

Readers who may be already aware of the many unsolved problems now in debate among New Testament scholars ought not to look to this book for fresh light upon these controverted issues. It was not the aim of the author to discuss this type of question. He is well aware of diverging operations at many points in his discussion, but he disposes of the matter by simply asserting his own views without attempting to justify them by argument. He has shown commendable self-control in suppressing disputation in a book designed for popular consumption. But his informed attitude toward critical issues is one which the most exacting scholar will respect, even though one's own conclusions may be at variance with those of Professor Craig.

SHIRLEY JACKSON CASE

Mater Ecclesia: An Inquiry into the Concept of the Church as Mother in Early Christianity. By JOSEPH C. PLUMPE. Washington, D. C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1943. xxi, 149 pp. $2.00.

Five years ago, Professor Plumpe wrote an article on this topic in the *Transactions of the American Philological Association*, and the present monograph continues and elaborates his analysis of the data. Why is it that this title for the Church did not become common until the second half, or even the last quarter, of the second century? What gave rise to it, and where? The vogue of mother aeons, or goddesses, in contemporary religion, pagan and gnostic, is rightly ruled out; these were "wholly inconsequential factors" of the idea of the Christian Mother Church. The same holds true of the quasi-apotheohis of imperial queens. Professor Plumpe is disposed to trace the conception to the East, to Asia Minor and Phrygia in particular, since the earliest evidence implies confessors at Lyons and Vienne who were connected with Greater Phrygia. It does not seem so certain, however, that this means the introduction of Christianity into

Africa from the East; Tertullian's usage, which implies that Mother Church was a familiar term, may be otherwise explained, and so may the few allusions in Irenaeus.

In the fifth chapter, the author skilfully sketches the personification of the Church as Mother by Clement and Origen, and, in the fourth and sixth chapters, on Tertullian and Cyprian, he takes up the central conception as these North African writers applied it to the Catholic Church of their day. In the seventh chapter, on Methodius of Philippi, he shows how a mystical writer really reverts to the theology of Asia Minor, with a fresh impetus from the Pauline passage in Galatians. That passage (Gal. 4: 21 f.) was eventually changed by the addition of "all" ("Jerusalem which is above . . . is the mother of us all"), but it supplied the Old Testament hint of a celestial community with its family on earth. The Apostle himself never made it central; for him, the Church was rather the Building or the Body of Christ, and if he spoke of it as a Bride or Virgin, it was on Old Testament lines, in opposition to heresy or unfaithfulness. He never suggests, as Irenaeus does, that the Church of Jerusalem was the "metropolis" of Christianity—much less than Rome was. As Professor Plumpe puts it, "judging from the surviving documents at Rome, the concept and title were not in use at all" prior to Tertullian, and the Roman popes, down to the fourth century, did not use the title "either to designate the universal church, long after such usage had become general outside Rome" (pp. 126 f.). Why? Why is it not until Damasus that "Mother Church" comes to the lips of a Roman prelate? Partly, no doubt, because "Rome chose to assert her claim to the primacy on other grounds, historical and juridical, not on an emotional appeal imported from the East" (p. 128). But this does not account for the absence of "Mother Church" in early writers, such as Clement and Hermes, to say nothing of Ignatius of Antioch.

This is a timely and scholarly contribution to the study of early Christian terminology, which will command assent on most of the main issues. Now and then, however, some readers will hesitate. For example, the evidence that the use of faith and love together was an anticipation of the "Mother" notion, does not appear convincing. Again, while imperial Rome is "the mother of harlots" for the prophet John, there is no antithesis between her and the *alma mater*. Also, the bridal idea of the Church includes the notion of the Bride as the elect in the Fourth Gospel (3:27 ff; 6: 37 f.). As for the two allusions in Tertullian's tract on Baptism, the first, at the opening, is "characteristically fantastic," as Professor Souter has observed; it is forced exegesis to declare that in speaking of the Father and the Son one implies the "Mother, from whom the names of Father and Son derive their meaning." The second reference, at the end of the tract, describes the newly baptized coming up from the holy bath of regeneration "before your Mother spreading out your hands in prayer." Here Professor Plumpe renders *apud* by "in the house of" whereas "in the presence of" is surely sufficient. It is not certain that Tertullian's language involves "an actual house or building."

JAMES MOFFAT

The Thrill of Tradition. By JAMES MOFFATT. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1944. xii, 201 pp. $2.00.

The charm of Dr. Moffatt's last book is hinted at by the unexpected combination of ideas in the title—many concepts suggest themselves in connection with tradition, but "thrill" is not usually one of them. It is, I suspect, in a more precise sense than it bears in current colloquial speech that the author finds tradition thrilling—the quivering movement of life and power, rather than simply a momentary excitement is what he wishes us to associate with it. As he points out, the Greek word *paradosis* meant to Plato and others the oral transmission of an idea, or the inculcation of an art, rather than the handing over of a dead object. Tradition is an essential aspect of life. As such we follow it from Greek and Jewish backgrounds through the New Testament, the classic formulation of Christian tradition, into the life of the Christian Church. In religion it is, Dr. Moffatt would say, essential yet dangerous if unwatched. Instead of a preface he has given six pages of quotations, some familiar, some unexpected, bearing on both sides of the question. We must remember with Tertullian that "Christ our Lord said, I am the truth, not I am Convention" when we reflect with, of all people, James Martineau, that "To insist that religion shall owe nothing to the past, and be the same as if there were no history . . . is to require terms which the nature of man forbids and the providence of God will disappoint."

Coming to more modern times, Dr. Moffatt criticizes the "new Trent Religion" (the phrase is John Evelyn's) on Catholic grounds, as not sufficiently loyal to the central Christian tradition. (He perhaps shares the tendency of some critics to insist that ultramontanes must always be as unpleasantly ultramontane as possible.)

Another chapter deals with the question which arises when tradition becomes something "In the Way?" instead of a necessary living guide along the way. This was the problem of the Reformers; for the present day useful minor examples are taken from the religious use of traditional language, and related customs of worship and piety. Must we not sometimes change the expression just in order to retain the faith of our fathers?

The final section does not attempt to summarize, but resumes various aspects of the topic. Tradition is essential to a vital faith—like pieces on a chessboard, we can act more effectively when we are not limited to going only forward, as pawns do, but can also move freely backward or even sideways. Scholarship worn gracefully and religion discussed intelligently are the keynotes of this book, which is much more useful as well as pleasant than it would have been under some such title as "A Study of the Place of Tradition in Modern Christianity." To have written vividly on a subject so often treated ponderously is an achievement only less than writing positively on a subject so commonly abandoned to the controversialists. And Dr. Moffatt does not let us forget that the vitality of Christianity in all its forms has been found in the truly living tradition of faith and love.

E. R. HARDY, JR.

A History of Things Done Beyond the Sea by William Archbishop of Tyre; Translated and Annotated by Emily Atwater Babcock and A. C. Krey. New York: Columbia University Press (*Records of Civilization: Sources and Studies,* No. xxxv), 1943. 2 vol.; xii, 556, 553 pp. $13.50.

This translation of the history of the First and Second Crusades by William of Tyre (*ca.* 1130-*ca.* 1185) bids fair to be the standard version. Of the faithful rendering of the original little need here be said, except that for the period from 1127 to 1184 "it remains our chief primary source, and for the period before 1127 an important supplementary chronicle" (I, 38); and that William's careful sifting of all available evidence, together with a surprising degree of impartiality, makes "his usual procedure . . . almost that of a modern scholar and, to that extent, . . . superior to any of his contemporaries" (I, 30). But these two volumes are more than a mere English translation of a Latin text of high historical value. The Introduction (I, 3-49) covers all conceivable aspects of its subject (His Life, pp. 4-26; His Works, pp. 26-28; William as Historian, pp. 28-34; William as a Man of Letters, pp. 34-37; William's Influence on Later Writers, pp. 37-44; and Editorial Problems, pp. 44-49); while the very full notes, with copious documentation, and the Bibliography (II, 513-520) and Index (pp. 523-553) at once elucidate every statement made by William and furnish aid for further research. The two volumes fully measure up to the high standard of the series of which they form a worthy part.

L. H. G.

English Domestic or Homiletic Tragedy: 1575 to 1642. By Henry Hitch Adams. New York: Columbia University Press, 1943. x, 228 pp. $2.50.

This study of Elizabethan domestic tragedy was originally undertaken as the beginning of a general history of this type of drama. If the author can carry out his intention, and pursue the subject down to the days of Hebbel and Ibsen, he will have much more important and interesting materials to discuss than those dealt with here. Not even Thomas Heywood's *A Woman Killed With Kindness* rises above a rather low level of literary power, and most of the other plays are even cruder. The bulk of this thesis is necessarily devoted to the careful and clear description of dramas which have only historical importance, and not overmuch of that.

To readers of the *Review of Religion,* the most useful portion of Dr. Adams' book will probably be his account of popular theology in Elizabethan times. He has found a rich and authentic source of information in a sixteenth-century volume entitled *Certain Sermons, or Homilies, Appointed to be Read in Churches, in the Time of the Late Queen Elizabeth of Famous Memory,* which long was required to be read in the parishes of the kingdom, and which sets forth the points of doctrine most familiar to the general public of those times. It was a stern, not to say repulsive, form of Christianity which dwelt excessively upon sin and its punishment. Whatever its limitations, it proved congenial and useful to these writers of plays dealing with murder and retribution, and

Dr. Adams shows that a knowledge of this dour system of morality helps us to understand the domestic tragedies of that period. An important part of the doctrine was that God might be expected to intervene directly to bring sinners to justice. This explains the appropriateness of the latter part of the sub-title of this volume: "Illustrated with Striking Examples of the Interposition of Providence for the Amendment of Men's Manners."

ERNEST BERNBAUM

Religion and the Issues of Life. By EUGENE W. LYMAN. Association Press, New York, 1943. 140 pp.

This is a continuation and rounding off of the Hazen series of small books on great religious themes by twelve well-known authors. Nobody could be found better equipped to write such a concluding and synthesizing word than Dr. Eugene W. Lyman, Professor Emeritus of the Philosophy of Religion in Union Theological Seminary.

With a few skilful strokes Dr. Lyman shows the relation of all our major contemporary problems to religion. One of the best chapters is that which defines "the four dimensions of religion"—upward, inward, outward, forward. The chapter on religion and truth distinguishes between science as a body of facts and laws, as applied science, and as a method of throwing light on the perennial question of whether science is in conflict or working partnership with religion. Important fresh insights appear in the discussion of how religion itself can be a way to truth by the route of vision, faith, fellowship, great religious personalities, continued revelation, and the recapture of inherited truth through the Bible and the Church.

The analysis of religion and worship puts clarity of meaning into what is too often, even for devout worshipers, a vague and inchoate mood. Yet it is written from such a depth of authentic personal experience that to read the chapter is not only to understand worship better, but to be moved to worship.

The section on religion and ethics deals briefly but pointedly with both personal and social ethics. One is amazed to discover how much can be said in how few pages, without appearance of haste or superficiality, on such mammoth themes as democracy, war and peace, nationalism, racialism, imperialism, and the universality of the Christian message. A concluding chapter on religion and philosophy deals—not with the whole range of problems in either field—but with their central meeting-points in issues relating to man, nature, and history.

Without being overloaded, the book contains a wealth of apt citation from many sources. The supplement, which contains a carefully selected brief bibliography from eighteen different fields touched upon by the book, is not only a valuable guide to further study, but is evidence in itself, if any were needed, that the book is the product of a remarkably comprehensive and well-stored mind. To read it is to get a better grip on Christian faith and its message for our times.

GEORGIA HARKNESS

The Gateway to Citizenship. A Manual of Principles and Procedures for Use by Members of the Bench and Bar, the Staff of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, Civil and Educational Authorities, and Patriotic Organizations in Their Efforts to Dignify and Emphasize the Significance of Citizenship. By CARL B. HYATT. Edited by EDWINA AUSTIN AVERY. Washington, D.C.: United States Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1943. vii, 153 pp.

This little volume deserves the serious consideration of students of religion. Though it is devoted primarily to the problem of dignifying the rites of naturalization for the United States, it recognizes the intimate relation between such secular ceremonial and religion, and borrows for its purposes from sacred traditions and litanies. On the very first page there is reference to the religious character of primitive initiation rites, and a somewhat guarded expression of the hope that naturalization ceremonies, like these primitive initiations, may invest the newcomer with "a new purpose and a new strength." At the outset, too, and throughout the volume there is exhibited an all too "primitive" trait of exaggerating the collective virtues of the tribe; for example, the United States is called "the finest fraternity known to man." However, parallel with the customary patriotic rhetoric, gathered under the telling title of "creeds and codes," there is an excellent anthology of more serious literature on American citizenship. In fact, two quite different conceptions of what a naturalization rite should be are curiously jumbled here. One type of material preaches "Americanism" and "glorifies" American life; the other attempts to give formal, but informative statements of the rights and duties of an American citizen. The best "source material," I should say, comes from our Chief Justices and from "statements by foreign-born Americans," not from our political orators.

One judge explains that his aim in the ritual is "to completely change the nature of the ceremony from that of a mere formality into a natural, human, personal relationship between the individual and the court as a representative of the Government" (p. 20, note). This seems to me a mistaken notion of what any ritual should be: the initiate needs a dignified, formal introduction to American citizenship, not a personal introduction to a United States court. Ministers have a professional urge to get in the way of God! A more adequate statement is made by the author when he says: "The induction ceremony should be stripped clean of everything that fails to reflect basic ideas concerning citizenship. If the ceremonial portrays and makes impressive these ideas, then it cannot be challenged as a show or a dramatic spectacle. Those in charge must direct each and every procedure toward the end of emphasizing the worth of citizenship; otherwise the ceremony can become subject to criticism" (p. 14).

H. W. S.

Philosophy in Postwar Reconstruction. Proceedings of The American Catholic Philosophical Association, vol. XIX (1943). Issued by the Office of the Secretary of the Association, Catholic University of America, Washington, D. C., 1944. 200 pp. $2.00.

With the exception of an address by Professor Ralph Barton Perry, this volume is devoted to an exposition of those aspects of Catholic philosophy that are relevant to the making of peace and the reorganization of the world. Some of the material is technical, particularly the reports of the round table discussions, but the addresses contain precisely the kind of exposition that non-Catholics need as a basis for co-operation in pursuit of common ends.

Anton C. Pegis, of Fordham, pleads for a return to the idea of "a divinely centered man." The reference is, of course, to the medieval philosophic synthesis and historic Catholic humanism. There are two addresses on the concept of Natural Law, which is being revived in non-Catholic circles. Arthur J. Kelly, of Loyola, derives from it the limitations to which the sovereign state is subject and the essential unity of the human race. Thomas J. Riley, of St. John's Seminary, explores the concept in relation to government in the post-war world. He deplores pre-occupation with the "material concomitants, rather than the essential constituents, of human happiness." The principles of St. Thomas Aquinas are basic in world planning, "not because they are Christian or Catholic, but because they are the expression of absolute and unchanging truth."

John A. O'Brien, of Boston College, contributes an illuminating account and critique of Catholic personalism. The crucial nature of the personalists' main propositions is recognized, as is their authentic Thomist character. Maritain's distinction between "person" and "individual" is discounted—to the disappointment of this reviewer. In outlining a philosophy of education for the post-war world, John J. Wright stresses the role of philosophy in the present crisis. "As philosophers, and, in the case of some of us, as priests, we must uncompromisingly fulfil our vocations as exponents of the universals as against the dividing particulars; our vocation must remain to be the soul of the world, to hold together its divided elements, however others may tear at its unity." The insistence on the inseparability of religion and education is, happily, more acceptable than formerly outside Catholic circles.

In a plea for international co-operation in philosophy, Vernon J. Bourke, of St. Louis University, decries what he regards as the decadence of American philosophy. He thinks pragmatism is exemplified in Hitler's rampage. The matter is hardly so simple, but it must be admitted that at many points the Nazi philosophy, in its complete moral relativism, follows the pragmatic line.

A casuistic—in the good sense—discussion of the problems which the armies of occupation will encounter, in the light of Catholic principles, is furnished by Bernard McMahon.

Professor Perry makes bold to defend liberalism before a Catholic audience, giving a content to the word which differs from Catholic usage, but which his

hearers could not fail to understand. Liberalism, he says, "took the side of democracy against absolute monarchy, of the unprivileged against the privileged, of the future against the past, of reform against the established system, of scientific enlightenment against dogma, of critical inquiry against orthodoxy, of the individual against the institution." As a basis of co-operation, the Harvard professor called on the liberal to "acknowledge that his social philosophy rests on a moral principle of universal validity, neither reducible to self-interest, nor vulnerable to the charge of relativism." On the other hand, the Catholic "must abstain from polemics which attribute to liberalism as a whole the objectionable characteristics of some liberals. He must cease to charge liberals with the childish errors of confusing political secularism with philosophical atheism, tolerance with indifferentism, and liberty with license." He must also, says Mr. Perry, use restraint in spreading the concept "faith and morals" over questions of public policy and guard against excessive application of the authoritarian principle.

In an introductory statement Archbishop Stritch affirms that "Christian thought alone is capable of giving men genuine peace"; that the present crisis was made out of the errors of philosophers; and that charity, not justice, begets harmony of wills.

F. Ernest Johnson

Which Way Ahead? By Walter Russell Bowie. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1943. xi, 145 pp. $1.50.

Date With Destiny. By Ralph Washington Sockman. New York: Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1944. 157 pp. $1.50.

These two books are concerned alike with our Christian obligations for the immediate and further future. Dr. Sockman calls his book "a preamble to Christian culture," and is concerned with broad aims for the nation; Dr. Bowie is concerned with what the Church can do, and how it can accomplish its mission.

Dr. Sockman has shaped eight chapters to the eight clauses of the Preamble to the Constitution, and has endeavored to sketch the conditions necessary for the achievement of the aims there set forth. In each section there is an analysis of our chief failures and dangers on the road to a "more perfect Union," and some suggestions as to how the spirit of Christ must be applied to social problems if the desired solution is to be achieved. The result is a clear and leading, if cursory, survey of the vast complex of problems, in the author's usual striking and easy style. Once in a while his apt phrasing goes awry and produces a banal or bizarre simile, but on the whole the reading is pleasant. The great weakness, which one feels keenly in a book by a Christian minister, is the lack of any suggestion that perhaps the grace of God has something to do with the shaping of the destinies of men and nations.

Dr. Bowie has diagnosed the illness of our age somewhat more thoroughly,

with constant reference to the symptoms manifest in the body of the Church. His presentation is forthright and forceful, and the style is fluent and beautiful. There runs throughout a strong sense of urgency and the conviction that in the present situation the Church can find opportunities for fulfilling its high mission in greatness and strength. Not that this is another book of general aims and hopes: the chapters are full of wise and specific proposals for the working out of the immediate problems each parish and community faces. Especially striking is the plan for a democratic and working parish organized on the basis of a frank analysis of the congregation as it actually is. Dr. Bowie faces concrete problems and difficulties, and his solutions combine thorough knowledge and tempered vision.

HOLT GRAHAM

The Five Books of Moses. Selected and translated for Jewish youth by BEN-AMI SCHARFSTEIN. New York: Shilo Publishing House, 1944. x, 219 pp.

A very attractive book, and one which Gentile as well as Jewish children would enjoy and profit by. The author's aim to remove such obstacles as archaism and unintelligibility, and to achieve simplicity without sacrificing dignity, is most satisfactorily achieved.

Juridical Folklore in England, Illustrated by the Cucking-Stool. By JOHN WEBSTER SPARGO. Durham, N. C.: Duke University Press, 1944. vii, 163 pp. $2.50.

This learned monograph will be of more interest to students of linguistics, folklore, and history of law than to students of religion, although this peculiar form of punishment (ducking) for scolds is clearly derived from the biblical conception of the tongue as a member dangerous to the soul: "And the tongue is a fire, . . . it defileth the whole body, and setteth on fire the course of nature; and it is set on fire of hell" (James 3:6). What more natural than to extinguish it in the nearest stream?

The Voice in the Wilderness. By FLORENCE L. IVES. Boston: Bruce Humphries, Inc., 1944. 239 pp. $2.00.

A devotional book composed of quotations from the Bible grouped under subject headings such as God the Father, The Messianic Christ, The Holy Spirit, The Adversary, The Covenant, etc., with an Argument at the end of each chapter summing up the teaching conveyed by the passages quoted.

AMONG THE PERIODICALS

Ancient Religions

The Attic Orgeones. By William Scott Ferguson. *Harvard Theological Review,* xxxvii (1944), 61-40.

The Cult of Heroes. By Arthur Darby Nock. *Harvard Theological Review,* xxxvii (1944), 141-73.

Sambathis. By Herbert C. Youtie. *Harvard Theological Review,* xxxvii (1944), 209-18.

The Goddess in Canaanite Folk Religion. By James B. Pritchard. *Crozer Quarterly,* xxi (1944), 106-17.

Lithuanian Legends and Fairy Tales. By E. J. Harrison. *Aryan Path,* xv (1944), 312-19.

Oriental Religions

The Fundamentals of Buddhism. By U Ba. *Maha-Bodhi,* lii (1944), 11-27.

The Guru Tsongkhapa of Tibet. By Vaihindra Mantramitra and Ananda Baltari. *Middle Way,* xix (1944), 29-32.

Tagore à Bolpur. By Gabriel-M. Lussier. *La Nouvelle Relève,* iii (1944), 269-78.

Self-Effort or Grace. By S. K. Maitra. *Vedanta Kesari,* xxxi (1944), 8-14.

Self, World and the Absolute in Advaitavada. By S. N. L. Shrivastava. *Vedanta Kesari,* xxxi (1944), 98-102; 123-26.

Samaveda—A Note. By Jagadish Chandra Mitra. *Prabuddha Bharata,* xlix (1944), 296-98.

The Philosophy of Divine Leela. By Akshaya Kumar Banerjee. *Prabuddha Bharata,* xlix (1944), 275-81; 311-16.

The God-Guru Conception. By A. P. Arokiasamy. *Vedanta Kasari,* xxxi (1944), 58-64.

Whither Indian Charity? By John Barnabas. *Aryan Path,* xv (1944), 261-67.

Caste in the Medical Profession. By B. Bhattacharyya. *Aryan Path,* xv (1944), 268-72.

India at the World-Exhibition of 1944. *Vedanta Kesari,* xxxi (1944), 3-7; 49-53; 73-79.

Dominant Ideas in the Formation of Islamic Culture. By G. Levi Della Vida. *Crozer Quarterly,* xxi (1944), 207-16.

A Fatwa on the "Ascension of Jesus." By C. C. Adams. *Moslem World,* xxxiv (1944), 214-17.

The Secret of Sacrifice in I'Dul-Adha. By Hazrat Mirza Ghulam Ahmad. *Moslem Sunrise,* xvi (1944), No. 2, 5-8.

The Love of God. By Imam Abu Hamid Muhammad Al-Ghazali. *Moslem Sunrise,* xvi (1944), No. 2, 9-18.

Adepts and Adept Writings. By John Roger. *Theosophical Forum,* xxii (1944), 343-48.

The Three Spiritual Heroes of the Bahai Movement. By John Haynes Homes. *New History,* xiii (1944), No. 11, 3-15.

Judaism

The Meaning of Judges 5 8b-13. By Charles Goodwin. *Journal of Biblical Literature,* lxiii (1944), 257-62.

The Oracles of Balaam. By W. F. Albright. *Journal of Biblical Literature,* lxiii (1944), 207-33.

Psalm 47. By James Muilenburg. *Journal of Biblical Literature,* lxiii (1944), 235-56.

The Archaeological Background of Some Passages in The Song of Songs. By Samuel Krauss. *Jewish Quarterly Review,* xxxv (1944), 59-78.

A Wedding Song for Solomon. By Robert Gordis. *Journal of Biblical Literature,* lxiii (1944), 263-70.

The Immortality of the Soul According to Judaism. By Samuel M. Segal. *Religion in Life,* xiii (1944), 562-67.

Jewish Mysticism. By Jacob S. Minkin. *Journal of Religion,* xxiv (1944), 188-200.

A Perennial Pattern of Prejudice. By Bernard Heller. *Religion in Life,* xii (1944), 397-408.

The Jews of Kurdistan a Hundred Years Ago: A Traveler's Record. By Walter J. Fischel. *Jewish Social Studies,* vi (1944), 195-226.

Jewish Identity in the Modern World. By Max Arzt. *Reconstructionist,* x (1944), No. 10, 9-14.

Christianity: Historical

Church History and Secular History. By James Hastings Nichols. *Church History,* xiii (1944), 87-99.

Christianity and History. By Jack Finegan. *Religion in Life,* xii (1944), 358-67.

On the Temptations of Christ and Zarathushtra. By Herbert Pierrepont Houghton. *Anglican Theological Review,* xxvi (1944), 166-75.

The Crucifixion Calendar. By Grace Amadon. *Journal of Biblical Literature,* lxiii (1944), 177-90.

Studies in Texts. By W. K. Lowther Clarke. *Theology,* xlvii (1944), 131-33.

The Sources of the Fourth Gospel. By Edwin C. Broome, Jr. *Journal of Biblical Literature,* lxiii (1944), 107-23.

Is John an Alexandrian Gospel? By Alfred M. Perry. *Journal of Biblical Literature,* lxiii (1944), 99-106.

The Early Circulation of Paul's Letters. By Lucetta Mowry. *Journal of Biblical Literature,* lxiii (1944), 73-86.

Relationship of the Shepherd of Hermas to the Epistle of James. By Oscar J. F. Seitz. *Journal of Biblical Literature,* lxiii (1944), 131-40.

Glossolalia in the Apostolic Church. By Ira Jay Martin, 3rd. *Journal of Biblical Literature,* lxiii (1944), 123-31.

Arabia in the New Testament. By Eric F. F. Bishop. *Moslem World,* xxxiv (1944), 192-98.

The Informality of Early Christianity. By HENRY J. CADBURY. *Crozer Quarterly,* XXI (1944), 246-50.

The Development of the Early Ministry. By MASSEY HAMILTON SHEPHERD, JR. *Anglican Theological Review,* XXVI (1944), 135-50.

The Equal Ministry of Men and Women in the Church. By DOROTHEA BELFIELD. *Religions,* No. 48 (July, 1944), 6-10.

The Fierce Tertullian. By CARROLL E. SIMCOX. *Holy Cross Magazine,* LV (1944), 209-13.

Evidences of Christianity in Egypt During the Roman Period. By H. I. BELL. *Harvard Theological Review,* XXXVII (1944), 185-208.

Dante. By HENRY M. BATTENHOUSE. *Religion in Life,* XIII (1944), 586-600.

The Marian Exiles—Denizens or Sojourners? By FREDERICK A. NORWOOD. *Church History,* XIII (1944), 100-10.

The Significance of Luther's Earliest Extant Sermon. By H. S. BLUHM. *Harvard Theological Review,* XXXVII (1944), 175-84.

The Doctrine of Infant Salvation. By ALAN H. HAMILTON. *Bibliotheca Sacra,* CI (1944), 342-56.

Let the People Pray. By GEORGE SIMMS. *Theology,* XLVII (1944), 122-26.

Beauty for Ashes, or The 1949 Prayer Book. By J. H. M. STANIFORTH. *Theology,* XLVII (1944), 170-75.

Le culte protestant et la musique. By PIERRE PIDOUX. *Revue de théologie et de philosophie,* XXXII (1944), No. 130, 18-35.

An Obscure Chapter of Quaker History. By HENRY S. CADBURY. *Journal of Religion,* XXIV (1944), 201-13.

Kierkegaard—The Danish Jeremiah. By DAVID WESLEY SOPER. *Religion in Life,* XIII (1944), 522-35.

The Christian Heritage of Nonresistance. By D. ELTON TRUEBLOOD. *Religion in Life,* XII (1944), 409-17.

One of "The Seven against Christ." Henry Bristow Wilson, 1803-1888. By D. L. SCOTT. *Modern Churchman,* XXXIV (1944), 31-39.

Our American Theological Heritage. By HUGH THOMPSON KERR, JR. *Christendom,* IX (1944), 344-53.

"Probationers for Eternity." Notes on Religion in the United States in the Year 1800. By PETER OLIVER. *Harvard Theological Review,* XXXVII (1944), 219-25.

Alfred Loisy. By R. D. RICHARDSON. *Modern Churchman,* XXXIV (1944), 64-68.

The Martyrdom of a Liberal Spanish Cardinal. By LAWRENCE FERNSWORTH. *Protestant,* V (1944), No. 10, 32-33.

William Adams Brown—1865-1943. By SAMUEL MCCREA CAVERT. *Religion in Life,* XII (1944), 341-49.

CHRISTIANITY: CONTEMPORARY

China and the World Church. By MILDRED CABLE. *World Dominion,* XXII (1944), 219-23.

The Sinarquists Try Murder. By CESAR ORTIZ. *Protestant,* V (1944), No. 9, 14-17.

The Vatican and Latin America. By O. I. Roche. *Protestant,* v (1944), No. 10, 27-30.

Latin Quebec. By Mary Curtice. *Protestant,* v (1944), No. 10, 30-32.

The Voice of the Andes. By C. W. Jones and R. E. Larson. *World Dominion,* xxii (1944), 142-46.

Hickey over Cambridge. By Ben Richardson. *Protestant,* v (1944), No. 10, 18-22.

What Does the Church Think of Us? By George N. Shuster. *Current Religious Thought,* iv (1944), No. 6, 7-10.

Confessional Theology and the Anglican Church. By R. P. McDermott. *Theology,* xlvii (1944), 133-37.

The Place of the Cathedrals. By D. R. Hutchinson. *Theology,* xlvii (1944), 175-80.

A Protestant Critique of Anglicanism (Church Congress Syllabus 8: "The Anglican Tradition," Part v). By Paul Lehmann. *Anglican Theological Review,* xxvi (1944), 151-59.

Definitely Encouraging. Statement of Purpose of the Episcopal Evangelical Fellowship. *Chronicle,* xliv (1944), 221-22.

Liberal Theology and Churchmanship. By James Parkes. *Modern Churchman,* xxxiv (1944), 23-30.

The Church Penitent. By Vida Scudder. *Holy Cross Magazine,* lv (1944), 195-98.

"A World Adrift." By Helen Wodehouse. *Hibbert Journal,* xlii (1944), 300-9.

The Recovery of Christian Worship. By G. C. Edmonds. *Congregational Quarterly,* xxii (1944), 235-41.

Religious Education Becomes Ecclesiastical Propaganda in Diocese of New York. *Chronicle,* xliv (1944), 198-99.

When Symbolism Becomes Dangerous. By Oscar Frederic Green. *Chronicle,* xliv (1944), 204-6.

Protestantism's Inner Conflict. By William Clayton Bower. *Christendom,* ix (1944), 290-301.

Orthodoxie contre libéralisme. Un proces à reviser. By Franz-J. Leenhardt. *Revue de théologie et de philosophie,* (1944), No. 131, 49-74.

Conservatism States Its Case. By Hillyer H. Straton. *Religion in Life,* xii (1944), 430-37.

People's Congress of Applied Religion. By Henrietta Buckmaster. *Protestant,* v (1944), No. 9, 4-6.

American Lutheranism at the Crossroads. By O. H. Pannkoke. *Christendom,* ix (1944), 354-68.

The Case for the Cults. By Gerald E. Richter. *Religious Digest,* xvii (1944), No. 107, 69-74.

The Holy Rollers Roll Along. By Jack Warren Moore. *Christian Horizons,* vi (1944), No. 4, 5-8.

Moslem Converts. By J. Christy Wilson. *Moslem World,* xxxiv (1944), 171-84.

The Future of Christianity in China. By CHAN WING-TSIT. *Religion in Life,* XIII (1944), 568-77.

The World Council of Churches and the War Emergency. By HENRY SMITH LEIPER. *Religion in Life,* XIII (1944), 483-94.

A Christian Insight into Post-War Economics. By CHARLES D. KEAN. *Christianity and Society,* IX (1944), No. 3, 12-17.

A Handbook on Post-War Reconstruction: Religious Aspects. By LESLIE T. PENNINGTON. *Journal of Liberal Religion,* VI (1944), 36-46.

Selected Pamphlets, 1943-44. *Information Service, Federal Council of Churches,* XXIII (1944), No. 28.

GENERAL THEORY OF RELIGION

Aristotle's Natural Theology. By BERTRAND J. CAMPBELL, O.F.M. *Franciscan Studies,* XXV (1944), 134-50.

The Ethical Significance of the Crucifixion and Resurrection. By W. BURTON EASTON, JR. *Christianity and Society,* IX (1944), No. 3, 34-39.

Une morale chrétienne, est-elle possible? By EDMOND GRIN. *Revue de théologie et de philosophie,* XXXII (1944), No. 130, 5-17.

"Thou shalt not kill." By PRYNS HOPKINS. *Freedom,* III (1944), 278-91; 362-73.

Man's Fall in Martin Heidegger's Philosophy. By ERNEST H. FREUND. *Journal of Religion,* XXIV (1944), 180-87.

Adler and the Existence of God. By WILLIAM BRYAR. *New Scholasticism,* XVIII (1944), 270-83.

A Philosophic Approach to the Incarnation. By H. BULLOCK. *Modern Churchman,* XXXIV (1944), 75-81.

God's Foreknowledge and Man's Free Will. By CLEMENT ROGERS. *Modern Churchman,* XXXIV (1944), 47-54.

Freedom of the Will and Psychology. By LOUIS A. J. MERCIER. *New Scholasticism,* XVIII (1944), 252-61.

Godward Aspect and Sacrifice. By WILLIAM E. WILSON. *Congregational Quarterly,* XXII (1944), 219-27.

An Inner Conflict in the Christian Life. By W. S. URQUHART. *Hibbert Journal,* XLII (1944), 328-34.

In Defense of the Otherworldly. By JOHN WOOLMAN BRUSH. *Crozer Quarterly,* XXI (1944), 232-37.

A Man and His Solitariness. By E. M. ROWELL. *Hibbert Journal,* XLII (1944), 323-27.

Further Woe and Wickedness. By PRYNS HOPKINS. *Freedom,* III (1944), 193-206.

Personalism As a World Movement. By THE EDITOR. *Personalist,* XXV (1944), 230-42.

Personalism As the Basis of Religious Experience. By PAUL R. HELSEL. *Personalist,* XXV (1944), 276-86.

The Personalistic Movement in Psychology. By HERBERT L. SEARLES. *Personalist,* XXV (1944), 243-55.

What Is Man? By MORDECAI M. KAPLAN. *Reconstructionist,* X (1944), No. 9, 9-13.

A Contribution to the Problem of Immortality. By HENRY LANZ. *Philosophical Review,* LIII (1944), 321-36.

Scientific Religion. By GEORGE W. HARBUCK and COY WYNN. *Christian Horizons,* VI (1944), No. 4, 2-4.

Natural Law and the Nature of Man. By PAUL RAMSEY. *Christendom,* IX (1944), 369-81.

Real Life is Being. By MARTIN JARRETT-KERR. *Theology,* XLVII (1944), 154-58.

Una Filosofia Cristiana de la Vida. By PEDRO GRINGOIRE. *Luminar,* VI (1944), 271-85.

La Filosofia Existencial y la Filosofia de la Vida. By WALTER CERF. *Luminar,* VI (1944), 233-44.

Whitehead's Idea of God. By STAR M. HEIMSATH. *Anglican Theological Review,* XXVI (1944), 129-35.

Ely on Whitehead's God. By BERNARD M. LOOMER. *Journal of Religion,* XXIV (1944), 162-79.

The Religion of Liberal Politics as Seen in Thomas Jefferson. By KERN EUTSLER. *Christianity and Society,* IX (1944), No. 3, 18-25.

Reformed Materialism and Intrinsic Endurance. By R. W. SELLARS. *Philosophical Review,* LIII (1944), 359-82.

A Symposium: A Centenary Appraisal of Julius Wellhausen. *Journal of Bible and Religion,* XII (1944), 160-80.

The Dark Night of the Soul. By GEORGIA HARKNESS. *Religion in Life,* XII (1944), 333-40.

The Story of a Soul in Conflict. By P. J. *Prabuddha Bharata,* XL (1944), 250-60.

A Personal Analytic Approach to the Problem of the Holy Name. By NANDOR FODOR. *Psychoanalytic Review,* XXXI (1944), 165-80.

Vachel Lindsay Number. *Shane Quarterly,* V (1944), Nos. 2-3.

Religious Values in Modern Poetry. By CECIL F. WILSON. *Religion in Life,* XII (1944), 438-50.

Poetry and the Spiritual Life. By ESTHER ORLANDER. *Message of the East,* XXXIII (1944), 147-56.

Religion in Some Current Novels. By MORTIMER J. COHEN. *Reconstructionist,* X (1944), No. 10, 19-24.

Art in a Post War World. *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism.* Special issue. III (1944), No. 9-11.

How Beautiful Are Thy Tabernacles! By JUDE MEAD, C.P. *Liturgical Arts,* XII (1944), 87-90.